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Over the past few decades, the volume of international migrants has
increased considerably. As a result, impacts of international migration on mi-
grants’ communities of origin have become much more prevalent and diverse.
Using both quantitative and qualitative methods, this dissertation investigates
a little studied aspect of such diverse impacts: the impact upon ethnic struc-
tures and relations in migrants’ communities of origin. More specifically, I
examine to what extent international migration affects the level of socioeco-
nomic inequality across ethnic groups and how such impacts influence indige-
nous people’s ethnic identity in two Central American countries: Guatemala
and Nicaragua. I contend that ethnic identity shift is one of the most signif-
icant changes that international migration brings to these countries because
such a shift can even endanger the existence of the indigenous population. I
vii
have found that international migration reinforces ethnic identity shift from
indigenous to Mestizo in both countries. At the same time, the pace of such a
shift differs by a community’s characteristics including its demographic com-
position and definition of indigenousness. While it is hard to deny the fact
that international migration provides indigenous people in both countries eco-
nomic opportunities that are hard to obtain through other ways, it can also
have unexpectedly negative effects on ethnic minorities and their cultures in
the long run. Since indigenous people in both countries face a tough economic
reality, it is difficult to prevent them from migrating to other countries. In
such a situation, to conserve indigenous cultures and prevent more indigenous
people from abandoning their ethnic identities, we need to assure that indige-
nous people can feel pride in their cultures while they participate in national
economy and politics under the strong pressure caused by changes originating
from international migration and multicultural reforms. Understanding how
the definition of indigenousness is constructed and transformed as well as a
mechanism of ethnic identity shift is an essential step to finding solutions to
the dilemma related to international migration among indigenous people and





List of Tables xiii
List of Figures xv
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
1.1 Research Problem and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Aims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Organization of Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chapter 2. Theoretical Overview 10
2.1 Indigenous Peoples of Guatemala and Nicaragua . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 International Migration from Guatemala and Nicaragua . . . . 19
2.2.1 Factors Affecting International Migration . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.2 Impacts of International Migration on Sending Commu-
nities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3 International Migration, Multicultural Reforms, and Ethnic Iden-
tity Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Chapter 3. Methodology 52
3.1 Mixed-Methods Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2 Statistical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.1 Data Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.2 Principal Component Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
ix
3.2.3 Bayesian Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3 Primary Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.1 Research Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3.2 Survey Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3.3 Focus Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3.4 In-Depth Interview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4 Agent-Based Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Chapter 4. Ethnic Differentials in the Selectivity of Migrants
and Remittance Recipient Households 73
4.1 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3 Modeling Strategy and Explanatory Variables . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4.1 The Selectivity of Migrant Households . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4.2 Migrant Household Selectivity in Cantel and Bilwi . . . 91
4.4.3 The Selectivity of Economic Remittance Recipient House-
holds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Chapter 5. Ethnic Differentials in Effects of Economic Remit-
tance on Recipient Households 111
5.1 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3 Modeling Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3.1 Economic Remittances and Income Inequality . . . . . . 114
5.3.2 Economic Remittances and Children’s Schooling . . . . 118
5.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.4.1 Economic Remittances and Income Inequality . . . . . . 120
5.4.2 Economic Remittances and Children’s Schooling . . . . 127
5.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
x
Chapter 6. Impacts of International Migration on Ethnic Struc-
tures in Cantel and Bilwi 143
6.1 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6.2 Data and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.3.1 Impacts of International Migration on Socioeconomic Struc-
tures and Social Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.3.2 Migrant Household as Social Status . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.3.3 Ethnic Markers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.3.3.1 Residential Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.3.3.2 Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6.3.3.3 Traditional Clothes and Skin Color . . . . . . . 162
6.3.4 Image of Indigenousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.3.5 Inter-ethnic Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Chapter 7. International Migration and Ethnic Identity Shift in
Guatemala and Nicaragua 170
7.1 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
7.2 Ethnic Identity as Social Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7.3 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7.3.1 Model Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7.3.2 Modeling Ethnic Identity Mechanism: Transmission on
the Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
7.3.3 Ethnic Image Transformation and Rewiring Process . . 184
7.3.4 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
7.4 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
7.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Chapter 8. Conclusions 205
8.1 Impacts of International Migration on Inhabitants of Sending
Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
8.2 A Review of the Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
8.3 Impacts of International Migration on Ethnic Identity . . . . . 214
xi
Appendices 221
Appendix A. Results from Multilevel Probit Regression 222





4.1 Percentage Distribution of Demographic Characteristics of House-
holds in Guatemala, 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2 Percentage Distribution of Demographic Characteristics of House-
holds in Nicaragua, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3 Multilevel Logistic Regression Predicting the Logged Odds of
Becoming a Migrant Household in Guatemala, 2002 . . . . . . 84
4.4 Multilevel Logistic Regression Predicting the Logged Odds of
Becoming a Migrant Household in Nicaragua, 2005 . . . . . . 89
4.5 Percentage Distribution of Demographic Characteristics of House-
holds in Cantel, 2002 and Bilwi, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.6 Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting the Logged Odds of
Becoming a Migrant Household in Cantel, 2002 . . . . . . . . 94
4.7 Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting the Logged Odds of
Becoming a Migrant Household in Bilwi, 2005 . . . . . . . . . 99
4.8 Percentage Distribution of Demographic Characteristics of House-
holds in Guatemala, 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.9 Percentage Distribution of Demographic Characteristics of House-
holds in Nicaragua, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.10 Multilevel Logistic Regression Predicting the Logged Odds of
Becoming an Economic Remittance Recipient Household in Guatemala,
2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.11 Multilevel Logistic Regression Predicting the Logged Odds of
Becoming an Economic Remittance Recipient Household in Nicaragua,
2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Characteristics of House-
holds, Guatemala, 2006 and Nicaragua, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.2 Multilevel Linear Regression Predicting Non-Remittance Income
among Non-Recipient Households in Guatemala, 2006 and Nicaragua,
2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.3 Gini Indices Comparisons: Observed vs. No Remittances and
No Migration Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
xiii
5.4 Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Characteristics of School
Attendance among Children of Household Heads in Guatemala,
2006 and Nicaragua, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.5 Cox Hazard Models Predicting the Risk of School Dropout
among Guatemalan Households, 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.6 Cox Hazard Models Predicting the Risk of School Dropout
among Nicaraguan Households, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.7 Cox Hazard Models Predicting the Risk of School Dropout
among Guatemalan Indigenous Households, 2006 . . . . . . . 135
5.8 Cox Hazard Models Predicting the Risk of School Dropout
among Guatemalan Non-Indigenous Households, 2006 . . . . . 136
5.9 Cox Hazard Models Predicting the Risk of School Dropout
among Nicaraguan Indigenous Households, 2005 . . . . . . . . 138
5.10 Cox Hazard ModelsPredicting the Risk of School Dropout among
Nicaraguan Non-Indigenous Households, 2005 . . . . . . . . . 139
7.1 Description of States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
7.2 Description of Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
7.3 List of Parameter Values Fixed in the Current Chapter . . . . 189
A.1 Multilevel Probit Regression Predicting Households’ Remittance
Recipient Status in Guatemala, 2006 and Nicaragua, 2005 . . 222
xiv
List of Figures
7.1 Scheme of Indigenous Ethnic Identity Shift . . . . . . . . . . . 180
7.2 Two Distributions of Images of Indigenous Groups at Popula-
tion Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
7.3 Results from Simulation Runs with a Narrow Image Distribu-
tion at the Population Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
7.4 Results from Simulation Runs with a Wide Image Distribution




1.1 Research Problem and Objectives
Over the past few decades, the volume of international migrants has in-
creased considerably. Ostensibly, their migration patterns have become much
more diverse and complex. As a result, impacts of international migration on
sending societies (migrants’ communities of origin) have become much more
prevalent and diverse. This dissertation investigates a little studied aspect
of such diverse impacts brought by international migration: the impact upon
ethnic structures and relations in sending societies. More specifically, I ana-
lyze to what extent international migration affects the level of socioeconomic
inequality across ethnic groups and importantly, how such impacts influence
indigenous people’s ethnic identity among indigenous groups in two Central
American countries: the K’iche’ group in Guatemala and the Miskitu group
in Nicaragua.
Although classical sociological theorists such as Karl Marx and Max
Weber suggested that the importance of ethnicity would decline through mod-
ernization and social changes, ethnicity has become a key concept in explain-
ing the formation of nation-state, political and social movements, and inter-
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national migration patterns in various Latin American countries. However,
despite the increasing volume and importance of the Latin American inter-
national migration stream, especially to the United States, and the severe
level of inequality and discrimination in the region that are largely defined
by ethnicity, few studies have examined what international migration tells us
about ethnicity-related issues including unequal ethnic relations and changes
in ethnic identity in sending communities.
On the other hand, ethnic identity shift among migrants and their fam-
ilies has been discussed extensively in research on international migration in
terms of assimilation in receiving countries (Alba and Nee 1997; Portes and
Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994). One reason for the lack of such research focusing
on migrant sending communities can be attributed to the fact that research
on assimilation in receiving countries mainly examines the second and later
generations of migrants. In addition, it is rare to observe ethnic identity shift
among people left behind in European countries that sent a number of mi-
grants to the New World. This is not the case in Guatemala and Nicaragua
where changes in ethnic identity may occur over the course of a person’s life.
I posit that ethnic identity shift is especially relevant in various Latin Amer-
ican countries including Guatemala and Nicaragua where ethnic boundaries,
especially between the mainstream Mestizo group and ethnic minorities have
rarely been clear.
Ethnic identity shift, I contend, is one of the most significant changes
that international migration brings in Guatemala and Nicaragua because such
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a shift can transform these countries’ ethnic structures and even endangers
the existence of the indigenous population in these countries. Additionally,
the decrease in the proportion of ethnic minorities in these countries can ob-
scure social problems closely tied to one’s ethnic background. In this regard,
international migration and multicultural reforms, which have also influenced
Guatemala and Nicaragua’s ethnic structure drastically over the past decade,
may have a very similar impact on indigenous groups in these countries. As
Hale (2002) argues on multicultural reforms, both international migration
and multicultural reforms offer indigenous people unprecedented opportuni-
ties and perils at the same time. The author argues that such a paradoxi-
cal phenomenon takes place because multiculturalism in Latin America has
emerged “in the general context of neoliberal political and economic reforms”
(2002:493). As a result, even though changes that took place under the cur-
rent neoliberal agenda may seem drastic, the majority of indigenous peoples
cannot benefit from these changes. Rather, since Guatemalan and Nicaraguan
indigenous peoples belong to the poorest group in their countries, the increase
in the gap between the rich and the poor that took place under the neoliberal
multiculturalism suggests that indigenous peoples can be socioeconomically
more vulnerable today.
I argue that international migration may exacerbate the situation that
surrounds indigenous people because it is unlikely that international migration
equally benefit the whole population due to its selective nature. Hence, rather
than reinforcing indigenous ethnic identities among migrant households, inter-
3
national migration may lead them to abandon their ethnic identities. Such a
shift will be easier when Mestizo cultural patterns including food consump-
tion and costume are introduced into traditionally indigenous communities.
For example, Popkin (2005) has observed in Guatemala that international mi-
gration has resulted in the establishment of new ethnic boundaries within the
municipality of Santa Eulalia. The author has found that some migrants and
their household members adopted behaviors that people in the municipality
associate with Ladino (mixed-blood) Guatemalans.
Therefore, while we cannot negate the fact that both international mi-
gration and multicultural reforms do offer indigenous groups opportunities,
without resolving fundamental problems such as the very high ethnic inequal-
ity level, the majority of indigenous people cannot take advantage of these
new opportunities. As a result, both multicultural reforms and international
migration may simply widen the gap between and within ethnic groups that
may weaken community cohesion. Given the increasing importance of in-
ternational migration on country’s economy and culture in both Guatemala
and Nicaragua, a failure to examine the relationship between international
migration and ethnic identity in these countries constitutes a deficiency in
knowledge to construct true and robust multicultural society that would en-
courage Guatemalan and Nicaragua indigenous people to preserve their ethnic
identities and cultures.
There are various reasons why international migration can affect ethnicity-
related factors in Guatemala and Nicaragua. By focusing on Guatemala and
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Nicaragua, the two countries that share various similarities (e.g. severe so-
cioeconomic difficulties and discrimination that indigenous groups face) but
also present fundamental differences (e.g. different degrees of multicultural
reforms, collective memory of the civil war that took place in these countries,
and the average level of educational attainment) from each other, I will be
able me to test my hypotheses and answer research questions. By comparing
the two cases, I aim to identify factors that are most likely affected by interna-
tional migration and what changes in such factors mean for ethnic identity and
relations as well as multicultural society that both Guatemala and Nicaragua
endorse today.
1.2 Aims
To examine impacts of international migration on ethnic identity shift
in sending societies, it is essential to first examine how international migration
affects ethnicity-related factors. Therefore, the aims of this dissertation are:
1. To evaluate ethnic differentials in the selectivity of international migrants
and economic remittance recipient households.
2. To examine the extent to which international migration affects the overall
level of poverty and inter- and intra-ethnic socioeconomic inequality.
3. To evaluate impacts of international economic remittances on house-
holds’ wealth and their children’s educational attainment.
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4. To identify factors leading to different impacts of international migration
on Guatemalan and Nicaraguan populations.
5. To analyze impacts of international migration on ethnic relations in send-
ing communities.
6. To examine and verify a mechanism of ethnic identity shift and make
a prediction of impacts of international migration and multicultural re-
forms on inter-ethnic relations.
1.3 Research Design
These aims will be achieved applying a mixed-methods approach. To
analyze the selectivity of migrants and remittance recipient households as well
as impacts of economic remittances on income inequality and children’s edu-
cational attainment, I use demographic censuses from the two countries and
nationally representative data sets from the ENCOVI 2006 (Encuesta Nacional
de Condiciones de Vida) for Guatemala and ENMV 2005 (Encuesta Nacional
de Hogares Sobre Medición del Nivel de Vida) for Nicaragua. Findings from
statistical analysis of these data will be complemented by fieldwork undertaken
in two indigenous communities in Guatemala and Nicaragua. The fieldwork
is aimed at understanding what findings from the statistical analysis of the
secondary data suggest for Guatemalan and Nicaragua indigenous groups as
well as their perception of various socioeconomic factors, indigenousness, and
ethnic relations. In addition, due to the lack of available secondary data, the
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information collected in the field is the only data for studying impacts of inter-
national migration on ethnic identity shift and exploring similarities between
international migration and multicultural reforms in terms of their impacts on
indigenous cultures that I hypothesize.
Finally, based on findings from both the statistical analysis and field
observations, I propose a mathematical model of ethnic identity shift. One
purpose of the mathematical model is to rigorously analyze and verify findings
from Guatemalan and Nicaraguan research communities to understand simi-
larities and differences in impacts of international migration on these commu-
nities. In addition, with the proposed model, I will make predictions relating
to ethnic relations and indigenous cultures in both Guatemala and Nicaragua
and present policy recommendations for preserving indigenous cultures in these
countries.
1.4 Organization of Dissertation
Since people’s ethnic identity is closely related to their socioeconomic
status, relative positions in society, and circumstances that surround them,
the relationship between international migration and ethnic identity shift falls
under two larger theoretical frameworks: 1) impacts of international migration
on sending communities and; 2) the relationship between people’s ethnic iden-
tity and socioeconomic situations. In the literature of international migration,
I will especially focus on the following three sub-areas: 1) the socioeconomic
selectivity of migrants; 2) assimilation of international migrants in receiving
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countries, particularly in the US, and; 3) impacts of economic and social remit-
tances on migrant sending communities. Additionally, in discussing indigenous
groups in Guatemala and Nicaragua, it is fundamental to understand reasons
for drastic changes that took place in these two countries: the end of the civil
wars accompanied by the establishment of democratic government, changes
in state’s attitude toward indigenous and other ethnic minority groups, and
the increasing pace of indigenous people shifting their ethnic identity from
indigenous to Mestizo.
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical overview of these three topics and
similarities between international migration and multicultural reforms. I also
provide historical backgrounds related to the above-noted topics specific to
Guatemala and Nicaragua. The discussion of previous literature ends with
the exploration of possible links between these seemingly different and unre-
lated topics and how international migration can affect ethnic identity among
indigenous people. Chapter 3 presents a review of the methodology that is
used in this dissertation. Since I apply the mixed-methods approach, this
chapter will be divided into three sections: 1) description of the secondary
data sets and statistical methods used to analyze these data; 2) the primary
data collection efforts, description of the two research communities, criteria
used to select respondents for in-depth interviews and participants in focus
groups and; 3) introduction of agent-based modeling and computational sim-
ulation in the social sciences.
Chapters 4 and 5 present findings from the quantitative analysis of
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the secondary data sets. While findings from the fieldwork will complement
my findings and arguments throughout the dissertation, Chapter 6 will be
exclusively devoted to findings from my field observations. The mathematical
model of ethnic identity change and results from computational simulation
will be presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter in which
I highlight key findings from the dissertation research. This chapter will be
complemented by policy recommendations for the preservation of indigenous
groups and their cultures. Finally, I will propose a direction for future research
and show how this dissertation projects brings new insights to research on
international migration by emphasizing impacts of international migration on




This chapter starts with an overview of Guatemalan and Nicaraguan
indigenous groups and the situations they face. This overview will also explore
primary reasons that have motivated a number of indigenous people from these
countries to migrate internationally. In the second section, I introduce previous
literature on international migration focusing on two topics that are especially
relevant to this dissertation: migrant selectivity and impacts of international
migration on sending communities. The third section takes into account the
discussions presented in the previous two sections and discusses why interna-
tional migration may threaten ethnic identities among indigenous peoples in
sending communities. In addition, the hypothesized similarities in impacts
of international migration and neoliberal multicultural reforms on indigenous
groups will be discussed extensively in this section. Finally, considering the
review of previous literature and the above-noted hypothesized similarities, I
present hypotheses that will be tested in this dissertation project.
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2.1 Indigenous Peoples of Guatemala and Nicaragua
The circumstances that surround indigenous peoples in Guatemala and
Nicaragua differ in various aspects. First, the proportion of indigenous pop-
ulation in Guatemala and Nicaragua differs considerably. The latest national
demographic census (2002) shows that about 41% of Guatemalans are indige-
nous today, the proportion only surpassed by Bolivia (Layton and Patrinos
2006). On the other hand, according to the 2005 population census, only
about 8% of Nicaraguans are considered as indigenous or other ethnic mi-
norities such as Creoles. This difference can easily be felt in these countries.
In Guatemala, it is hard not to encounter an indigenous woman wearing her
traditional clothes (corte and huipil) even in large cities including Guatemala
City. On the other hand in Nicaragua, the presence of indigenous and other
ethnic minorities is hardly visible in Managua and other parts of the country,
except for the Atlantic Coast region where the majority of ethnic minorities
reside.
Guatemala and Nicaragua differ in terms of several other characteris-
tics. For example, a large difference in Gross National Income (GNI) exists be-
tween these two countries: while GNI per capita was approximately US$2,590
in Guatemala in 2006, it was a mere US$930 in Nicaragua during the same
year (World Bank 2007). The following figures also highlight Nicaragua’s
poverty: about 79.9% of people and 45.1% of people live with less than $2 and
$1 per day respectively. These figures are considerably high even compared
to those in Guatemala where about 16% of people live with less than $1 per
11
day and 37.4% with less than $2 (United Nations Development Programme
2005). At the same time, it is worth noting that while the average economic
level of Guatemala is much better Nicaragua’s, this fact alone does not tell us
the whole story about economic situations that Guatemalans and Nicaraguans
face. Guatemala is the most unequal country in income distribution in Cen-
tral America with a Gini index of .55 in 2000. Camus (2002) argues that the
Guatemalan social structure is very polarized. Guatemala’s socioeconomic
structure suggests a sharp contrast with the Nicaraguan case. While the level
of economic inequality is not low as compared to various developed countries
such as Japan and the U.S., Nicaragua (the Gini index was .43 in 2001) is the
least unequal country in the region (World Bank 2007).
In spite of the above-noted differences between the two countries, in-
digenous peoples in Guatemala and Nicaragua share various common charac-
teristics and face very similar socioeconomic situations. First of all, indigenous
people in both countries were severely affected by these countries’ civil wars,
violence and political conflicts in the late 20th century (Hale 1994; Jonas
2000). For instance, since 1960, Guatemala experienced the Latin America’s
longest and bloodiest civil war that did not end until the signing of peace
accords in 1996 (Chase-Dunn 2000). In the Guatemalan highlands where in-
digenous peoples concentrate, it was not uncommon to find entire villages
empty because their former residents had been either massacred or forced to
flee (Wynia 1990). Similarly during the 1980s under the Sandinista govern-
ment (1979-1990), indigenous peoples of Nicaragua, such as the Miskitu and
12
Mayangna groups who concentrate in the Nicaraguan Atlantic Coast, were
unfairly treated by the national government, and their villages in rural areas
were repeatedly attacked by army units (Dennis 1993; Hale 1994).
Furthermore, similar to their counterparts in other parts of Latin Amer-
ica, indigenous peoples in both Guatemala and Nicaragua are more disadvan-
taged than their non-indigenous counterparts in most areas including income,
housing, education, occupation, and health when compared to non-indigenous
people (Hall et al. 2006). Indeed, as Camus (2002) suggests, there are two
profound divisions in Latin America that are closely related: the poor and
the rich and indigenous and non-indigenous peoples and these divisions have
affected indigenous peoples’ socioeconomic situations. For example, using the
2005 demographic census, Yoshioka and Esparza Ochoa (2009) have found that
indigenous children in Nicaragua face a significantly higher risk of early death
than their non-indigenous counterparts, which holds true even after taking
into account socioeconomic differentials between the two groups. Similarly
in Guatemala, indigenous people also lag behind their non-indigenous coun-
terparts in a number of socioeconomic indicators (Bastos and Camus 1995;
Camus 2002; Shapiro 2006).
Indigenous peoples’ disadvantaged socioeconomic status in Guatemala
and Nicaragua today is at least in part the consequence of the repression of
and discrimination against them that were present since the onset of the colo-
nial period. In the colonial period, both countries developed relatively strong,
largely Hispanic ruling classes (Booth et al. 2006). The division of classes
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largely defined by the ethnicity implies that the region has been multicultural
for a long time (Sieder 2002). Indeed, the term “ind́ıgena” (indigenous) is
the proof of the existence of multicultural society as there was no such so-
cial category as indigenous until it was “invented” by European colonizers
(Warren and Jackson 2002). As a result, indigenous peoples were suffering
not only from a severe inequality in income distribution and access to basic
social services such education and health, but also ethnoticide, institutional-
ized discrimination and prejudice against their existence and cultural rights
(Davis 2002; Jonas 1991). However, the problems that indigenous people faced
have been largely ignored and ethnic differences have not reflected the region’s
politics or legal and administrative arrangements (Hall et al. 2006). Rather,
such problems were regarded as a class-based issue by the state. Therefore,
Yoshioka and Esparza Ochoa (2009) postulate that the much higher level of
socioeconomic inequality in Guatemala as compared to that in Nicaragua can
be attributed in part to a higher proportion of the indigenous population in
Guatemala.
As discussed above, indigenous peoples in both Guatemala and Nicaragua
have suffered from centuries-long poverty and discrimination. Since the late
1980s, however, several events such as the adoption of ILO Convention 169
in 1989, the 1992 Nobel Prize, when Guatemalan activist Rigoberta Menchú
won the peace prize, the Zapatista’s revolt against the inauguration of the
NAFTA, Alejandro Toledo Manrique and Evo Morales’s victory as the first
indigenous presidents in Peru and Bolivia respectively and the United Na-
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tions’ decision to call for the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous
People (1995-2004), took place leading the world to pay unprecedented at-
tention to indigenous populations in Latin America. Not only did indigenous
populations attract more attention, they have also been pressing rights that
were not recognized by states for a long time. For example, indigenous peoples
in both Guatemala and Nicaragua have succeeding in gaining rights there were
difficult to imagine over the past two decades.
The proportion of the indigenous population in Guatemala and Nicaragua
did not have much influence on the shift in the state’s attitude toward the
indigenous groups. Despite its small proportion of ethnic minorities, the sig-
nificance of these minority groups in Nicaragua is as great as that of the
indigenous groups in Guatemala. For example, People on the Atlantic Coast
of Nicaragua also won the right to autonomy in the Atlantic coast region of the
country under the Sandinista rule, which is now called Región Autónoma del
Atlántico Sur (RAAS) and Región Autónoma del Atlántico Norte (RAAN).
The Nicaraguan government also began to recognize the rights of indigenous
groups, their distinctive characteristics and autonomy. The precedent that
the Nicaraguan government set in its relation with its ethnic minority groups
has profoundly influenced liberation struggles across Latin American countries
(Bourgois 1981). In addition to the above-noted changes, under the Violeta
Chamorro administration (1990-1997), the Nicaraguan Government initiated
the efforts to give back the land to those who have been unfairly expropriated
under the Sandinista rule (Deere and León 2001; Dı́az-Polanco 1997).
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Similarly in Guatemala, a large number indigenous people who lost
their land during the civil war gained it back during the 1990s. Following the
1994 Accord on the Displaced Population (Acuerdo para el Reasentamiento
de las Poblaciones Desarraigadas por el Enfrentamiento Armado), the 1995
Accord on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Acuerdo sobre Iden-
tidad y Derechos de los Pueblos ind́ıgenas) was signed. In this accord, the
Guatemalan government promised to take measures to recognize, title, pro-
tect, provide restitution to, and compensate indigenous people, and it rec-
ognized the right to individual, communal, or collective land tenancy (Deere
and León 2001). Along with the 1996 Socio-Economic Accord (Acuerdo sobre
Aspectos Socio-Económicos y Situación Agraria), the peace accords guarantee
the rights of indigenous people to freely show and practice their cultures such
as languages and religion (Montejo 2005).
At the same time, despite these new and drastic changes, indigenous
peoples in both Guatemala and Nicaragua continue to face tough socioeco-
nomic realities. The continuing socioeconomic difficulties that indigenous peo-
ples in these countries encounter in the presence of such dramatic and observ-
able changes may appear paradoxical, especially if we regard the rapid growth
of indigenous activism as the result of empowerment among indigenous peo-
ples. Hale (2002) attempts to explain this paradoxical phenomenon using the
concept of “neoliberal multiculturalism.” The author argues that neoliberal
multiculturalism took place in Latin America “in the general context of neolib-
eral political and economic reforms” (2002:493). It is not a coincidence that
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neoliberal multiculturalism and the recognition of indigenous cultural rights
emerged around the same time indicating that these two do not contradict.
For example, Evans (2001) suggests that one important factor that led
to the introduction of financial liberalization programs in Central America
during the 1990s is the electoral defeat of the 1990 Sandinista government in
Nicaragua. It was then the first time in many years that all states in Central
America shared a similar, pro-business attitude and the neoliberal agenda. As
Hale (2002) contends, advances in the recognition of indigenous cultural rights
are also in part a result of the democratization in the region. Furthermore,
the author states that the recognition of indigenous rights serve as a means
to resolve the neoliberal agenda. His argument is consistent with that of
Gustafson (2002) who argues that through the inclusion of indigenous issues
in policy reform, the proponents of the neoliberal agenda insulate elite interests
from popular forms of political participation. As a result, multicultural reforms
affirm new rights without rectifying past injustice through the establishment of
citizenship rights and resolving socioeconomic inequalities (Hale 2002; Hamel
1994).
Therefore, even though changes that took place under the current ne-
oliberal agenda may seem drastic, the majority of indigenous peoples cannot
benefit from these changes. Rather, the situations that surround indigenous
peoples have deteriorated since the emergence of the neoliberal agenda. Morley
(1995:vi) states that “[e]ven before the severe adjustment of the 1980s, Latin
America had the most inequitable income distribution and the highest level
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of poverty relative to its income of any area in the world.” However, over the
past two decades, the inequality level increased in almost all Latin American
and Caribbean countries (Portes and Hoffman 2003). Since Guatemalan and
Nicaraguan indigenous peoples belong to the poorest group in their countries,
the increase in the gap between the rich and the poor under the neoliberal
multiculturalism suggests that indigenous peoples can be socioeconomically
more vulnerable today.
Hence, even though at least some of indigenous rights are now recog-
nized, indigenous peoples in Guatemala and Nicaragua continue to be socially
excluded and face more serious socioeconomic difficulties. As Wood (2005)
argues, social exclusion takes place in several dimensions and therefore, inclu-
sion in one dimension does not necessary mean that a group is included in
society. The current situation in which indigenous peoples in Guatemala and
Nicaragua find themselves reflects the author’s point. Indeed, indigenous peo-
ple’s chance to achieve socioeconomic upward mobility appears to be scarce
because the high level of inequality in income and access to needed services seg-
regates citizens by their social class (Roberts 2005) and social class continues
to be largely correlated with ethnic backgrounds. This situation is especially
the case in Latin America where social provision is very low in part due to very
low tax rate relative to its GDP (Huber and Solt 2004). For instance, as of
1996, Guatemala’s overall tax ratio was the lowest in the hemisphere–merely
8%, which was far below the average (14%) for developing countries as a whole
(Jonas 2000).
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Additionally, since the indigenous population in Guatemala and Nicaragua
did not move in significant numbers to the cities, they could not participate in
the structural mobility that urbanization brought in these countries (Roberts
2011). As a result, the probability of indigenous upward mobility is quite lim-
ited in both Guatemala and Nicaragua today. As Jonas (2000) states, the only
resources for many Guatemalans–both indigenous and non-indigenous–will be
international migration to the U.S., which many Guatemalans have chosen
during the past two decades. The author suggests that the social networks
formed during the war now serve the social infrastructure for new migrants.
In a similar vein, a number of Nicaraguans left their country in search of better
economic opportunities mainly to the US and Costa Rica (Funkhouser 1992;
Lundquist and Massey 2005). In fact, the number of international migrants
from both Guatemala and Nicaragua has grown considerably over the few
decades and so do impacts of international migration on these countries. Im-
pacts of international migration extend well beyond a country and household’s
socioeconomic status. One such impact, I contend, is ethnic identity shift. To
show how international migration can influence migrant sending societies, in
the following section, I present a review of aspects of international migration
that are relevant to factors influencing ethnic identity shift.
2.2 International Migration from Guatemala and Nicaragua
Because of pessimistic economic situations that a number of Guatemalans
and Nicaraguans face, many people from these countries have migrated abroad.
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At the same time, migration is an expensive and risky process, especially
for Guatemalans and Nicaraguans as compared to Mexicans due to these
two countries’ geographical location. For example, to migrate to the US via
land, Guatemalan and Nicaraguan migrants must take an additional trip go-
ing through Mexico. As a result, the amount paid to a coyote (smuggler) in
the case of undocumented migrants is much higher than the case among Mex-
icans. For example, according to my field observations in Cantel, as of April
2009, people in the western highland of Guatemala, which is close to Mexico,
must expect to pay as high as US$6,000 to a coyote for their trips. Therefore,
those who can actually migrate are selected based on various criteria. Due to
such selectivity, households that benefit from international migration are not
drawn randomly from a community’s population. As a result, a community’s
socioeconomic structure may be transformed due to international migration.
To closely explore these points, in this section, I present previous literature
focusing on factors that influence people’s decisions to migrate and impacts of
international migration on sending communities focusing on economic remit-
tances.
2.2.1 Factors Affecting International Migration
Various theories of migration aim to explain why people migrate. For
example, neoclassical economics theory and theory of new economics of mi-
gration posit that economic factors influence people’s decision to migrate. At
the same time, these theories differ in reasoning how economic factors affect a
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migration flow as well as units of analysis. Those who support neoclassical eco-
nomics theory argue that it is differentials in wages, employment conditions,
and costs of migration between sending and receiving societies that encourage
or discourage migration. That is, an individual analyzes his or her expected
income in a receiving society and decides to migrate if the expected income is
high enough taking into account both his or her income in the current place
of residence and the risk of migration.
On the other hand, new economics of migration theory posits that
migration decisions are typically made by households instead of individuals to
minimize risks to household income (Massey et al. 1993). Minimizing risks
to household income is especially important in developing countries including
both Guatemala and Nicaragua because poor households cannot count on
“institutional mechanisms for managing risk [since these] are imperfect, absent,
or inaccessible” (Massey et al. 1993:436). Unlike neoclassical theory, this
theory suggests that a wage differential between sending and receiving societies
is not a necessary condition for households to send migrants abroad. New
economics of migration theory also focuses on the concept of relative income.
Hence, not only households’ absolute income, but also their income relative
to other households’ income is important to take into account in studying
international migration (Stark and Bloom 1985).
The above discussions suggest that indigenous peoples in both Guatemala
and Nicaragua tend to be more motivated to migrate internationally than non-
indigenous groups. As noted, indigenous people are much more likely to be
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poor than their non-indigenous counterparts and lag far behind them in terms
of various measures including educational attainment and health. Therefore,
a wage differential tends to be higher among indigenous peoples than Mesti-
zos. This is especially the case among people migrating to the US since the
majority of migrants to the US from these two countries are undocumented
and most of them can only obtain low-skilled jobs. Since indigenous peoples in
both Guatemala and Nicaragua face numerous difficulties including discrimi-
nation and severe poverty, their expected income in the US tends to be much
higher than that in their communities of origin.
However, despite a relatively high return that international migration
can bring to indigenous peoples of Guatemala and Nicaragua, many of them
have remained in their countries. While many people decide not to migrate
on their own will, others stay in their communities even if they wish to mi-
grate. For example, the extreme level of poverty may prevent a number
of people–both indigenous and non-indigenous alike–from migrating abroad.
Even though Guatemalans and Nicaraguans can migrate to the U.S. through
land, the cost of migration to the U.S. from Guatemala and Nicaragua is
much more expensive than taking a trip from Mexico. As a result, before
leaving their communities, migrants need to prepare a certain amount of
money. Therefore, migrants do not come from the lowest group of the in-
come distribution who are most likely to be indigenous in both Guatemala
and Nicaragua. While many indigenous people prepare money by putting up
their assets, mostly home or land property as collateral, others cannot obtain
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enough amount of money to take a trip, which is consistent with the fact that
Mexico-US migration comes disproportionately from not-so-poor households
and communities.
In addition to economic factors, individual and household’s geographi-
cal location of residence also affects migration and this factor can also discour-
age indigenous peoples form migrating abroad. Findley (1987) posits that com-
munity characteristics can affect household decisions to send migrants abroad
in various ways. Indeed, community characteristics themselves can affect the
probability of migration uniformly for all members of a community. For in-
stance, people in communities with better transportation and communication
technologies enjoy greater access to urban or foreign labor markets than an-
other. Hence, how individual and household characteristics affect household
decision to send migrants are conditional on community characteristics such as
accessibility, community’s migration history and agricultural situation (Find-
ley 1987).
It is also important to take into account that given different geographi-
cal locations where indigenous and non-indigenous groups tend to concentrate,
the perception of relative deprivation may differ between ethnic groups be-
cause indigenous groups tend to reside in isolated areas and how much people
feel about whether they are deprived or not is quite subjective. For exam-
ple, indigenous people living in communities with a high proportion of the
non-indigenous population might feel more deprived and therefore, are more
motivated to migrate internationally to improve their relative position in a
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community of origin. On the other hand, poor households who live in small
communities inhabited mostly by indigenous people may be less motivated to
migrate if most of households are also poor so their sense of relative deprivation
is low.
Therefore, considering circumstances that surround indigenous peoples
and their socioeconomic status, it seems that at least initially, indigenous
households are much less likely to send migrants abroad than their non-
indigenous counterparts. That is, they tend to be much poorer than non-
indigenous people preventing them from migrating. In addition, the sense of
relative deprivation is low among those living in indigenous communities since
most of households are poor. Nevertheless, a large number of indigenous house-
holds in both Guatemala and Nicaragua have sent migrants to other countries.
Hence, economic and geographical factors alone cannot explain international
migration flows from these countries.
In addition to the above-mentioned two factors, social capital, in the
form of migrant networks, has played an extremely important role in making
a decision to migrate. Indeed, migrants usually do not arrive in their destina-
tions as isolated individuals (Portes and Bach 1985). Migrant networks can
reduce the difficulties and risks of international migration that the majority
of indigenous migrants are expected to face. Previous research on internal
and international migration have presented the importance of migrant net-
works (Browning and Rodriguez 1985; Hagan 1994; Lomnitz 1975; Palloni et
al. 2001; Pérez Sáinz 2005; Taylor 1986). For instance, Palloni et al. (2001)
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have found that the effect of migrant networks persists net of human capi-
tal, common household characteristics, and unobserved conditions. Similarly,
Fussell (2004) and Massey and Espinosa (1997) argue that social capital is the
most powerful factor in predicting initial, repeat, and return migration.
Migrant networks can reduce the migration cost and potentially, offers
more benefits to migrants in several ways. First of all, migrant networks
can reduce the cost of migration by providing information on safe and cheap
routes (Choldin 1973; Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003) and when possible, by
sharing the cost of trip with other migrants. Migrant networks can also reduce
the non-money cost of migration such as emotional costs, language barriers,
and assimilation shock, which is especially the case if migrants do not speak
the language spoken in receiving societies (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003).
The language barrier is particularly relevant to many indigenous migrants
from Guatemala and Nicaragua since many of them may not speak Spanish
well. Furthermore, migrant networks can maximize the benefits of migration if
these networks help migrants to find jobs and offer other essential information
such as how to apply for legalization (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003; Hagan
1994). Indeed, Granovetter (1995) has argued the capacity to secure jobs
is best explained by personal contacts and networks explain the capacity to
secure jobs more than individuals’ education, training, or skill.
Previous research on international migration has suggested that mi-
grant networks play a very important role. Among Nicaraguan migrants, mi-
grant networks have influenced not only their decision to migrate, but also
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their destinations, usually either Costa Rica or the U.S. That is, probably due
to its more restricted access, migrant networks were found to be particularly
important for Nicaraguans migrating to the US (Lundquist and Massey 2005).
In a similar vein, several qualitative studies (Hagan 1994; Menj́ıvar 2002) have
emphasized the importance of migrant networks for Guatemalan migrants.
For example, indigenous migrants from San Pedro, Totonicapán turn to the
Pentecostal church and ask for pastors advice to make their decision and re-
ceive various forms of support including prayer (Hagan and Ebaugh 1999).
Similarly, Menj́ıvar (2002) has found that immigrant churches have played
an important role linking the migrants’ communities of origin and receiving
communities for both indigenous and non-indigenous groups.
Since migrant networks derive from family, friends, acquaintances, co-
workers and communities of origin (Massey et al. 1987; Tilly 1990), character-
istics of these networks tend to differ and work differently across groups. For
example, networks are neither identical nor function in the same way between
men and women. Hagan (1994) has found that since both economic and social
costs of migration are much higher for women than for men, migrant networks
are especially important for female migrants. The author argues that in the
US, Guatemalan female migrants’ social networks are weaker and far less ex-
tensive than those of male migrants, in part because women encounter fewer
opportunities for interacting with their co-workers, which is especially the case
among those working as a domestic worker.
Given various notable differences between indigenous and non-indigenous
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groups in both Guatemala and Nicaragua, migrant networks of indigenous
migrants also tend to be different from those possessed by non-indigenous
migrants. For example, Fussell and Massey (2004) argue social processes of
migration are distinct between people living in rural and urban areas. As
Fussell (2004) suggests, migrant networks are less pervasive in urban areas be-
cause of a larger size of population that yields greater anonymity. Therefore,
feedback effects of migration have less influence on the population and local
labor markets.
Socioeconomic, cultural, and geographical differences between indige-
nous and non-indigenous groups are likely to result in different migration pat-
terns between the two groups in both Guatemala and Nicaragua. Such differ-
ences lead to distinct impacts of international migration on these populations
that can change socioeconomic and ethnic structures of these countries. To
examine types of changes in ethnic relations due to international migration
that we can expect, I present a review of previous research that has explored
impacts of international migration on individuals and households residing in
migrants’ communities of origin below.
2.2.2 Impacts of International Migration on Sending Communities
International migration affects migrants’ communities of origin in vari-
ous ways. One of the most visible and important consequences of international
migration is economic remittance sent by migrants. In developing countries,
economic remittances are extremely important as these resources compensate
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for absent or poorly functioning local markets and the lack of government so-
cial programs (Sana and Massey 2005; Stark 1991). Since the tax rate in both
Guatemala and Nicaragua is low relative to the gross domestic product, the
provision of infrastructure and services is very limited in these countries, which
is especially the case in rural areas where indigenous groups concentrate. As a
result, even when people in rural areas earn similar incomes to those in urban
areas, they are more likely to face more limited access to resources because of
their locations (National Research Council 2003). Economic remittances often
provide necessary resources that households otherwise do not have access to
and it can provide more benefits to indigenous peoples as they are more likely
to reside in rural areas.
At a household level, economic remittances usually mean the increase
in total household income, relaxing the restriction on household budget. Eco-
nomic remittance to developing countries has experienced a dramatic increase
over the past few decades. According to the World Bank’s Global Economic
Prospects 2006, in 1990, remittances to middle and low income countries
amounted to about US$30 billion. Fifteen years later, they are estimated
to have reached almost US$170 billion. Remittances now account for about
30 percent of total financial flows to developing countries (Acosta et al. 2007;
World Bank 2006).
Economic remittances play an extremely important role in both Guatemalan
and Nicaraguan economies. During the past decade, the amount of remittance
sent to Guatemala and Nicaragua has dramatically increased. The amount of
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official inward remittance flow in 2006 was US$3.6 billion in Guatemala and
US$656 million in Nicaragua. These amounts account for 12.2% of GDP in
Guatemala and 10.3% of GDP in Nicaragua (Ratha and Xu 2008). Impacts
of economic remittance are easily observable in migrant sending societies. For
example, in one indigenous Guatemalan community, international migration
resulted in a movement to convert the town’s wiring from the original 220-volt
European-style to 110-volt U.S.-style so that residents can use products sent
by migrants residing in the U.S. (Rodriguez and Hagan 2000).
At the same time, we know little about whether there are any dif-
ferences in patterns of receiving economic remittances across ethnic groups.
Examining this point is important given the importance of economic remit-
tances and migration patterns that are probably different between indigenous
and non-indigenous groups. Various factors suggest that the propensity of mi-
gration among these two groups is likely to differ. In addition, as Roberts and
his colleagues (1999) argue, people’s decisions to migrate temporarily or per-
manently depends on the amount of investment opportunities in communities
of origin. The duration of migration may also affect a migrant’s propensity to
remit. Indeed, supporting new economics of labor migration theory, Lindstrom
(1996) has found that in Mexico, the absence of well-functioning capital and
insurance markets encourages short-term, repeat migration, while productive
investment opportunities lead to longer, singular trips.
Furthermore, since the presence and number of close relatives, espe-
cially children, reside in migrants’ community of origin affect migrants’ prob-
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ability of sending remittances home (Menj́ıvar et al. 1998), it is expected that
indigenous migrants from Guatemala and Nicaragua send remittances because
their households tend to be larger. Finally, how migrants are assimilated into
receiving societies also influence the probability of sending migrants. For ex-
ample, Rodriguez and Hagan (2000) have found that in the case of indigenous
Mayan immigrants in Houston, migrants send remittances to their parents at
first, but they are less likely to do so once they have their own child and start
their own families in the US.
Another important issue in relation to impacts of economic remittances
on sending communities is how households spend remittances they receive.
Economic remittances can influence recipient households directly and indi-
rectly. Remittances affect household directly since these resources boost house-
holds’ purchasing power. Additionally, I contend that remittances can also
have an effect on household’s economic situation indirectly if the experience
of migration and its related consequence changes a gender relation and intra-
household resource allocation. In Latin America, there is also a growing body
of evidence (Katz 2000) that women are more likely to spend any income they
earn individually for the household’s benefit (Deere and León 2001). Agar-
wal (1994:30) states that “the risk of poverty and the physical well-being of
a woman and her children could depend significantly on whether or not she
has direct access to income and not just access mediated through her husband
or other male family members.” Among poor households, female economic
autonomy is “a necessary condition to guarantee shared consumption of the
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family labor product” (Deere 1990:287).
International migration has a potential to modify the gender inequality
at least to some degree. Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) argues that in the process of
migration, patriarchy in the family sphere is realigned, because out of necessity,
women act automatically and assertively in managing household affairs. It is
also possible that migrants themselves start viewing gender roles differently
through the experience of migration. Such changes may result in more effec-
tive ways of using resources, resulting in improved health and human capital
among households regardless of whether household receive remittances or not.
Furthermore, even if the above-noted changes do not occur, migrant house-
holds may better manage their resources than their non-migrant households if
male members of the household migrate and as a result, a female member of
that household starts to manage the household resource.
Hence, economic remittances may influence a sending community’s so-
cioeconomic structure in various ways. One probable change brought by these
resources is the level of socioeconomic inequality. If we view economic re-
mittances as an additional income, recipient households are likely to benefit
from them. For example, in San Cristobal, Totonicapán, Rodriguez and Ha-
gan (2000) have observed impacts of economic remittance on this community
at different levels. At the individual level, remittances allow recipient house-
holds to purchase more food, especially meat and their children are more likely
to attend school longer and wear more expensive clothes. At the municipality
level, the impact of economic remittance can be seen through the emergence of
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new businesses, new housing construction, and a growing presence of small im-
ported trucks. In rural areas, these changes are especially visible and therefore,
motivate more people to migrate. Along with migrant networks established
by individuals already migrated, additional movement becomes more likely
over time, a process recognized as cumulative causation (Massey et al. 1993;
Myrdal 1957).
Previous studies that explored impacts of international migration on
a sending community have encountered a mixed finding. Some studies have
found that remittance can have a positive impact even on non-migrant house-
hold members. For instance, Kanaiaupuni and Donato (2000) have found that
while in its initial stages, migration is disruptive to community and households,
with time and economic remittances, it eases household survival as it becomes
part of local institutional and community life. Similarly, Taylor (2004) states
that the increase in local consumption resulting from economic remittances
benefits both migrant and non-migrant households. Orozco (2005) also argues
that acquisition of land and property as well as the emergence of businesses
funded by remittances can result in economic growth, especially in rural areas
that have traditionally been neglected by both the private and public sectors.
On the other hand, several studies have found negative consequences
of international migration. In the case of the Dominican Republic, for exam-
ple, Grasmuck and Pessar (1991) state that impacts of migration differentially
affect distinct social classes benefiting migrant households while hurting their
non-migrant counterparts. The authors argue that migration does not im-
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prove economic conditions of sending communities at the aggregate level. In
some cases, unemployment has risen and productivity has declined as a re-
sult of migration (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Piore 1979), which is consistent
with Taylor (2004) who posits that remittances do not substitute for sound
macroeconomic policies and well-designed strategies. Similarly, Rodriguez and
Hagan (2000) note that the prosperity brought by the U.S. migration has also
produced certain economic restrictions including the shortage of workers and
the increase in rural wages, slowing down local labor markets since the 1980s.
In the case of Bluefields, Nicaragua, Barham and Boucher (1998) have found
that international migration and remittances can exacerbate the city’s income
inequality.
Since the state does not have enough capabilities to provide social ser-
vices in both Guatemala and Nicaragua, the private sector has invested in the
health and education sectors. As a consequence, there are two-tier systems of
social welfare in these countries. That is, while the upper and upper middle
classes can afford private schools and health services, the poor, many of who
are indigenous, can rely only on under-funded and low-quality public service
(Gwynne and Kay 2000). Economic remittances may worsen such a problem if
the poorest groups are least likely to migrate due to the shortage of economic
resources. Therefore, we should be concerned that international migration can
raise the level of socioeconomic inequality in sending communities.
Whether or not economic remittances increase or decrease the level of
inequality depends at least in part on a community’s history of international
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migration. As noted, international migration is an expensive venture (Stahl
1982), especially the case for Central American migrants where GDP per capita
is lower than that in Mexico, but the cost of the trip is much more expensive.
Similarly, Massey and colleagues (1998) argue that because the first sending
households in a community, who tend to have less social capital, are usually
in the upper or middle income distribution, the remittances they receive will
increase inequality at first. Yet, the level of inequality may decrease if more and
more households send migrants as the result of structural changes in sending
communities (Massey et al. 1994).
While impacts of international migration on income inequalities have
been studied by various researchers, how the level of inequality is influenced
by economic remittances within communities, across communities, and by the
ethnicity of migrants has been little studied. Since the selectivity of migrants
is likely to differ by the ethnicity of migrants due to such factors as different
residential locations and history of international migration, how remittances
impact ethnic groups is likely to differ across groups. In addition, if economic
remittance recipient households spend household income more efficiently than
non-migrant household as a result of changes in behaviors and customs, even
taking into account income differentials, the level of inequality may be higher
in terms of children’s educational attainment.
As Acosta et al. (2007) state, remittances can also affect the long
term welfare of recipients by means of affecting human capital formation. The
authors claim that the net impact of migration and remittances on human
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capital accumulation is a priori unclear. While it is possible that migrant
remittances can help overcome economic limitations, leading to more human
capital investments among poor households, it is equally possible that mi-
gration of household members that precedes the receipt of remittances can
have disruptive impacts on household life including potentially negative con-
sequences on migrants’ children’s educational attainment. Furthermore, since
most migrants from Guatemala and Nicaragua work in occupations that re-
quire little schooling, children of migrant households may not value education,
especially if they also aim to migrate.
Previous research on remittances and children’s schooling has also faced
mixed findings. For example, López-Córdova (2005) finds that higher remit-
tance flows are associated with lower illiteracy rates in Mexican municipalities.
At the same time, in terms of schooling, positive impacts of migration hold
true only for 5-year old children, insignificant among 6-14 years old and even
negative for children of ages 15 to 17. In the case of El Salvador, Cox Edwards
and Ureta (2003) argue that children from remittance recipient households are
less likely to drop out of school, which, according to the authors, is because re-
mittances relax budget constraints affecting poor recipient households. Using
data from 11 countries, Acosta and others (2007) have studied the impact of
economic remittances on accumulated schooling among children of ages 10-15.
The authors have found that in 6 out of these 11 countries, economic remit-
tances are significantly related to a higher educational attainment including
Guatemala and Nicaragua.
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In the case of Guatemala and Nicaragua, Acosta and his colleagues
(2007) have found the significant correlation between remittances and chil-
dren’s schooling. However, it remains unclear whether these relationships hold
true across ethnic groups. It is essential to explore this point given the fact
that there is a large discrepancy in educational attainment between indigenous
and non-indigenous groups, especially in Guatemala. If indigenous children of
migrant households receive significantly higher years of schooling than those in
non-recipient households, and the impact of remittances differs across ethnic
groups, then, it is possible that ethnic relations change due to international
migration.
While economic remittance is one of the most visible consequences that
international migration can bring to migrants’ communities of origin, it is not
the only resources brought by these migrants. In addition to economic remit-
tances, migrants usually transfer social remittances from receiving societies to
their communities of origin. According to Levitt (1998), social remittances are
the ideas, behaviors, identities and social capital that transmit from receiving
societies to migrants’ communities of origin that are a local-level, migration-
driven form of cultural diffusion. Social remittances reflect the new type of
transnationalism. While transnationalism existed for a long time, the new
type of transnationalism is a relatively new phenomenon because of the ease
of travel and communication, an increasingly important role that migrants
play in sending economy and increased connection between sending and re-
ceiving societies (Levitt 1998). In fact, what characterizes today’s immigrants
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unique is “the high intensity of exchanges, the new modes of transacting, and
the multiplication of activities that require cross-border travel and contacts
on a sustained basis” (Portes et al. 1999:219). Hence, the increase in the fre-
quency and amount of economic remittances sent to Guatemala and Nicaragua
is most likely to be accompanied by the increase in the amount and influ-
ence of social remittances transferred to these countries. Social remittances
can affect various aspects of sending communities (Funkhouser 1995) such as
health behavior (Lindstrom and Muñoz-Franco 2005; 2006), gender relations
(Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994) and migratory behavior (Kandel and Massey 2002).
I contend that in the case of Guatemala and Nicaragua, social remit-
tances have stronger impacts on indigenous people than on non-indigenous
populations due to fewer years of formal education indigenous people receive
and the fact that indigenous groups are socioeconomically and culturally more
marginalized and isolated. In fact, Lindstrom and Muñoz-Franco (2005; 2006)
have found that Maya women, who tend to be socially insular, are more likely
to listen to a trusted peer than to professionals from outside their communities.
The authors posit that it is because social remittances are sent by former resi-
dents of the communities where women reside, these women feel less reluctant
to accept the advice by the migrants.
Social remittances suggest that migrants’ customs, ideas, and behav-
iors can change through their experience in receiving societies. Such experi-
ence does not always have a positive impact on migrants and their household
members. For example, Landale and her colleagues (2000) argue that assimila-
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tion can negatively affect migrants showing that the duration of US residence
among Puerto Rican mothers is positively correlated with infant mortality
among their children. Similarly, Smith et al. (2003) have found that while
immigration from rural Guatemala to the U.S. improves child health in terms
of children’s height, migrants’ children are considerably heavier and at an
higher risk of overweight and obesity, suggesting a different eating behavior.
In addition, unlike the European second and third generations who followed
the “straight-line path” of assimilation in the past, today’s immigrants may
follow a “bumpy road path” to reach socio-economic attainment (Gans 1992a;
b) or a pattern of “segmented assimilation,” in which second-generation youth
do not assimilate equally to a homogeneous American culture (Portes and
Zhou 1993). Therefore, results of assimilation and social remittances can dif-
fer across distinct groups.
One possible impact that economic and social remittances can make
in Guatemala and Nicaragua is changes in ethnic relations in these countries.
Such changes may occur through several mechanisms. First, indigenous and
non-indigenous migrants may interact with each other more frequently in re-
ceiving societies, especially among long-term migrants. For example, while
Guatemalan indigenous migrants tend to reside in areas separated from other
Latinos and they interact mainly among themselves (Rodriguez 1987), for im-
migrants’ long-term incorporation in receiving societies, it is essential that
migrants develop an expansive network of weak ties (Granovetter 1973) with
migrants of different ethnicities (Hagan 1998), other Hispanic groups and na-
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tive people.
Extensive social networks are particularly important for migrants since
the late 1980s, when restrictive national immigration policies began to appear
such as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act and the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 as well as California’s
Proposition 187 (Donato et al. 2005; Massey et al. 2002). These initiatives
led to intensified fear and insecurity within both the legal and undocumented
immigrant communities (Popkin 2005). Furthermore, pan-ethnic movements
in receiving societies may empower indigenous groups that can modify ethnic
relations. Several authors discuss this type of movements among Guatemalan
indigenous groups. For example, indigenous Mayans exiled in Mexico between
1982 and 1996 developed a consciousness of belonging to and sharing the same
base Mayan culture using Spanish as the common language (Montejo 2002;
Smith 1990; Warren 1993).
Although there exist various ways through which international migra-
tion may influence the relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous
groups, whether or not international migration improves ethnic relations in
Guatemala and Nicaragua is not clear. For example, Popkin (2005) has found
that in the municipality of Santa Eulalia, Guatemala, economic remittances
may reinforce class stratification and establish new ethnic boundaries. Non-
migrant households in the municipality regarded migrants and their family
members as ‘Ladinos’ due to their increasing wealth and also adoption of be-
39
haviors associated with non-indigenous people. Such behaviors can include
fashion and purchasing behavior. Therefore, while changes deriving from in-
ternational migration may increase the level of interactions between indigenous
and non-indigenous groups, it is possible that socioeconomic and class segre-
gation worsen, isolating and marginalizing the most disadvantaged indigenous
people.
The above review of previous research on international migration sug-
gests that because international migration is a selective and expensive process,
it is likely that migrants do not represent a community’s population. As a
result, international migration most likely affects distinct social classes differ-
ently. Therefore, to understand impacts of international migration on migrant
sending communities in countries where ethnic backgrounds and socioeconomic
classes are very closely related, it is essential to study how international migra-
tion influence ethnic relations. However, as compared to the number of studies
that focus on impacts of international migration on sending communities, few
such studies exist.
Overlooking this point prevents us from correctly evaluating actual im-
pacts of international migration on sending communities and ethnic relations
because international migration has a potential to lead individuals to shift
their ethnic identities. In the following section, I present a review of literature
relevant to ethnic identity shift and explore factors influential on such a shift
that can be affected by international migration. In doing so, I present hy-
pothesized similarities in impacts of international migration and multicultural
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reforms on ethnic identity shift and argue how the combination of international
migration and multicultural reforms can threaten indigenous peoples and their
cultures.
2.3 International Migration, Multicultural Reforms, and
Ethnic Identity Change
In the previous section, we have explored various factors that can in-
fluence migration flows. Since indigenous and non-indigenous people in both
Guatemala and Nicaragua differ considerably in terms of these factors, their
migration patterns are expected to be different. I have also presented several
examples from the previous studies that can affect inter-ethnic relations among
migrants in receiving societies as well as those left in migrants’ communities
of origin. While a change in ethnic relations due to international migration
itself merits serious attention, impacts of international migration can extend
beyond such a change. It is my contention that international migration can
influence individuals’ ethnic identity.
Max Weber (1978:389) defines ethnic groups as “those human groups
that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of sim-
ilarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of
colonization and migration; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an
objective blood relationship exists.” The author also argues that it is the so-
cial contact with others rather than cultural difference per se that leads to
definition of “us” and “them.” Weber’s position implies that group identities
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including ethnic identities are always defined in relation to non-members of a
group (Malešević 2004). Weber’s argument is consistent with a post-structural
view of ethnic identity. Rather than regarding ethnic identity as fixed, primor-
dial, or instrumental in nature, social conditions and individual’s negotiation
have an impact on one’s ethnic identity (Yashar 2005) and other ethnicity
related factors. For example, Yoshioka (2010) has found that individuals’
educational attainment is negatively correlated with their use of indigenous
languages. In a similar vein, Smith (1995) argues that gender may also affect
one’s ethnic identity. For instance, in the case of Guatemala, while it is very
easy to identify the majority of indigenous women because of their traditional
clothes, indigenous men often appear indistinguishable from Ladino men since
most of men do not wear traditional clothes anymore. Macro factors can also
influence ethnicity. For example, in the case of the US, the state has played a
fundamental role in formulating and maintaining racial categories (Rodriguez
1995). In the case of Latin America, since the onset of colonialism, the ethnic
and cultural diversity have been utilized by colonizers and the dominant class
to justify the exploitation of the indigenous population (Camus 2002).
Both micro and macro factors can influence the concept of ethnicity
and we must look at both types of factors. For example, regarding ethnic-
ity simply as “a personal choice runs the risk of emphasizing agency at the
expense of structure” (Nagel 1994:156). The post-structural view of ethnic
identity seems especially relevant in Latin America where the boundary be-
tween indigenous and non-indigenous has never been static (Wolf 1986) or
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clear. Taking into account this nature of ethnicity in Latin America is fun-
damental in designing social policies and programs for the region’s indigenous
peoples because what appears beneficial to indigenous people, including new
indigenous cultural rights, may actually threaten their cultures.
Let us take an example of bilingual education. While many Latin Amer-
ican countries endorse bilingual education today, bilingual education has of-
ten been found to actually discourage children from mastering their parents’
languages. In Guatemala, indigenous languages are often associated with the
negative values of the “traditional”: ignorance, lack of education, and poverty.
On the other hand, people associate the dominant language-Spanish-with the
positive values of the “modern” (England 2003). As a result, while bilingual
education is encouraged, many indigenous children do not learn indigenous
languages today because many parents believe it is more useful to teach their
children Spanish rather than their native languages. Such a belief often de-
rives from their own traumatic experiences as a result of their inability to speak
Spanish well at school (Brown 1996; England 1996). In other word, Spanish
is seen as one of the power symbols of the mainstream society (Hill and Hill
1980). Therefore, bilingual education cannot succeed in Latin America unless
we realized that children of ethnic minorities learn Spanish in the context of
a serious socio-cultural inequality (Lewin 1986).
The Guatemalan and Nicaraguan cases are especially interesting to con-
sider given Guatemala’s geographic location and Nicaragua’s relatively small
proportion of the indigenous population: while Guatemala shares its borders
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with Mexico, El Salvador, and Honduras, where the proportion of the in-
digenous population is less than 10% of the total population, almost half of
Guatemalans are indigenous. In the case of Nicaragua, while only about 8%
of Nicaraguans self-identify themselves as indigenous, the majority of indige-
nous peoples in the country have maintained their indigenous languages such
as Miskitu and Mayangna.
One reason why many indigenous peoples in Latin American countries
maintained their languages and ethnic identities despite the strong pressure
of castellanización and large socioeconomic discrepancies between indigenous
and non-indigenous groups is that there were few opportunities for indigenous
people. As a result, little incentive existed for them to learn Spanish (Gar-
zon 1998; Richards 2003). This is especially the case in Guatemala where
bilingual education started much later than in Mexico (Hall et al. 2006) and
lacked an official discourse of mestizaje (Hale 2002). A very low level of edu-
cational attainment among Guatemalan indigenous people today reflects few
opportunities that indigenous people in this country have enjoyed.
In the case of Nicaragua, indigenous and other ethnic minority groups
in the Atlantic region have maintained their identities due to various factors.
One of such factors is the geographical location of the Atlantic region. As
Adams (1981) states, Spanish colonials had determined that the Atlantic re-
gion of Nicaragua inhospitable and unrewarding and left largely intact. It was
British that were in close touch with the region’s indigenous groups, mainly
the Miskitu people (Dennis 2004). Since the late 1800s, as with other Central
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American countries with the Atlantic Coast including Guatemala, the Atlantic
region was penetrated by US multinational corporations (Bourgois 1986). In
addition, before the Catholic Church, the Moravian Church had worked on
the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua since 1849 (Hawley 1997). Miskitu indige-
nous people kept fairly close and positive relationship with the English and
later North Americans. These relationships and the strong influence of Mora-
vian Church resulted in what Hale (1994) calls “Anglo affinity” among the
Miskitu people. These factors helped those living in the Atlantic region to
hold an identity that is different from Nicaraguans in the rest of the country.
Since the 1980s there have been several drastic changes in the factors
that affected ethnic relations in both Guatemala and Nicaragua. For exam-
ple, the civil wars in these countries ironically increase the level of interaction
between indigenous and non-indigenous groups, especially in Nicaragua. For
example, Hawley (1997) notes that the establishment of government schools
results in more frequent contacts between Mestizos and Miskitus due to an
increase of Mestizos in Miskitu villages. According to the author, such in-
creased contacts resulted in the development of local class relations, motivat-
ing Miskitu merchants to give up their Miskitu identity and to start identifying
themselves as Mestizo in order to achieve upward social mobility.
Other notable drastic changes are an increase in the number of inter-
national migrants from Guatemala and Nicaragua and multicultural reforms
in both countries. Why these changes affect ethnic relations and identities?
To answer this question, we need to consider social boundaries attached to
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each ethnic group. Since ethnicity is a social constructed concept, as Barth
(1969) argues, there are different ways in which ethnic boundaries are main-
tained. According to the author, ethnic groups only persist as significant units
if they imply marked difference in behavior, which is persisting cultural dif-
ferences. Yet where persons of different culture interact, one would expect
these differences to be reduced, since interaction both requires and generates
a congruence of codes and values. Following Barth’s argument, as discussed,
two factors significantly contributed to the maintenance of indigenous groups
in Guatemala and Nicaragua: 1) less frequent contacts between indigenous
and non-indigenous groups and; 2) a significant socioeconomic and cultural
differences between the two groups.
The civil war in these countries is one factor that made inter-ethnic
contacts much more frequent. Another important is domestic migration of a
number of indigenous people to urban areas in these countries since indige-
nous people living in urban areas are much more likely to encounter with
Mestizos. Indeed, Bastos and Camus (1995) state that indigenous people liv-
ing in urban in Guatemala City more likely to lose their ethnic identity than
those in rural areas. Why can increased contacts between indigenous and non-
indigenous groups threaten indigenous ethnic identity if multicultural reforms
endorse indigenous cultural rights? This is because despite multicultural re-
form’s attitude toward indigenous rights, indigenous people continue to face
tough socioeconomic realities and discrimination. As a result, while today’s
multicultural reforms certainly help some indigenous people to overcome hard-
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ships and to be included in the mainstream society, the changes that seem ap-
parently beneficial to indigenous people can be detrimental to their cultures.
For instance, Garzon (1998) states on Guatemalan Mayan groups, indigenous
population’s integration into mestizo or Ladino society has often resulted in
the internalization of negative images attached to indigenous groups among
indigenous people themselves.
In addition, while indigenous groups still lag behind their non-indigenous
counterparts in most of socioeconomic measures, we have also seen various
socioeconomic advances among indigenous groups such as educational attain-
ment. For example, Baracco (2004) states that Planning for the Literacy
Project under the Sandinista Administration that began in 1980 had taught
12,500 people in the Atlantic region to read and write in Sumu, Miskitu, and
English. I argue that along with the increased contacts between indigenous
and non-indigenous groups, such advances can also threaten indigenous peo-
ples’ cultures. Obviously, socioeconomic advancements of indigenous peoples
in both Guatemala and Nicaragua should be welcomed. At the same time,
without rectifying the past injustice and improving fundamental socioeconomic
problems that both Guatemala and Nicaragua face, such advancements can
be a double edge sward for indigenous groups and cultures. This is especially
the case under today’s multicultural reforms that tend to widen the socioeco-
nomic gap between the poor and the rich as the majority of indigenous groups
in both countries belong to the lowest strata in their countries.
I contend that international migration can exacerbate ethnicity related
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issues because it is unlikely that international migration equally benefit the
whole population because of its selective nature. As a result, it may be the
case that rather than reinforcing indigenous ethnic identities among migrant
households, international migration may encourage them to abandon their
ethnic identities. For example, although they do not directly refer to ethnic
identity shift, Alba and Nee (1997) state referring to migrants in the US that
those members of minority groups who succeed in American labor markets
tend to leave behind their less successful counterparts and try to assimilate
themselves into the mainstream culture. Migrants and those households that
benefit from economic remittances may improve their relative positions in
their communities and such changes lead to the transformation of individuals’
images of social structure, including images of ethnic groups. As Davis et
al.(1941) and Lindenberg (1977) argue, those who are placed lower in a rank-
order of society distinguish fewer categories in this rank order. In fact, Popkin
(2005) has observed in Guatemala that international migration has resulted in
the establishment of new ethnic boundaries within the municipality of Santa
Eulalia: some migrants and their household members adopted behaviors that
people in the municipality associate with Ladino Guatemalans.
Therefore, along with multicultural reforms, international migration
has a potential to affect ethnic relations in various ways. Without under-
standing such impacts, it is difficult to evaluate what changes international
migration can bring to Guatemala and Nicaragua. Hence, it is essential to
examine what international migration can tell us about ethnic relations and
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structures in migrant sending communities. To achieve this goal, it is im-
perative to analyze both qualitative and quantitative data. This is why this
dissertation entails a mixed-method strategy that includes statistical analy-
ses of secondary data sets and field observations. The dissertation culminates
with the introduction of mathematical models that aim to explain mechanism
of ethnic identity shift and impacts of international migration on such a shift.
In the following section, I present hypotheses that will be tested in this project.
2.4 Hypotheses
In this dissertation, I first conduct statistical analyses of publicly avail-
able secondary data sets that will be discussed more in detail in the following
chapter. In these quantitative analyses, I test the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1:
The ethnicity of individuals will be significantly related to the propen-
sity of migration in both Guatemala and Nicaragua net of their socioe-
conomic and geographic characteristics. However, in Nicaragua, the cor-
relation will be less significant when we take into account households’
geographic locations.
Hypothesis 2:
Economic remittances increase the income inequality level, especially
within the same ethnic groups.
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Hypothesis 3:
The impact of remittance on children’s schooling is larger among indige-
nous households than non-indigenous households.
In addition, based on analyses of primary data collected during my
fieldwork in Guatemala and Nicaragua, I test the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4:
Impacts of socioeconomic upward mobility on changes in ethnic identities
will be more visible in Cantel, Guatemala than in Bilwi, Nicaragua.
Hypothesis 5:
Both indigenous and non-indigenous people who have achieved socioe-
conomic upward mobility through international migration will be more
sensitive to images and boundaries of ethnic groups and ethnic relations.
Hypothesis 6:
International migration creates new social boundaries that separate peo-
ple by other means including migration status, religious affiliations, and
socioeconomic positions.
Finally, findings from both quantitative and qualitative analyses will
be considered when I test the following hypothesis using the complex adaptive
systems approach and mathematical models.
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Hypothesis 7:
Wide definition of indigenousness will reinforce more indigenous people




This chapter describes the methodology used in this dissertation. Since
impacts of international migration on sending communities and ethnic iden-
tity shifts involve complex processes and thus require us to explore various
aspects of international migration, my dissertation has employed a mixed-
methods approach. The mixed-methods approach applied in this dissertation
entails quantitative analyses of secondary data sets, primary data collection
in research communities, and agent-based modeling that takes into account
findings from both quantitative and qualitative analyses. In addition to the
description of these methods, I will also introduce the project’s research com-
munities and present rationales for conducting my fieldwork in these particular
communities.
3.1 Mixed-Methods Approach
To closely analyze various impacts of international migration on send-
ing communities and determine what international migration tells us about
the ethnic identity shift and relations, the use of only one method does not
suffice since no single method can deal with all aspects of international migra-
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tion discussed in this dissertation. For example, to my knowledge, there is no
quantitative data set out there that covers all aspects of international migra-
tion explored in this project. Even if such a data set exists, variable-oriented
research such as regression analysis that primarily explores a correlation be-
tween factors alone is insufficient to fully understand processes that are as
complex as those leading to changes in ethnic identity and relations.
According to Creswell and Clark (2003), when one research method
is inadequate by itself to explore a research problem, it is preferred to ap-
ply the mixed-methods research design. The combination of qualitative and
quantitative data and methods helps researchers to obtain a more complete
answer. My dissertation project fits perfectly into such a situation. In fact,
my fieldwork has several easily recognizable benefits. For example, using a
questionnaire designed exclusively for this dissertation project, I could gather
necessary information for exploring my research questions. At the same time,
the project could not be completed solely with the qualitative method either
since it would not tell us much about how international migration affects send-
ing communities’ macro socioeconomic structures. Therefore, I have used both
quantitative and qualitative methods in this dissertation. In the rest of this
chapter, I present and describe each method applied in this dissertation and
explain how these methods could contribute to the project.
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3.2 Statistical Analysis
In this dissertation, I have analyzed several publicly available quanti-
tative data sets from Guatemala and Nicaragua. I have explored two topics
relevant to international migration using these data sets: 1) selectivity of
international migrants and economic remittance recipient households and 2)
impacts of economic remittances on recipient households’ socioeconomic sta-
tus and on the income inequality level. Below, I briefly introduce the data sets
and then, describe each of the statistical methods used in the dissertation.
3.2.1 Data Sets
I have used two data sets for each country: demographic census and
survey data sets. These data sets were collected by the Guatemalan Na-
tional Institute of Statistics (INE) and by the Nicaraguan National Institute
of Statistics and Census (INEC). I have first examined the latest national de-
mographic censuses for both Guatemala (2002) and Nicaragua (2005). These
data are 100% data and contain a very large number of cases (11,237,196 in-
dividuals for Guatemala and for Nicaragua, 5,142,098 individuals). Therefore,
these data sets have enabled me to explore various ethnicity-related issues,
which is difficult with small data sets. This point is especially important for
Nicaragua where the population size is much smaller than Guatemala’s and
also, where the proportion of ethnic minorities is very small. Since the cen-
sus data from both countries have a question on whether or not a household
has at least one member currently living abroad, I have analyzed if migrant
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selectivity differs across ethnic groups using these data sets. In addition, the
large number of cases also has enabled me to create reliable aggregate level
data at the municipality level as well as to estimate regression models limiting
a sample to those households living in my research communities.
In addition to the census data, I have used recently collected nation-
ally representative survey data. The Guatemalan’s data (National Survey of
Living Conditions, ENCOVI) were collected in 2006 while the data collection
took place for Nicaragua’s National Survey Living Measurements (ENMV) in
2005. Although the sample size for these survey data sets are much smaller
(13,693 households for Guatemala and 6,594 households for Nicaragua) than
that of the demographic censuses, these surveys provide much more informa-
tion that is useful for this dissertation including more detailed information
on households’ conditions and importantly, households’ remittance recipient
status, the amount of such remittances that are absent in the census data,
and a household’s spending behavior. Furthermore, since these survey data
sets report information on household members’ income, I could use these data
sets to examine whether or not economic remittances would affect the level
of income inequality between migrant and non-migrant households as well as
within and across ethnic groups in both Guatemala and Nicaragua.
3.2.2 Principal Component Analysis
While the census data used in the dissertation are very useful, they
do not report any income. Hence, it is not possible to directly observe each
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household’s economic status from the data sets. Nevertheless, to examine the
association between ethnic background and migration, we must control for a
household’s economic status since in both Guatemala and Nicaragua, one’s
economic status is strongly correlated with his or her ethnic background.
To overcome the above-noted difficulty, have I used principal compo-
nent analysis to construct an asset index that is used as a proxy for a house-
hold’s economic status. Principal component analysis determines and assigns
weights for each asset possessed by a household used to construct the index.
The application of principal component analysis to construct an asset index
was introduced by Filmer and Pritchett (2001). In principal component analy-
sis, we try to maximize the variance of a linear combination of a set of variables,
in our case, assets and resources reported in the census data sets. In another
word, in principal component analysis, we seek for “a dimension along which
the observations are maximally separated or spread out” (Rencher 2002:380).
Let us suppose that we have a data set with a set of N variables a∗1i to
a∗Ni, which represent the ownership of N assets by each household i. Principal
components analysis first normalize each of these variables by its mean and
standard deviation. We must normalize a∗1i to a
∗
Ni (let us call normalized vari-
ables as a1i to aNi) in order to make the principal components scale invariant.
We can express these normalized variables as linear combinations of a set of
underlying components for each household i:
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a1i = ν11A1i + ν12A2i+, .., ν1NANi
... i = 1, .., I
aNi = νN1A1i + νN2A2i+, .., νNNANi,
where the As are the components and the νs, which do not vary across house-
holds, are the coefficients on each component for each variable. These coeffi-
cients are referred to as component scores.
Note that we can observe only the left-hand side of the above equations.
To find the linear combination of the variables with maximum variance (i.e.,
Anj), we need to solve the equations (R - λnI)vn = 0 for λn and vn, where R
is the matrix of correlations between the scaled variables and vn is the vector
of coefficients on the nth component for each variable. Solving the equation
yields the characteristic roots of R, λn, which are also known as eigenvalues,
and their associated eigenvectors, vn. The final set of estimate is produced by
scaling the vns so the sum of their squares sums to the total variance.
We can obtain the “scoring factors” from the model by inverting the
system implied by the above equations and yield a set of estimates for each of
the N principal components:
A1i = f11a1i + f12a2i+, .., f1NaNi
... i = 1, .., I
ANi = fN1a1i + fN2a2i+, .., fNNaNi
The first principal component, expressed in terms of the unnormalized vari-
ables, is therefore an index for each household based on the expression. The
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crucial assumption for the use of this asset index is that household long-run
wealth explains the maximum variance (and covariance) in the asset variables.
There is no way to test this assumption directly (Filmer and Pritchett 2001).
However, various studies (e.g., Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Mckenzie 2005) have
shown the usefulness of the asset index constructed by the procedure noted
above.
3.2.3 Bayesian Statistics
Regression analysis is one of the two statistical methods used to analyze
the secondary data sets and explore the research questions of this dissertation.
I have estimated all regression models using Bayesian statistics instead of
the classical (or frequentist) statistics. The popularity of Bayesian statistics
has grown considerably in the social sciences over the past decade thanks to
advances in the computational capacity and the development of Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling methods. Detailed descriptions of models
estimated in the dissertation were given in the following two chapters where I
present analyses of the secondary data sets. Instead, I discuss reasons why I
used Bayesian statistics here.
Unlike the classical statistics, Bayesian statistics takes into account a
prior distribution for parameters in a model. Therefore, regression models







posterior ∝ likelihood × prior
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While the inclusion of prior distribution in a model has been criticized
on several grounds, there are various important advantages. First, Bayesian
interval estimates (credential intervals) “have a clearer and more direct inter-
pretation than classical confidence intervals” (Lynch 2007:71). In addition,
due to the large sample size that the data sets contain, the prior’s influence
on the posterior distribution (i.e. parameter values) is negligible. Finally and
most importantly, models based on Bayesian statistics give us more detailed
summaries of parameters.
3.3 Primary Data Collection
This dissertation project has also involved fieldwork to collect primary
data. The information collected in the field and findings from qualitative
analyses of these primary data complement results of the statistical analyses
presented in Chapters 4 and 5. Additionally, along with findings from the
statistical analyses, the field observations provide the invaluable information
for exploring the research questions and constructing proposed mechanisms of
ethnic identity shift presented in Chapter 7.
I conduct the fieldwork in two communities: Cantel in Guatemala and
Bilwi in Nicaragua. Both of these communities have a very high proportion
of indigenous people and other ethnic minorities. At the same time, these two
communities differ in various important ways making the comparison of these
communities important and rewarding. These differences, along with socioe-
conomic and demographic differentials between Guatemala and Nicaragua at
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the national level, have helped me to sort out factors affecting ethnic identity
changes in these countries.
3.3.1 Research Locations
In Guatemala, I conducted my fieldwork in Cantel, an indigenous mu-
nicipality located approximately 20 minutes from Guatemala’s second largest
city Quetzaltenango, popularly called Xela. According to the 2002 census,
there are 30,376 inhabitants in this municipality and the vast majority of
these people (95.73%) identify themselves as indigenous, most as K’iche’. The
name “Cantel” probably either derives from “Cantil”, a common name of
Agkistrodon bilineatus or from ki’che words of “can” or “k’an” (yellow) and
tel (rocks) (SOCODEVI et al. 1994). Today’s Cantel was founded around
1580, when residents encountered under an cypress tree an image of the Vir-
gin Asunción and as a result asked for their own church. In a document
published in 1689, Cantel is mentioned as Asunción Cantel. Today’s Cantel
is a closed population in terms of migration from outside of the municipality
(SOCODEVI et al. 1994). The municipality’s ethnic composition is quite
homogeneous and many find their spouses in the same municipality.
The above description of Cantel may give us an impression that it is just
like many other indigenous communities and municipalities that exist in the
western highland of Guatemala, including Cantel’s own neighboring communi-
ties such as Zunil. However, Cantel is radically different from other indigenous
communities in Guatemala in one very important aspect: the presence of once
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Central America’s largest cotton textile mill within its municipality (Nash
1967). In 1876, the Spanish firm of Sanchez y Hijos brought a cotton textile
mill into the municipio of Cantel. The factory was installed in Cantel because
of the municipality’s geographic location: The flow of the Samalá River gave
enough power to run a turbine needed for powering the spinning machines and
other machines in the factory (Nash 1967).
The Fábrica (factory) drastically changed various aspects of Cantel.
For example, as Garrard-Burnett argues (1998), at the time that the Fábrica
was built, the traditional economy in the region was intact. However, the
Fábrica came to control the important resources of the municipality such as a
school and a clinic. Nash (1967) also states that at the time of his fieldwork
in the 1950s, the Fábrica employed about one fourth of Cantel’s economically
active population. Despite the presence of the Fábrica, which was shut down
in July, 2008, many characteristics of the municipality remained unchanged for
years. For example, Nash (1967) found that people in Cantel and other parts
of the western highland region of Guatemala continued to speak K’iche’ and
the women wore their traditional clothes. The author argues that the study of
Cantel tells of the way this particular community evolved mechanisms enabling
it to adjust to a new mode of production with relatively little cultural loss or
social disorganization. Nash (1967:145 & 148) states the principal reasons for
Cantel’s cultural maintenance as follows:
Cantel made its greatest changes during a revolutionary decade,
but it never surrendered control of its affairs to a central govern-
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ment. The most revolutionary of ideas and activities can be han-
dled by a small society like Cantel if local people, without abso-
lute political and economic power, are the agents and adherents of
the new ways. Cantel worked out its adjustment to an influx of
new ideas in an arena where local people could make the ultimate
choice. Unlike China, the factory was not the government, and
the government was not specifically committed to the success of
the factory...[changes in Cantel], like the factory itself, came into
a community in which there had been ethnic continuity. People
who were to work in the factory or join the new political parties
had already worked out a set of social understandings and personal
relationships prior to the factory or the revolution. The physical
sameness of the population meant that no imported and alien pop-
ulation or cultural tradition came into the local society to compete
with and perhaps undermine it.
The description of Cantel presented by Nash more than 40 years ago still holds
true in many aspects. For example, the majority of women continue to wear
indigenous clothes today. At the same time, there are some notable changes
including the loss of the K’iche’ language among young generations. Nash
has stated that the Fábrica brought some drastic changes to the municipality
of Cantel. I argue that international migration from this municipality brings
the most drastic changes and impacts to Cantel since the establishment of
the Fábrica. Indeed, international migration affects the municipality in more
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numerous ways than did the Fábrica. As a consequence, indigenous ethnic
identities and indigenous cultures in the municipality, which have survived
under the strong influence of the Fábrica, are at risk today. During field
observations in this municipality, I have explored sources of differences in the
impacts of the Fábrica and international migration on Cantel and consequences
of international migration we should expect in this municipality.
In Nicaragua, I conducted the fieldwork in Puerto Cabezas, locally
called Bilwi where a large number of Miskitu indigenous people reside. Bilwi is
the urban center of the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN). Accord-
ing to the 2005 demographic census, there are 66,166 people in this municipal-
ity and about 70% of them identify themselves as Miskitu while approximately
20% of people are Mestizos and 2.31% Creoles. There are several other ethnic
minority groups in the municipality including the Mayangna group. Therefore,
unlike Cantel, Bilwi is a quite multicultural society.
According to Dennis (2004), one possible etymology for the word “Miskitu”
is the English word “musket.” Helms (1971) points out that it was through
acquiring muskets that the Miskitu subjugated other indigenous groups and
spread up and down the Coast from Cape Gracias a Dios and up the Rı́o Coco
(Coco River). As this possible influence of English on the name of the ethnic
group suggests, the Miskitu group has been strongly influenced by British and
American cultures. In fact, the Miskitu language contains a lot of English
words that have become traditional Miskitu words (Dennis 2004). As Den-
nis (2004) argues, it was probably the flexibility and adaptability of Miskitu
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culture that allowed it to survive and prosper.
The attitude of the Miskitu group toward foreign cultures is very dif-
ferent from the Mayangna indigenous people who are relatively isolated from
other ethnic groups of Nicaragua and maintain a closed attitude toward re-
lations with strangers. The Mayangna group seems to have discouraged in-
termarriage and attempts to live with them and learn their culture and lan-
guage (Dennis 2004). Indeed, in Puerto Cabezas, many people believe that
the Mayangna is totally endogamous. While this is not true, to my knowledge,
only a small number of Mayangna women marry those of a different ethnicity.
Like Cantel, many people from Puerto Cabezas have left there and
migrated to other countries. For example, a number of Miskitu immigrants
reside in various parts of the US such as Port Arthur, TX, and Miami today
(Dennis 2004). At the same time, there are several differences between Bilwi
and Cantel. In addition to Bilwi’s ethnic composition that is much more
multiethnic than that of Cantel, one important characteristic of Bilwi that
differentiates it from Cantel is the fact that there are a number of migrants into
this municipality from other indigenous communities, mainly those located in
RAAN. This migration flow affects various characteristics of the Miskitu people
including their attitude toward the Sandinista administration. For example,
while many Miskitu people maintain what Hale (1994) calls Anglo affinity, this
is not usually the case among those Miskitus living in the Rio Coco region.
Unlike Miskitu communities in other areas of the RAAN, the Moravian
church, the traditional provider of such services on the Coast, failed to effec-
64
tively penetrate the area (Baracco 2004). As a result, Anglo affinities among
these Miskitus are weak. Therefore, there was a room for the Sandinistas to
establish a friendly relationship with Miskitu people in the Rio Coco region.
The social closeness between Sandino’s soldiers who were mainly poor land-
less peasants and those in the Rio Coco helped both groups to have a good
relationship. In addition, under the crisis caused by the Great Depression,
Sandino’s social program of providing schools, hospitals, and land seemed to
offer an alternative to the Miskitu group, especially for those in the Rio Coco
region (Baracco 2004).
As a consequence of the Rio Coco’s geographic location, we can ob-
serve several important differences between Miskitus in the Rio Coco region
and those living outside of the region. First, the Miskitu people in the Coco
River region are much more likely to support the Sandinista. Second, prob-
ably because of the Sandinista influence, they are much more likely to speak
Spanish well than Miskitus in other parts of the RAAN. Third, because of
the relative absence of the Moravian church, the Miskitus in the Coco River
region are Catholics rather than Moravians. Since a large number of Miskitus
in the Coco River region have migrated into Puerto Cabezas over the past
few decades, we have observed various changes among the Miskitus in Bilwi.
Today, international migration seems to have accelerated these changes and
also, initiated other drastic changes that may have led to changes in ethnic
identity among Miskitu people in Puerto Cabezas.
Even though the majority of residents in both Cantel and Bilwi are
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ethnic minorities of Guatemala and Nicaragua, these two municipalities differ
in various important ways. Cantel is an ethnically very homogenous society
that is very different from Bilwi’s multiethnic society. While Cantel is a very
closed municipality in terms of its population in-flow, Spanish is much more
commonly spoken there than in Bilwi. That is, while the majority of people
do speak Spanish in Bilwi, there are two other languages spoken by many:
Miskitu and Creole English and this multi-linguistic nature of Bilwi makes
its residents always sensitive to ethnicity-related issues that is not the case in
Cantel. Despite these differences, I have observed that some people, especially
young people in Cantel, start showing preference for identifying themselves as
Mestizos or Ladinos rather than indigenous. Furthermore, in both municipal-
ities, it seems that international migration is a major influential factor on this
trend. Why do two municipalities that seem to differ from each other so much
present very similar patterns of impacts of international migration? The main
purpose of my dissertation fieldwork is to collect necessary information to an-
swer this question and further our understanding of international migration’s
impacts on ethnic identity and relations.
3.3.2 Survey Questionnaire
The survey questionnaire, which can be found in Appendix B, contains
a relatively small number of basic demographic questions and those related to
international migration. The survey questionnaire has had two main purposes.
First, with this questionnaire, I collected information that was not available in
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the secondary data sets used in the statistical analyses. For example, the sur-
vey contains questions regarding possible changes in household behaviors due
to international migration and the frequency of contacts between international
migrants and their household members in Guatemala or Nicaragua.
In addition to asking these questions, the survey questionnaire has also
served to select candidates for in-depth interviews and focus groups. While I
had certain criteria for choosing key-informants such as religious leaders and
those individuals who work at municipality or regional governmental offices,
to determine who are likely to provide valuable information in an in-depth
interview, we need to have at least a certain amount of information about re-
spondents such as their households’ migration status and ethnic backgrounds.
The survey questionnaire has provided me with an opportunity to collect such
information.
I began the survey questionnaire with various initial criteria. In Cantel
where the vast majority of inhabitants are indigenous, I first categorized the
population into four groups by the following two factors: the sex of household
heads and their households’ migration status. In Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua,
in addition to the sex of respondents and their households’ migration sta-
tus, I also included respondents’ religious affiliation in terms of Moravian or
other religions including Catholic and Evangelical since the affiliation with the
Moravian Church is a very important factor in determining one’s indigenous
identity in Nicaragua. In a similar way, I found that the distinction between
evangelical and Catholic was important in Cantel. Therefore, I considered
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households’ religious affiliation in Cantel too. The sample size for Cantel is 60
households while it is 120 households for Puerto Cabezas.
3.3.3 Focus Group
During the survey data collection, I recruited people who may partici-
pate in focus groups. I conducted three kinds of focus groups for this disserta-
tion, each with five to eight participants: 1) members of migrant households;
2) non-migrant household members and; 3) female members of both migrant
and non-migrant households. By conducting different focus groups between
migrant and non-migrant households, I examined whether migrant and non-
migrant household members have different ideas and attitude toward migration
and changes brought by it.
Goals of the focus groups were to learn what participants feel about
their ethnic images, boundaries, and relations and how these factors are af-
fected by international migration. I also expected that these open discussions
would clarify participants’ reactions to and interpretations of changes brought
by international migration, impacts on ethnicity-related factors. In doing so,
I tried to sort out those factors that were most likely affected by international
migration and those that are not. The focus groups were conducted during the
same period when I visited respondents for in-depth interviews. If I encoun-
tered any interesting and/or important points in the focus groups that had
not been explored before, such a point was included in subsequent interviews.




I conducted in-depth interviews with those individuals who meet crite-
ria as key-informants and those who seem particularly interesting in terms of
topics related to international migration and ethnic identity shift. Following
the IRB guidelines, I explained that their participation was voluntary and that
their answers would remain confidential. The interviews were conducted in ei-
ther Spanish or local indigenous languages (i.e. K’iche’ in Cantel and Miskitu
in Bilwi) and were digitally recorded.
Key informants in this dissertation are religious leaders, local govern-
ment officials who are familiar with the history of Cantel or Bilwi and topics
relating to ethnic identity shift and relations in these municipalities. I also ad-
dressed questions regarding the history of international migration and ethnic
relations in these municipalities and whether or not religious affiliations had
affected the propensity of international migration, especially during the time
of the political conflicts. Additionally, I asked them if there were any other
notable factors or events that impacted the community’s socioeconomic and
ethnic structures.
I also had interviews with return migrants, their household members,
and members of current migrant households. In these interviews, I asked re-
spondents regarding their migration experience, possible changes in their eth-
nic identities as indigenous and if they admitted any changes, why such changes
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took place. I also talked about respondents’ relationship with their household
members and people in their communities, how they saw their communities,
and their inter-ethnic relationship before and after migration experiences.
3.4 Agent-Based Modeling
The main purpose of the dissertation is to understand processes of
ethnic identity shift among indigenous peoples in Guatemala and Nicaragua
and what international migration tells us about such a shift. This purpose
is built on two important assumptions: one’s ethnic identity as indigenous in
these countries is conditional on both individual- and structural-level factors
and also, international migration influences these factors. The comparison of
Guatemala and Nicaragua is done to facilitate identifying influential factors
and differential consequences of international migration in terms of ethnic
identities in these countries.
However, identifying these factors itself does not lead us to under-
stand processes of ethnic identity shift. According to Cederman (2005:870),
“[s]ociological process theory requires explanations to specify theoretical en-
tities, relations, and mechanisms that together generate the social forms to
be explained.” Therefore, to achieve this goal, even the combinational use
of the statistical analyses and field observations is not sufficient. It is true
that the statistical analyses are helpful in identifying factors that influence
migration patterns and those that are likely to be affected by international
migration. Similarly, the field observations and the analyses of the primary
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data collected in the field are aimed at understanding changes brought by in-
ternational migration and how individuals perceive such changes. At the same
time, the information we can obtain from these methods alone cannot help
us verify mechanisms of ethnic identity shift since doing so requires us con-
ducting the fieldwork in a number of communities in various different settings
in terms of both individual and structural characteristics, which appears un-
practical or impossible. For example, since processes of impacts on social and
economic remittances on changes in images and boundaries of ethnic groups
can concatenate in complex ways over time conditional on initial and para-
metric conditions, two individuals who are socioeconomically very similar to
each other can end up holding totally different ethnic identities. This is why
agent-based modeling is applied in this dissertation.
Agent-based modeling is a computational method that enables a re-
searcher to create, analyze and experiment with models composed of agents
that interact within an environment. In the past agent-based computational
models have generated various social phenomena such as right skewed wealth
distribution (Epstein and Axtell 1996). Therefore, agent-based modeling can
be a complementary tool for analysis and explanations that are impossible to
formulate using solely mathematical models (Moretti 2002).
According to Cederman (2005), agent-based modeling allows us to con-
duct research that is generative. The author states that “[i]nstead of subsum-
ing observations under laws, the main explanatory goal is to make a puzzling
phenomenon less puzzling” (2005:868). In a similar vein, Barth (1981) dis-
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tinguishes generative explanations from the mere discovery of emergent social
forms. The author argues that it is not sufficient to identify the associations.
Instead, what we need is a deeper explanatory reconstruction of how the social
forms of interest were generated. Agent-based models can be designed to be
generative so that they by specified operations and can generate social forms
in which we are interested. In fact, Axelrod (1997:3) argues that the agent-
based method “is a third way of doing science,” that is different from both
induction and deduction as agent-based modeling is a way of doing thought
experiments.
I conducted agent-based modeling research based on findings from both
quantitative analyses of the secondary data sets and qualitative analyses of the
primary data collected in the field. Taking into account these findings, I exam-
ine mechanisms and processes of ethnic identity shift by changing parameter
values included in the models. In doing so, I aimed to understand how eth-
nic identity shift is being generated and how international migration affects
processes of ethnic identity shift. Therefore, both quantitative and qualita-
tive methods as well as the comparison between Guatemala and Nicaragua
and Cantel and Bilwi are necessary to understand processes that generate so-
cial forms of interest in this dissertation: ethnic identity shift. Hence, each
method used in this dissertation complements other methods. That is why the
mixed-methods approach has been appropriate in this dissertation.
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Chapter 4
Ethnic Differentials in the Selectivity of
Migrants and Remittance Recipient
Households
4.1 Objectives
This chapter tests the hypothesis presented in Chapter 2 related to
the selectivity of migrants and economic remittance recipient households (i.e.
Hypothesis 1). While a number of studies that explored these points, we
know little about how an individual’s ethnic background relates to migration
patterns. To my knowledge, one of few quantitative studies that has considered
migrants’ ethnicity is done by Adams (2006). However, his main focus is
not the migrant’s ethnic background and therefore, he does not elaborate on
this point. The evaluation of the relationship between one’s ethnicity and
migration patterns is important in countries where social classes are closely
correlated with one’s ethnicity including Guatemala and Nicaragua.
In this chapter, I examine if there are considerable differentials in mi-
gration patterns between indigenous and non-indigenous groups. Thanks to
the very large data size of the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan census data, I can
analyze possible ethnic differentials in the selectivity of migrant households
using both the whole national sample and the sample limited to the research
73
communities (Cantel and Bilwi). The quantitative analysis based solely on the
research communities is extremely useful since it has allowed me to see if pat-
terns of migrant household selectivity differ between the whole national and
research community samples. Such knowledge is essential to analyze primary
data obtained in my fieldwork, propose mechanisms of ethnic identity shift,
and to make conclusions about impacts of international migration on ethnic
relations in Guatemala and Nicaragua.
In addition, I study if the selectivity of remittance recipient households
differs between indigenous and non-indigenous households. While the eval-
uation of migrant households’ selectivity across ethnic groups is essential, it
alone cannot tell us how international migration influences sending societies’
economic and ethnic structures. As Popkin (2005) states, changes in a com-
munity’s economic structure by international migration can also affect ethnic
relations. Hence, identifying types of households that are most likely to benefit
from international migration and exploring any notable ethnic differences is
also fundamental in this project.
4.2 Data
To study the selectivity of migrants and economic remittance recipi-
ent households, I use both of the two data sets (i.e. census and survey data)
presented in the previous chapter. The analysis of the migrant household se-
lectivity is based on the 2002 Guatemalan census and the 2005 Nicaraguan
census. Since these data sets were collected by the national statistics institute
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of each country, they differ in several ways. For example, the number of vari-
ables that give us information on a household’s access to resources that are
used to calculate the asset index differs between these censuses. Nevertheless,
these two data sets report various comparable information, including the in-
formation on an individual’s ethnic identity enabling us to estimate regression
models for each data set with the identical number and kinds of explanatory
variables. Since neither the census nor the survey used in this chapter was
designed for the analysis of international migration, only limited information
on the topic is available. Yet, the combination of the two data sets enable us
to examine the two types of selectivity related to international migration.
The unit of analysis is the household and in the Guatemalan census
data, there are 2,171,633 households and in the Nicaraguan census, 997,374
households. For the municipality of Cantel, Guatemala, the data set contains
5,988 households while for Bilwi, 10,382 households. A household’s migration
status is the outcome variable in this analysis. By migration status, I mean
whether a household has at least one of its members living abroad. Note, how-
ever, that the way the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan censuses asked the house-
hold’s migration status differs slightly from each other. The Guatemalan cen-
sus asked whether any member from a household permanently left Guatemalan
during the ten years before the census was taken in 2002. On the other hand,
the Nicaraguan census’s question was if any ex-members of a household cur-
rently live abroad and not limited to the past 10 years before the census was
taken.
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In the evaluation of the selectivity of international economic remittance
recipient households, the unit of analysis is also households. However, instead
of the census data, I use the survey data collected in Guatemala and Nicaragua.
The survey data (ENCOVI for Guatemala and ENMV for Nicaragua) include
households’ economic remittance recipient status. The final data sets include
13,638 households for Guatemala and 6,859 households for Nicaragua. Unlike
the census data, these data sets contain a small proportion of missing cases in
explanatory variables, amounting to less than one percent for each data set.
Instead of deleting cases with missing data, I have included these cases in the
regression models and imputed missing values while I estimated the Bayesian
regression models.
4.3 Modeling Strategy and Explanatory Variables
The two outcome variables for the regression analyses presented in this
chapter are: 1) a household’s migration status and; 2) economic-remittances
recipient status. The above information was reported by household heads
when the data were collected. The outcome variables are coded as dummy
variables and I assign the value of 1 if a household is a migrant or economic
remittance recipient household and 0 otherwise. Since the outcome variables
are dichotomous, the assumption of normality is clearly violated. Therefore,
we need to transform the outcome variable and use an appropriate error dis-
tribution for it. I use binomial models with the logit transformation. That is,
assuming the distribution of the outcome variable is binomial with mean µ, we
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estimate p, the probability that the event (i.e. the probability of a household
to be a migrant household or economic remittance recipient household) occurs.
Using the logit model, p is transformed as follows:
Pr(Yi = 1) = logit
−1(x′β)
To take into account the regional variability, except for the models
limited to the Cantel and Bilwi samples, I use multilevel logistic regression
treating municipalities as the second-level units. In the case of individual-
level data, the classical, single-level model takes for granted that the binary
response y is representative of the response of a particular respondent who is
taken from a set of independent observations. Hence, we assume that observa-
tions are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). However, as Powers
and Xie (2008) argue, this assumption seldom holds true in social science set-
tings. That is, it is likely that lower-level units (households in this dissertation)
of analysis are nested within higher-level units (municipalities). As a result,
households within the same municipality tend to be socio-demographically
more similar to each other than those across municipalities, and therefore, the
i.i.d. assumption is likely to be violated. Since indigenous and non-indigenous
groups differ not only in terms of individual-level socioeconomic and demo-
graphic characteristics but also community-level factors such as their places
of residence as discussed previously, the use of multilevel modeling instead of
single-level regression is necessary to examine ethnic differentials in migration
patterns among households in Guatemala and Nicaragua.
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The multilevel models presented in this chapter allow the intercept to




where pij denotes the probability of being a migrant or remittance recipient
household for the ith household from the j th municipality. uj is the munici-
pality level (level-2) residual and is assumed to be normally distributed with
mean 0 and variance σ2u, and independent of x (Powers and Xie 2008).
Since I have estimated the random-intercept model, a more detailed
expression of the model is as follows:
logit(pij) = β0j + βkzij
β0j = β00 + β0hxj + uj
The above expression suggests that z varies by households within mu-
nicipalities while x varies by municipalities. It also indicates that only the
random intercept β0j varies among level-2 units. Note that β0j has a mean β00
that is the mean of the intercept of the municipality level units conditional on x.
As the above expression shows, there are h municipality level variables. In all
multilevel models presented in the current chapter, the second level variables
include regions of households’ residence. The municipalities are nested within
these regions and in the Guatemalan case, there are eight regions while there
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are four regions in Nicaragua. In the analyses based on the census data, I also
include one additional second-level variable: the percentage of the indigenous
population in each municipality.
To clarify if the ethnicity of household heads relates to the propensity
of becoming migrant or economic remittance recipient households and how
the correlation is affected by socioeconomic factors, I use a series of nested
models. In addition to the second-level explanatory variables, I have chosen
independent variables included in the models taking into account the previ-
ous literature. First of all, I include a household’s urban-rural status. One’s
residential location has been found as an influential factor on international mi-
gration in various previous studies. Indeed, in both Guatemala and Nicaragua,
not only socioeconomic status of individuals differs by urban-rural status, but
also their social networks. Therefore, controlling for this factor is important.
In addition, since indigenous groups are more likely to reside in rural areas
than their non-indigenous counterparts, controlling for this factor is funda-
mental to determine the correlation between one’s ethnic background and the
selectivity of migrant households.
Other independent variables included in the models are: the age of
household heads, their level of educational attainment, the household size and
the number of individuals of ages 15 and up in the household. Since the census
data do not report an individual or household income, I have constructed the
asset index as a proxy for the household’s wealth. The asset index is then
divided into quintiles and the first quintile (i.e. the poorest group) is treated
79
as a reference group.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 The Selectivity of Migrant Households
Table 4.1 below presents the descriptive statistics of the Guatemalan
households from the 2002 census used in the analysis of the selectivity of
migrant households. In 2002, about 6% of Guatemalan households were mi-
grant households. The table also reports the descriptive statistics by ethnic
groups and we can observe several notable differences between indigenous and
non-indigenous households. For example, more than half of indigenous house-
hold heads have received none or little formal education while among non-
indigenous households, almost 70% of household heads have received at least
some primary education.
Furthermore, there is an obvious ethnic difference in households’ wealth
status. While only about 12.6% of non-indigenous households find them-
selves in the poorest 20% of the Guatemalan households, more than 33%
of indigenous households belong to this group. We can also see that non-
indigenous households are much more likely to reside in urban areas than their
non-indigenous counterparts. Finally, the table suggests that non-indigenous
households (6.44%) are more likely to be migrant households than indigenous
households (5.40%).
80
Table 4.1: Percentage Distribution of Demographic Characteristics of Households in Guatemala, 2002
Total Sample Non-Indigenous Indigenous
Indigenous 36.14 — —
Region
Metropolitan Area 25.79 35.94 7.85
North 7.97 2.14 18.28
Northeast 8.86 12.32 2.73
Southeast 8.50 12.68 1.10
Central 11.41 11.24 11.71
Southwest 21.57 11.19 39.90
Northwest 12.83 11.05 15.96
Peten 3.09 3.44 2.46
Lives in Urban Area 50.23 59.31 34.20
Female Head 22.68 25.12 18.36
Household Head’s Age
< 30 17.90 17.00 19.51
30 - 44 36.38 35.84 37.35
45 - 64 32.43 33.04 31.35
65+ 13.28 14.13 11.79
Household Head’s Education
None or less than Primary 33.58 23.89 50.72
Primary Education 45.92 47.77 42.65
Post-Primary Education 20.50 28.34 6.64
Household Size
1 - 3 27.89 31.46 21.56
4 - 6 46.27 48.50 42.34
7+ 25.84 20.04 36.10
Male Members Aged 15+
None 9.50 10.35 7.99
1 - 2 78.42 78.37 78.50
3+ 12.09 11.28 13.51
Female Members Aged 15+
None 3.86 4.49 2.74
1 - 2 82.01 82.07 81.92
3+ 14.13 13.44 15.35
Spouse’s Ethnic Status
No Spouse 26.21 28.75 21.73
Non-Indigenous 45.88 70.00 3.26
Indigenous 27.91 1.25 75.01
Household’s Asset Index
1st Quintile 20.02 12.58 33.18
2nd Quintile 20.05 15.33 28.39
3rd Quintile 19.95 20.05 19.76
4th Quintile 19.99 24.32 12.33
5th Quintile 19.99 27.71 6.34
Migrant Household 6.06 6.44 5.40
N: 2,171,633
I also present the descriptive statistics of the Nicaraguan census data
below (Table 4.2). Although we need to take into account the fact that the
Nicaraguan census used in the dissertation was collected three years after the
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Guatemalan data, Nicaraguan households (10.18%) are more likely to have
at least one household member living abroad than Guatemalan households
(6.06%). It seems that this is in part because of the two main receiving coun-
tries for Nicaraguan migrants. That is, in addition to the US, Nicaragua’s
neighboring country Costa Rica also receives a large number of Nicaraguan
migrants.
Similar to the Guatemalan cases, we can find various ethnic socio-
demographic differences in the Nicaraguan census. The most notable differ-
ence is households’ residential locations. Nicaragua’s ethnic minority groups
concentrate in the Atlantic region and the data reflect this fact. While less
than 9% of the Nicaraguan households live in the Atlantic region, almost 40%
of households headed by indigenous individuals reside in this region. In addi-
tion, as was the Guatemalan case, non-indigenous heads tend to have received
longer years of formal education than indigenous heads. At the same time, the
difference is not as large as was the case in the Guatemalan sample. A part
of the smaller ethnic difference can be attributed to a generally higher level of
educational attainment in Nicaragua as compared to Guatemala. Addition-
ally, indigenous households tend to be larger than non-indigenous households
but tend to be poorer, both of which are consistent with the Guatemalan case.
Finally, Nicaraguan indigenous households were also less likely to be a migrant
household (8.24%) than non-indigenous households (10.31%).
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Table 4.2: Percentage Distribution of Demographic Characteristics of Households in
Nicaragua, 2005
Total Sample Non-Indigenous Indigenous
Indigenous 6.28 — —
Region
Managua 25.70 27.05 5.52
Pacific 30.82 31.42 21.87
Central 33.07 32.95 34.86
Atlantic 10.41 8.58 37.75
Lives in Urban Area 55.80 56.48 45.57
Female Head 30.02 30.14 28.26
Household Head’s Age
< 30 18.32 18.38 17.42
30 - 44 36.51 36.58 35.50
45 - 64 32.48 32.43 33.36
65+ 12.68 12.61 13.72
Household Head’s Education
None or less than Primary 27.18 27.13 27.95
Primary Education 41.69 41.40 46.02
Post-Primary Education 31.13 31.48 26.03
Household Size
1 - 3 30.47 30.82 25.28
4 - 6 47.86 48.12 44.01
7+ 21.67 21.06 30.71
Male Members Aged 15+
None 10.06 10.14 8.82
1 - 2 75.29 75.39 73.73
3+ 14.65 14.46 17.45
Female Members Aged 15+
None 4.42 4.43 4.27
1 - 2 79.76 79.88 77.99
3+ 15.82 15.69 17.74
Spouse’s Ethnic Status
No Spouse 33.16 33.34 30.51
Non-Indigenous 62.67 66.08 11.73
Indigenous 4.17 0.58 57.76
Household’s Asset Index
1st Quintile 20.04 19.13 33.63
2nd Quintile 20.03 19.77 23.95
3rd Quintile 20.00 20.18 17.23
4th Quintile 20.03 20.40 14.48
5th Quintile 19.90 20.52 10.71
Migrant Household 10.18 10.31 8.24
N:997,374
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Table 4.3: Multilevel Logistic Regression Predicting the Logged Odds of Becoming a Migrant Household in Guatemala, 2002
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Explanatory Variables Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD
Individual-Level
Indigenous -0.381 0.011 (-0.402 -0.359) -0.250 0.011 (-0.273 -0.228) 0.007 0.013 (-0.019 0.031)
Lives in Urban Area -0.025 0.008 (-0.041 -0.010) -0.381 0.008 (-0.397 -0.365)
Female Head 0.893 0.006 (0.880 0.905) 0.396 0.010 (0.375 0.415)
Household Head’s Age
(< 30)
30 - 44 0.037 0.009 (0.019 0.056) -0.088 0.011 (-0.108 -0.067)
45 - 64 0.576 0.009 (0.557 0.593) 0.407 0.010 (0.388 0.426)
65+ 0.541 0.011 (0.520 0.562) 0.369 0.012 (0.346 0.393)
Head’s Education
(None or less than Primary)
Primary Education 0.226 0.008 (0.211 0.240) 0.032 0.008 (0.017 0.046)
Post-Primary Education 0.334 0.011 (0.313 0.354) -0.048 0.011 (-0.069 -0.027)
Household Size
(1 - 3)
4 - 6 0.179 0.008 (0.164 0.195)
7+ 0.267 0.010 (0.246 0.287)
Male Members Aged 15+
(None)
1 - 2 -0.498 0.010 (-0.518 -0.477)
3+ -0.561 0.014 (-0.586 -0.534)
Female Members Aged 15+
(None)
1 - 2 0.097 0.020 (0.058 0.137)
3+ 0.200 0.022 (0.159 0.245)
Spouse’s Ethnic Status
(No Spouse)
Non-Indigenous -0.305 0.011 (-0.325 -0.284)
Indigenous -0.528 0.013 (-0.554 -0.503)
Household’s Asset Index
(1st Quintile)
2nd Quintile 0.592 0.012 (0.569 0.616)
3rd Quintile 1.047 0.012 (1.024 1.071)
4th Quintile 1.342 0.013 (1.316 1.368)
5th Quintile 1.681 0.015 (1.652 1.709)
Municipality-Level
% Indigenous -0.002 0.002 (-0.005 0.001) -0.003 0.002 (-0.006 0.001) -0.002 0.002 (-0.005 0.001)
Region
(Metropolitan Area)
North -0.881 0.290 (-1.453 -0.328) -0.803 0.309 (-1.412 -0.223) -0.551 0.272 (-1.104 -0.017)
Northeast 0.207 0.261 (-0.300 0.722) 0.190 0.263 (-0.325 0.691) 0.384 0.246 (-0.112 0.875)
Southeast -0.116 0.260 (-0.614 0.402) -0.108 0.261 (-0.626 0.422) 0.144 0.245 (-0.357 0.615)
Central -0.614 0.250 (-1.079 -0.132) -0.607 0.255 (-1.139 -0.105) -0.597 0.232 (-1.059 -0.111)
Southwest 0.280 0.241 (-0.189 0.725) 0.284 0.240 (-0.220 0.769) 0.370 0.222 (-0.038 0.835)
Northwest 0.863 0.244 (0.392 1.359) 0.892 0.245 (0.419 1.382) 1.087 0.226 (0.628 1.532)
Peten -0.433 0.323 (-1.069 0.208) -0.335 0.332 (-0.999 0.286) 0.062 0.316 (-0.550 0.657)
Intercept -2.841 0.216 (-3.283 -2.440) -3.601 0.217 (-4.016 -3.132) -3.790 0.199 (-4.209 -3.402)
Deviance 918,426 890,505 868,081
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Table 4.3 presents results from the Bayesian multilevel logistic models
using the Guatemalan demographic census data set described above. Note that
in all regression models that I present in this dissertation, an approximate
mixing of two parallel chains were achieved after 10,000 iterations and the
first half of the iterations (i.e. 5,000 iterations) were discarded as a barn-
in period. Model 1 suggests that indigenous households are less likely to be
migrant households as compared to Ladino households. Overall, the odds
of indigenous households to have at least one migrant living abroad is only
about 68% of the odds among non-indigenous households. The difference is
significant at the 95% high posterior density (HPD) level.
In addition, the model suggests the propensity to be a migrant house-
hold differs across regions within Guatemala. As compared to households in
the metropolitan area, households in the north and central areas are less likely
to have a migrant in outside of Guatemala. On the other hand, we can see
that the percentage of indigenous households at the municipality level is not
strongly correlated with a household’s odds to be a migrant household.
In Model 2, I also control for three characteristics of household heads:
their sex, age and level of formal education as well as urban-rural status. Both
household heads’ age and education are positively correlated with the odds of
households having at least one of the household members living abroad. For
example, the odds of households headed by those with some primary education
to be migrant households is more than 25% higher than the odds of households
headed by those with none or little formal education. In addition, as compared
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to households headed by those of ages under 30, households with heads of ages
30 and up are more likely to be migrant households. This finding suggests
that young people are more likely to migrate than older people. Note that
while the indigenous households remain significantly less likely to be migrant
households than non-indigenous households in this model, the difference is not
as substantive as was the case in Model 1. Indeed, the exponentiated odds
ratios change from 0.68 in Model 1 to 0.78 in Model 2. Hence, these models
demonstrate that at least a portion of the ethnic difference in the propensity
becoming a migrant household can be attributed to indigenous households’
lower socioeconomic characteristics.
In Model 3, I include all the explanatory variables considered in this
analysis. In this model, there is no statistically significant difference between
the two ethnic groups at the 95% HPD level. On the other hand, most of
the other explanatory variables have significant impacts on the propensity of
a household to send a migrant. For example, households living in urban areas
are less likely to have sent migrants. This is possibly due to the fact that in
Guatemala, many rural people migrate to urban areas, especially Guatemala
City and they may be less likely to have their ex-household members living
abroad.
In addition, female headed households are more likely to be migrant
households. According to my field observations, it is usually male members of
the household who first migrate. In fact, we can find that households headed
by those who have a spouse in the household are less likely to be migrant
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households than households headed by those who do not have a spouse within
the household. At the same time, we can also see that households headed
by those individuals whose spouses are indigenous are less likely to be mi-
grant households than those households headed by those with non-indigenous
spouses. Since the current model controls for the household’s socioeconomic
condition, this point possibly reflects the importance of migrant networks and
therefore, merits more consideration.
Another important finding from this model is that the household’s eco-
nomic status is positively correlated with its migration status. Economically
advantageous households are significantly more likely to be migrant house-
holds than poor households. For example, the odds of households whose asset
index is found in the second lowest quintile to be migrant households is more
than 1.8 times as high as the odds among the poorest 20% households. Fur-
thermore, the advantage increases among more wealthy households. Since
the census data used in this study do not report any longitudinal informa-
tion, it is difficult to infer from this finding the causal relationship between
a household’s wealth and migration status. At the same time, the fact that
the household’s economic status is strongly correlated with migration status
indicates that migration is a very selective process at least in the economic
sense among Guatemalans. Table 4.3 has demonstrated that international mi-
grant households in Guatemala are very selective and this is one reason why
indigenous households are less likely to be migrant households as compared to
non-indigenous households.
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We have seen that the socioeconomic disadvantage among indigenous
households holds also true in Nicaragua. Then, we might expect that similar
migration patterns can be found among Nicaraguan households. The results
from regression models using the Nicaraguan census data are presented below
(Table 4.4). Actually, indigenous households are more likely to be migrant
households than their non-indigenous counterparts. Overall, the odds of in-
digenous households to be migrant households is about 1.2 times of the odds
among non-indigenous households. At the same time, households in the At-
lantic region, where a large number of indigenous peoples reside, are less likely
to be migrant households than those households residing in Managua. On
the other hand, households in the Pacific region are more likely to be migrant
households than households in Managua. This is probably because the Pacific
region is close to Costa Rica where many Nicaraguans choose as their destina-
tion country. In addition, the fact that indigenous households are more likely
to be migrant households taking into account region of residence may indicate
that indigenous households residing outside the Atlantic region is considerably
different from other indigenous households.
The statistical difference in the odds of sending migrants between Man-
agua and the Atlantic region disappears in Model 2 where various additional
variables are included. Therefore, the disadvantage in sending migrants abroad
among households in the Atlantic region can mainly be attributed to these
characteristics. At the same time, interestingly, indigenous households con-
tinue to be more likely to be migrant households, but the difference is smaller.
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Table 4.4: Multilevel Logistic Regression Predicting the Logged Odds of Becoming a Migrant Household in Nicaragua, 2005
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Explanatory Variables Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD
Individual-Level
Indigenous 0.173 0.018 (0.139 0.206) 0.155 0.018 (0.120 0.191) 0.185 0.021 (0.143 0.225)
Lives in Urban Area 0.470 0.009 (0.453 0.488) -0.036 0.010 (-0.056 -0.016)
Female Head 0.729 0.007 (0.716 0.742) 0.352 0.011 (0.330 0.374)
Household Head’s Age
(< 30)
30 - 44 0.003 0.012 (-0.018 0.026) -0.217 0.013 (-0.242 -0.191)
45 - 64 0.872 0.011 (0.850 0.893) 0.484 0.013 (0.458 0.509)
65+ 1.276 0.013 (1.252 1.303) 0.819 0.015 (0.791 0.848)
Household Head’s Education
(None or less than Primary)
Primary Education 0.314 0.009 (0.297 0.330) 0.067 0.010 (0.047 0.085)
Post-Primary Education 0.599 0.010 (0.579 0.620) 0.053 0.012 (0.030 0.076)
Household Size
(1 - 3)
4 - 6 0.149 0.009 (0.131 0.166)
7+ 0.449 0.013 (0.424 0.473)
Male Members Aged 15+
(None)
1 - 2 -0.238 0.012 (-0.260 -0.215)
3+ -0.170 0.016 (-0.200 -0.138)
Female Members Aged 15+
(None)
1 - 2 -0.071 0.020 (-0.109 -0.030)
3+ -0.183 0.023 (-0.227 -0.138)
Spouse’s Ethnic Status
(No Spouse)
Non-Indigenous -0.506 0.012 (-0.528 -0.484)
Indigenous -0.445 0.030 (-0.505 -0.385)
Household’s Asset Index
(1st Quintile)
2nd Quintile 0.491 0.017 (0.460 0.524)
3rd Quintile 0.943 0.017 (0.909 0.976)
4th Quintile 1.401 0.017 (1.368 1.434)
5th Quintile 2.075 0.018 (2.040 2.111)
Municipality-Level
% Indigenous -0.008 0.003 (-0.013 -0.002) -0.009 0.003 (-0.014 -0.005) -0.009 0.003 (-0.014 -0.004)
Region
(Managua)
Pacific 0.748 0.227 (0.315 1.200) 0.777 0.212 (0.377 1.180) 0.937 0.205 (0.559 1.328)
Central 0.037 0.225 (-0.406 0.482) 0.280 0.203 (-0.110 0.700) 0.603 0.200 (0.210 0.977)
Atlantic -0.687 0.260 (-1.173 -0.139) -0.372 0.251 (-0.840 0.128) 0.068 0.241 (-0.437 0.517)
Intercept -2.633 0.210 (-3.039 -2.239) -4.035 0.194 (-4.433 -3.656) -3.852 0.192 (-4.214 -3.476)
Deviance 629,268 590,301 569,226
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This point merits serious attention since educational works in the same way as
in Guatemala and as we have seen, indigenous household heads in Nicaragua
also lag behind their non-indigenous counterparts in terms of various socioe-
conomic measures including the level of educational attainment.
Finally in Model 3, I control for additional household characteristics.
Indigenous households are more likely to be migrant households. Interestingly,
the exponentiated odds of indigenous households to be migrant households is
slightly larger in this model (1.20) than in Model 1 (1.17). Since indigenous
households’ socioeconomic characteristics that tend to promote more migra-
tion are less favorable as compared to those of non-indigenous households as
shown in Table 4.2, this point is puzzling. It is possible that factors other
than those included in this model influence the propensity of migration among
Nicaraguan households. For example, in one of the interviews I conducted in
Bilwi, I found that among households in the Atlantic region, Creole households
are most likely to migrate to the US because of their English ability and this
was true during the 1980s when the civil war was severe.
Urban households are less likely to be migrant households and female
headed households are more likely to be migrant households, which is consis-
tent with findings from the Guatemalan models. The ethnicity of the spouse is
also important but unlike Guatemala, those households headed by individuals
whose spouses are indigenous are more likely to be indigenous than households
headed by those with spouses who are not indigenous. Household’s economic
status works in the same ways as in the Guatemala’s case. Note also that in
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this model, households in the Pacific and Central regions are more likely to be
migrant households than those living in Managua. However, such a statisti-
cally significant difference does not exist between households in Managua and
those living in the Atlantic region.
4.4.2 Migrant Household Selectivity in Cantel and Bilwi
Taking advantage of the censuses’ large data size, I also conduct regres-
sion analyses of the Cantel and Bilwi data using the Bayesian binomial logistic
regression. Table 4.5 describes socioeconomic characteristics of households in
both Cantel and Bilwi. The table shows that while the majority of inhabitants
in both Cantel and Bilwi are indigenous, there are various notable socioeco-
nomic and demographic differences between the two municipalities. First of
all, more than 96% of households in Cantel are headed by those people who
identify themselves as indigenous. On the other hand, about one fourth of
the population in Bilwi can be identified as non-indigenous. Note that since
Creole people are categorized as indigenous in this table, we can see that Bilwi
is a very multi-cultural and linguistic society as compared to Cantel’s quite
homogeneous and indigenous population.
Indigenous households in Cantel are less likely to reside in urban ar-
eas, while the opposite is true in Bilwi. That is, indigenous households are
slightly more likely to be found in urban areas than non-indigenous house-
holds although the difference is small. Overall, in both Cantel and Bilwi,
non-indigenous household heads have received more formal education than in-
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digenous heads. Furthermore, the ethnic difference in households’ asset index
exists in both Cantel and Bilwi. Note that the asset index is based on the
national sample presented in Table 4.1 and therefore, the Cantel and Bilwi
population is not distributed evenly across the quintiles.
We can infer that Cantel’s economic level is close to the average national
level. About 40% of the households are found in the third quintile of the wealth
distribution and 12% of the households find themselves in either the poorest
or richest households. At the same time, the table also shows the obvious
economic advantage of Ladino or non-indigenous households as compared to
indigenous households. For example, while less than 1% of non-indigenous
households in Cantel find themselves in the lowest national quintile, more than
6% of indigenous households belong to the same category. Hence, although
most of indigenous households in Cantel may not be found themselves among
the poorest households in Guatemala, the economic advantage among non-
indigenous households is hard to deny.
Unlike the households in Cantel, the economic status among households
in Bilwi is worse than that of the average Nicaraguan household. About 53% of
Bilwi households are found in the poorest two quintiles of the wealth distribu-
tion. This is consistent with various previous studies that focus on the Atlantic
Region (Jamieson 1999). At the same time, we can also find non-indigenous
group’s economic advantage over indigenous households in this municipality.
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Table 4.5: Percentage Distribution of Demographic Characteristics of Households in Cantel, 2002
and Bilwi, 2005
Cantel Bilwi
Total N.I. Indigenous Total N.I. Indigenous
Indigenous 96.08 — — 75.15 — —
Lives in Urban Area 54.61 76.17 53.73 61.51 60.66 61.79
Female Head 19.04 28.09 18.67 32.27 26.05 34.32
Household Head’s Age
< 30 17.33 15.74 17.40 19.58 22.17 18.73
30 - 44 37.99 37.45 38.01 40.41 40.43 40.40
45 - 64 32.57 34.47 32.49 28.90 28.10 29.16
65+ 12.11 12.34 12.10 11.12 9.30 11.71
Household Head’s Education
None or less than Primary 16.18 7.66 16.53 18.67 18.57 18.70
Primary Education 66.00 47.23 66.77 43.24 36.36 45.51
Post-Primary Education 17.82 45.11 16.70 38.09 45.08 35.79
Household Size
1 - 3 26.22 34.04 25.90 19.79 22.71 18.83
4 - 6 48.65 53.19 48.46 42.06 46.20 40.69
7+ 25.13 12.77 25.64 38.14 31.09 40.48
Male Members Aged 15 +
None 7.80 10.21 7.70 8.54 7.83 8.78
1 - 2 81.00 82.13 80.95 71.29 75.00 70.06
3+ 11.21 7.66 11.35 20.17 17.17 21.16
Female Members Aged 15+
None 2.40 5.96 2.26 2.85 3.68 2.58
1 - 2 84.72 82.13 84.83 75.54 80.04 74.06
3+ 12.88 11.91 12.92 21.60 16.28 23.37
Spouse’s Ethnic Status
No Spouse 20.62 30.64 20.22 28.46 25.78 29.35
Non-Indigenous 3.49 53.19 1.46 16.72 54.77 4.14
Indigenous 75.89 16.17 78.32 54.82 19.46 66.51
Household’s Asset Index
1st Quintile 6.08 0.43 6.31 26.20 25.97 26.28
2nd Quintile 26.27 9.36 26.96 26.80 18.29 29.61
3rd Quintile 40.06 25.96 40.64 17.79 14.92 18.74
4th Quintile 20.76 37.87 20.06 18.25 22.52 16.84
5th Quintile 6.83 26.38 6.03 10.96 18.29 8.54
Migrant Household 4.98 9.79 4.78 6.28 7.67 5.82
Cantel N: 5,988; Bilwi N: 10,382
Note: N.I. = Non-Indigenous
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Table 4.6: Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting the Logged Odds of Becoming a Migrant Household in Cantel, 2002
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Explanatory Variables Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD
Individual-Level
Indigenous -0.748 0.231 (-1.181 -0.277) -0.511 0.258 (-0.968 0.042) -0.255 0.285 (-0.758 0.335)
Lives in Urban Area -0.035 0.123 (-0.267 0.200) -0.187 0.127 (-0.429 0.049)
Female Head 1.449 0.126 (1.213 1.696) 0.736 0.209 (0.300 1.133)
Household Head’s Age
(< 30)
30 - 44 0.162 0.195 (-0.214 0.545) -0.006 0.205 (-0.409 0.389)
45 - 64 0.413 0.196 (0.056 0.809) 0.312 0.206 (-0.090 0.718)
65+ 0.231 0.238 (-0.241 0.688) 0.159 0.260 (-0.370 0.664)
Household Head’s Education
(None or less than Primary)
Primary Education 0.274 0.166 (-0.058 0.603) -0.025 0.171 (-0.340 0.314)
Post-Primary Education 0.525 0.218 (0.097 0.940) -0.038 0.221 (-0.465 0.384)
Household Size
(1 - 3)
4 - 6 0.251 0.158 (-0.041 0.577)
7+ 0.249 0.210 (-0.144 0.677)
Male Members Aged 15+
(None)
1 - 2 -0.551 0.207 (-0.958 -0.133)
3+ -0.507 0.279 (-1.090 0.054)
Female Members Aged 15+
(None)
1 - 2 0.712 0.587 (-0.348 1.876)
3+ 0.584 0.623 (-0.576 1.801)
Spouse’s Ethnic Status
(No Spouse)
Non-Indigenous -0.700 0.404 (-1.519 0.064)
Indigenous -0.723 0.218 (-1.161 -0.296)
Household’s Asset Index
(1st Quintile)
2nd Quintile 1.726 0.715 (0.551 3.433)
3rd Quintile 2.639 0.705 (1.467 4.229)
4th Quintile 2.906 0.713 (1.743 4.560)
5th Quintile 3.519 0.728 (2.341 5.183)
Intercept -2.246 0.224 (-2.702 -1.816) -3.414 0.385 (-4.242 -2.719) -5.428 0.968 (-7.682 -3.697)
Deviance 2,362 2,237 2,140
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Table 4.6 above suggests that indigenous households in Cantel are sig-
nificantly less likely to be migrant households than non-indigenous households.
Overall, the odds of indigenous households in Cantel to be migrant household is
only about 47% of the odds among non-indigenous households. This odds ratio
is much smaller than that presented in Model 1 using the whole census data.
Therefore, the model indicates that the disadvantage of indigenous households
in terms of international migration is much more profound in Cantel than in
Guatemala as a whole. In Model 2, we can see that part of indigenous house-
holds’ lower odds of sending migrants abroad is attributable to their lower
educational attainment. As was the case in the analyses of the migrant selec-
tivity using the whole census data, Model 2 indicates that households headed
by individuals with a higher level of formal education are more likely to be
migrant households. In addition, we can observe that the odds ratios of the
two educational factors (i.e. some and post-primary education as compared
to none or less than primary education) are larger in the Cantel case than
the whole Guatemalan case, highlighting the importance of one’s educational
attainment in this particular municipality.
In addition, the statistically significant difference in the odds of send-
ing migrants abroad between indigenous and non-indigenous households dis-
appears in this model. Furthermore, the odds of female headed households
to be migrant households is more than 4 times as high as that of households
headed by men. Therefore, male members in Cantel are much more likely to
migrate than female members and migrants are likely to leave their spouses.
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This point is consistent with my own observations in Cantel.
The fact that the disadvantage in socioeconomic characteristics among
indigenous households as compared to non-indigenous households is correlated
with the lower odds of sending a migrant abroad among indigenous households
becomes more explicit in Model 3. In addition, we can encounter some other
interesting findings in this model. For example, a household’s economic sta-
tus measured by its asset index is strongly correlated with a household’s odds
to send migrant abroad. At the same time, when we control for this factor,
the statistically significant correlation between household heads’ educational
attainment and the odds of being migrant households disappears. Since one’s
educational attainment and economic status are positively correlated, this find-
ing again emphasizes the socioeconomic selectivity of migrant households in
Cantel. The model also suggests that households with the larger number of
male members are less likely to be migrant households while the opposite is
true for the number of female household members.
Another important finding from this model is that while households
where both a head and a spouse are present are less likely to be migrants,
the difference is statistically significant at the 95% level only for the odds
of households headed by those whose spouses are indigenous. As discussed,
people in Cantel are likely to leave their spouses in the municipality when they
migrate. At the same time, as was the case in the whole Guatemalan sample,
households whose heads’ spouses are indigenous are least likely to be migrant
households taking into account for other factors. Again, this point may reflect
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the difference in migrant networks between indigenous and non-indigenous
households and as well as some additional factors affecting migration patterns
thus, I will return to this point in Chapter 6.
Results from the regression models based on the Bilwi data are pre-
sented in Table 4.7. As was the case of Cantel, overall, indigenous households
are less likely to be migrant households than Mestizo households. At the same
time, the gap between these two ethnic groups is smaller in the Bilwi case
as compared to households in Cantel. Model 2 shows that household head’s
level of education is strongly correlated with the household’s odds of sending
international migrants. This is probably because even though non-indigenous
people tend to receive longer years of formal education, the difference in edu-
cational attainment between indigenous and non-indigenous individuals is not
as large as that found in Cantel and Guatemala as a whole. Note also that
the substantive correlation between heads’ educational attainment and the
propensity of sending migrant is stronger in Bilwi than in Cantel. Further-
more, the model suggests that those households living in urban areas are more
likely to be migrant households than rural households. In addition, consistent
with households in Cantel, households headed by females are more likely to
send migrants abroad than male headed households.
In Model 3, we can find some other variables that are significantly cor-
related with the odds of being migrant households at the 95% HPD level. For
example, as was the case in Cantel, a household’s economic status is positively
correlated with the odds of sending migrants abroad. In addition, one par-
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ticularly important point is while households where both heads and spouses
are present are less likely to be migrant households, the odds is actually lower
among heads whose spouses are non-indigenous than those with indigenous
spouses. That is, the odds of households headed by those with non-indigenous
spouses is about 44% of the odds among households whose heads’ spouses are
absent, the odds of households with heads and indigenous spouses is about
50% of the odds among households where heads’ spouses do not live within
the household. Therefore, it is possible that the relationship between migrant
networks and individuals’ ethnic background work differently between Cantel
and Bilwi.
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Table 4.7: Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting the Logged Odds of Becoming a Migrant Household in Bilwi, 2005
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Explanatory Variables Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD
Individual-Level
Indigenous -0.294 0.087 (-0.471 -0.128) -0.261 0.091 (-0.442 -0.083) -0.074 0.104 (-0.280 0.128)
Lives in Urban Area 0.866 0.116 (0.646 1.087) -0.195 0.150 (-0.496 0.087)
Female Head 0.564 0.086 (0.387 0.726) 0.081 0.129 (-0.180 0.335)
Household Head’s Age
(< 30)
30 - 44 0.304 0.139 (0.045 0.581) 0.012 0.151 (-0.279 0.312)
45 - 64 1.138 0.139 (0.864 1.422) 0.525 0.154 (0.219 0.839)
65+ 1.960 0.158 (1.665 2.287) 1.248 0.178 (0.903 1.593)
Household Head’s Education
(None or less than Primary) 0.403 0.130 (0.156 0.658) 0.141 0.145 (-0.134 0.439)




4 - 6 0.043 0.128 (-0.200 0.288)
7+ -0.234 0.168 (-0.573 0.107)
Male Members Aged 15+
(None)
1 - 2 0.229 0.158 (-0.091 0.533)
3+ 0.569 0.186 (0.190 0.928)
Female Members Aged 15+
(None)
1 - 2 0.100 0.297 (-0.481 0.681)
3+ 0.452 0.322 (-0.211 1.056)
Spouse’s Ethnic Status
(No Spouse)
Non-Indigenous -0.819 0.179 (-1.172 -0.472)
Indigenous -0.686 0.139 (-0.959 -0.411)
Household’s Asset Index
(1st Quintile)
2nd Quintile 0.497 0.199 (0.120 0.882)
3rd Quintile 1.135 0.221 (0.708 1.560)
4th Quintile 1.979 0.214 (1.554 2.405)
5th Quintile 2.410 0.222 (1.984 2.835)
Intercept -2.489 0.071 (-2.628 -2.350) -4.805 0.200 (-5.218 -4.398) -4.434 0.343 (-5.118 -3.780)
Deviance 4,862 4,470 4,210
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4.4.3 The Selectivity of Economic Remittance Recipient House-
holds
We have explored the selectivity of international migrant households
using the census data above. Now, let us shift our focus to the selectivity
of economic remittance recipient households. Table 4.8 below presents the
descriptive statistics of the Guatemalan ENCOVI data set used in the analysis.
Since these data are sample data, I use the sampling weight provided in the
data sets for the descriptive statistics in Tables 4.8 and 4.9.
About 16% of households receive economic remittances from outside of
Guatemala. This is much higher than the percentage of migrant households
(6.06%). There are a few possible reasons to explain this fact. First, some
households left Guatemala taking all members and thus, they did not appear
in the census data. At the same time, these households may send remittances
to their parents, relatives, or friends. Hence, even when a household does
not have any ex-members living abroad, that household may also receive eco-
nomic remittances. In addition, since the Guatemalan census asked whether
any member of the household left the country only during the 10 years before
the census was taken, those households whose members left Guatemala earlier
may not appear as migrant households in the census data. As was the case of
migrant households, the table indicates that indigenous households (15.33%)
are less likely to receive economic remittances than their non-indigenous coun-
terparts (17.00%).
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Table 4.8: Percentage Distribution of Demographic Characteristics of Households in Guatemala,
2006
Total Sample Non-Indigenous Indigenous
Indigenous 35.58 — —
Region
Metropolitan Area 27.36 37.32 9.31
North 7.83 2.44 17.59
Northeast 8.43 11.54 2.79
Southeast 8.15 11.84 1.48
Central 11.29 11.56 10.80
Southwest 22.35 16.54 32.89
Northwest 11.61 5.18 23.26
Peten 2.98 3.58 1.90
Lives in Urban Area 53.74 62.55 37.78
Female Head 22.69 24.92 18.66
Household Head’s Age
< 30 17.49 18.05 16.48
30 - 44 35.38 34.26 37.42
45 - 64 33.74 33.71 33.80
65+ 13.39 13.98 12.30
Household Head’s Education
None or less than Primary 30.86 22.13 46.67
Primary Education 44.39 45.00 43.29
Post-Primary Education 24.75 32.87 10.04
Household Size
1 - 3 31.32 36.15 22.56
4 - 6 46.20 47.61 43.66
7+ 22.48 16.24 33.78
Male Members Aged 15+
None 63.35 65.31 59.81
1 - 2 33.24 31.56 36.29
3+ 3.41 3.14 3.90
Female Members Aged 15+
None 14.93 16.88 11.41
1 - 2 73.43 73.58 73.14
3+ 11.64 9.54 15.45
Household’s Asset Index
1st Quintile 20.00 15.19 28.70
2nd Quintile 20.02 15.58 28.06
3rd Quintile 19.99 19.93 20.10
4th Quintile 20.12 23.17 14.59
5th Quintile 19.87 26.13 8.55
Receives International Remittance 16.40 17.00 15.33
N: 13,638
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Table 4.9: Percentage Distribution of Demographic Characteristics of Households in Nicaragua, 2005
Total Sample Non-Indigenous Indigenous
Indigenous 4.01 — —
Region
Managua 26.03 26.91 5.04
Pacific 29.64 30.39 11.62
Central 33.67 34.62 10.98
Atlantic 10.65 8.08 72.36
Lives in Urban Area 58.34 59.03 41.70
Female Head 31.43 31.56 28.40
Household Head’s Age
< 30 10.46 10.56 7.94
30 - 44 32.40 32.07 40.19
45 - 64 40.16 40.27 37.41
65+ 16.99 17.09 14.46
Household Head’s Education
None or less than Primary 30.87 31.16 23.99
Primary Education 41.69 41.38 49.06
Post-Primary Education 27.44 27.46 26.95
Household Size
1 - 3 21.13 21.46 13.09
4 - 6 44.08 44.28 39.35
7+ 34.79 34.26 47.56
MaleMembers Aged 15+
None 8.68 8.76 6.63
1 - 2 73.00 73.04 72.10
3+ 18.32 18.20 21.27
Female Members Aged 15+
None 4.64 4.63 4.80
1 - 2 75.22 75.41 70.64
3+ 20.14 19.96 24.56
Household’s Asset Index
1st Quintile 20.07 19.71 28.61
2nd Quintile 20.33 19.97 29.05
3rd Quintile 20.01 20.07 18.58
4th Quintile 19.76 20.04 12.92
5th Quintile 19.82 20.20 10.85
Receives International Remittance 21.86 22.06 16.97
N:6,859
A similar trend can be found in the Nicaragua’s ENMV data (Table
4.9). As was the case in the census data, Nicaraguan indigenous households
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lag behind non-indigenous households in terms of various socioeconomic char-
acteristics. Overall, Nicaraguan households are more likely to receive interna-
tional remittances (21.86%) than Guatemalan households (16.40%). This is
consistent with the higher proportion of Nicaraguan households that are mi-
grant households as compared to that of Guatemalan households and also, my
field observations in Bilwi that many households have long depended on remit-
tances sent from outside of Nicaragua. Finally, as was the case of Guatemala,
Nicaraguan indigenous households are less likely to receive international re-
mittances (16.97%) than non-indigenous households (22.06%).
Results from multilevel logistic models predicting the logged odds of
receiving international remittances in Guatemala are presented in Table 4.10.
In all of the three models, indigenous households are less likely to receive eco-
nomic remittances and the difference is statistically significant at the 95% high
posterior density level. Therefore, the models in Table 4.10 suggest that in-
ternational migration may increase the economic gap between indigenous and
non-indigenous households since non-indigenous households are more likely to
benefit from economic remittances. However, the difference shrinks as more so-
cioeconomic characteristics are controlled (Model1 to Model 3). For example,
the odds ratio of indigenous households to receive international remittances
is only about 66% of the odds among non-indigenous households in Model 1.
Yet, in Model 3, while the odds ratio among indigenous households continues
to be smaller than that of non-indigenous household, it is about 75% of the
odds ratio among non-indigenous households.
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In Model 2, we find that household heads’ educational attainment is
significantly correlated with the odds of receiving economic remittances. How-
ever, this factor is found insignificant in Model 3 in which additional factors
are taken into account. Furthermore, as expected, the household’s economic
status is positively correlated with the household’s odds of receiving economic
remittances at the 95% HPD level. Another notable finding in these models
is that in Models 2 and 3, we can see that rural households are more likely to
receive international remittances than urban households and the gap is larger
in Model 3 when all factors used in the analysis are controlled than in Model
2.
While rural households’ advantage over urban households may seem to
shrink the inequality level in the Guatemala’s economic structure, this may
not be necessarily the case. Since households’ socioeconomic status is posi-
tively correlated with the odds of receiving remittances and rural households
tend to lag behind urban households in these characteristics, it is possible that
only socioeconomically very selective households in rural areas receive these
resources. In addition, even though rural households may be more likely to
receive economic remittances, indigenous households who tend to reside in ru-
ral areas are less likely to receive these remittances. The models based on the
ENCOVI data above suggest that indigenous households are less likely to re-
ceive international remittances than their non-indigenous counterparts. While
some of such a difference can be attributed to socioeconomic advantages of
non-indigenous households, the regression results demonstrate that this ad-
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vantage alone cannot explain the difference in odds of receiving remittances
between these two groups.
In the case of Nicaragua, we can also find a statistically significant
difference in the odds of receiving international remittances at the 95% level
between indigenous and non-indigenous households in Model 1. However, con-
trary to the Guatemalan case, indigenous households are significantly more
likely to receive economic remittances than Mestizo households. More specifi-
cally, the odds of receiving international remittances among indigenous house-
holds is about 1.66 times as much as the odds among non-indigenous house-
holds. However, the odds of households in the Atlantic region to receive re-
mittances is only about 27% of the odds among households in Managua.
The regional difference continues to exist in Models 2 and 3 in which I
control for additional factors. The sex and the educational level of household
heads are correlated with the propensity of receiving remittances in the ex-
pected way. Unlike the Guatemalan case, urban households are more likely to
receive remittances than rural households. The statistically significant ethnic
difference, which continues to exist in Model 2, disappears in Model 3 when
households’ asset index is also controlled. Since households’ economic status
is positively correlated with the odds of receiving remittances, this is puz-
zling as indigenous households’ socioeconomic status is generally lower than
that of non-indigenous households. Therefore, it is probable that factors other
than included in Model 3 can affect a household’s odds to receive economic
remittances in Nicaragua.
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Table 4.10: Multilevel Logistic Regression Predicting the Logged Odds of Becoming an Economic Remittance Recipient Household in Guatemala, 2006
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Explanatory Variables Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD
Individual-Level
Indigenous -0.422 0.086 (-0.593 -0.257) -0.364 0.084 (-0.522 -0.202) -0.286 0.085 (-0.455 -0.122)
Lives in Urban Area -0.200 0.092 (-0.390 -0.027) -0.292 0.093 (-0.470 -0.121) -0.865 0.105 (-1.067 -0.663)
Female Head 1.425 0.058 (1.316 1.540) 1.472 0.057 (1.356 1.582) 1.430 0.073 (1.294 1.578)
Household Head’s Age
(< 30)
30 - 44 -0.181 0.081 (-0.346 -0.017) -0.413 0.092 (-0.593 -0.231)
45 - 64 0.339 0.081 (0.196 0.496) 0.113 0.097 (-0.079 0.309)
65+ 0.490 0.100 (0.300 0.684) 0.388 0.107 (0.177 0.592)
Household Head’s Education
(None or less than Primary)
Primary Education 0.256 0.067 (0.113 0.385) 0.030 0.069 (-0.100 0.169)
Post-Primary Education 0.447 0.099 (0.258 0.637) 0.037 0.101 (-0.158 0.242)
Household Size
(1 - 3)
4 - 6 0.470 0.075 (0.315 0.617)
7+ 0.636 0.103 (0.429 0.837)
Male Members Aged 15+
(None) -0.256 0.063 (-0.380 -0.131)
1 - 2 -0.777 0.166 (-1.092 -0.457)
3+
Female Members Aged 15+
(None)
1 - 2 -0.405 0.088 (-0.574 -0.229)
3+ -0.104 0.131 (-0.370 0.147)
Household’s Asset Index
(1st Quintile)
2nd Quintile 0.737 0.101 (0.539 0.931)
3rd Quintile 1.282 0.112 (1.059 1.492)
4th Quintile 1.674 0.121 (1.431 1.902)




North -0.179 0.255 (-0.681 0.315) -0.104 0.255 (-0.627 0.358) 0.152 0.250 (-0.324 0.664)
Northeast 0.415 0.178 (0.088 0.772) 0.455 0.184 (0.096 0.824) 0.484 0.185 (0.125 0.854)
Southeast 0.515 0.200 (0.098 0.893) 0.578 0.213 (0.177 0.996) 0.727 0.207 (0.342 1.124)
Central -0.538 0.200 (-0.944 -0.149) -0.508 0.197 (-0.907 -0.132) -0.471 0.199 (-0.872 -0.093)
Southwest 0.802 0.180 (0.444 1.163) 0.855 0.190 (0.468 1.227) 0.963 0.182 (0.604 1.328)
Northwest 1.296 0.224 (0.857 1.722) 1.404 0.235 (0.938 1.856) 1.433 0.227 (0.999 1.861)
Peten 0.570 0.271 (0.043 1.085) 0.638 0.280 (0.093 1.166) 0.947 0.277 (0.422 1.512)
Intercept -2.596 0.172 (-2.934 -2.254) -2.995 0.201 (-3.381 -2.586) -3.596 0.215 (-4.044 -3.171)
Deviance 9,651 9,566 9,184
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Table 4.11: Multilevel Logistic Regression Predicting the Logged Odds of Becoming an Economic Remittance Recipient Household in Nicaragua, 2005
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Explanatory Variables Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD
Individual-Level
Indigenous 0.504 0.217 (0.066 0.906) 0.417 0.222 0.01 0.858 0.377 0.218 (-0.050 0.792)
Lives in Urban Area 0.855 0.084 (0.695 1.015) 0.342 0.085 0.179 0.512 0.221 0.104 (0.016 0.415)
Female Head 0.759 0.072 (0.618 0.907) 0.834 0.107 0.619 1.044 0.571 0.084 (0.397 0.727)
Household Head’s Age
(< 30)
30 - 44 0.302 0.142 0.023 0.570 0.178 0.138 (-0.089 0.457)
45 - 64 0.926 0.138 0.663 1.197 0.680 0.143 (0.411 0.963)
65+ 1.320 0.156 1.021 1.627 1.022 0.156 (0.710 1.306)
Household Head’s Education
(None or less than Primary)
Primary Education 0.668 0.088 0.500 0.841 0.148 0.089 (-0.020 0.331)
Post-Primary Education 0.713 0.072 0.580 0.857 0.347 0.116 (0.129 0.582)
Household Size
(1 - 3)
4 - 6 0.043 0.096 (-0.132 0.240)
7+ 0.103 0.120 (-0.136 0.336)
Male Members Aged 15+
(None)
1 - 2 -0.468 0.118 (-0.709 -0.237)
3+ -0.524 0.155 (-0.831 -0.221)
Female Members Aged 15+
(None)
1 - 2 -0.389 0.183 (-0.723 -0.020)
3+ -0.348 0.205 (-0.735 0.049)
Household’s Asset Index
(1st Quintile)
2nd Quintile 0.404 0.127 (0.155 0.651)
3rd Quintile 0.550 0.128 (0.294 0.796)
4th Quintile 1.086 0.144 (0.800 1.358)




Pacific 0.416 0.318 (-0.194 1.025) 0.404 0.323 (-0.257 1.005) 0.486 0.322 (-0.161 1.096)
Central -0.412 0.312 (-1.041 0.179) -0.312 0.322 (-0.950 0.326) -0.187 0.313 (-0.796 0.409)
Atlantic -1.324 0.358 (-1.999 -0.622) -1.183 0.366 (-1.932 -0.474) -0.938 0.367 (-1.662 -0.219)
Intercept -2.169 0.304 (-2.760 -1.602) -3.181 0.335 (-3.845 -2.508) -2.521 0.403 (-3.343 -1.714)
Deviance 5,749 5,608 5,484
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4.5 Discussion
The statistical models presented in the current chapter have demon-
strated various important findings. First of all, in the national level analysis, I
found that migration is a socioeconomically selective process in both countries.
Since none of the data sets used in this chapter are longitudinal data, we can-
not make any conclusions about a causal relationship between a household’s
economic status and migration patterns. At the same time, the facts that these
two factors are positively correlated and that indigenous households tend to
be poorer than non-indigenous households indicate that it is probable that
international migration can impact inter-ethnic relations in these countries.
The findings from the analyses of the Cantel and Bilwi samples have
suggested that the disadvantage of indigenous households is much larger in
Cantel than in Bilwi. Two possible explanations are: 1) the gap in educational
attainment between the two ethnic groups is smaller in Bilwi than in Cantel,
in part thanks to the Sandinista administration’s literacy program during the
1980s (Baracco 2004) and; 2) the longer history of international migration
from Bilwi as compared to Cantel, which will be discussed more in detail in
Chapter 6. Nevertheless, we cannot negate that indigenous households are less
likely to send migrants abroad in both of these municipalities. Furthermore,
since the ethnic compositions of Cantel and Bilwi considerably differ, impacts
of international migration can be very different despite the similar patterns of
the migrant household selectivity.
Models presented in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 have shown that even though
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the proportion of households that receive international economic remittances
surpasses the proportion of migrant households in both Guatemala and Nicaragua,
there also exists a notable ethnic gap in the odds of receiving economic remit-
tances. At the same time, the gap exists in different ways between Guatemala
and Nicaragua. In Guatemala, we found that overall, indigenous households
are significantly less likely to receive economic remittances while the opposite
is true among households in Nicaragua. Since Nicaraguan households in the
Atlantic region, where many indigenous people reside, are less likely to receive
these resources, at the national level, there may be no significant difference
in the odds of being recipient households. Nevertheless, this is an important
point that merits further attention.
In addition, Models presented in Table 4.10 show that even control-
ling for all the factors considered in these models, Guatemalan indigenous
households are significantly less likely to receive economic remittances than
non-indigenous households at the 95% HPD level. It is uncertain why the
statistically significant advantage among indigenous households in the odds of
receiving economic remittances between the two ethnic groups disappeared in
Model 3 of Table 4.11 when controlling for various households’ characteristics
given that indigenous households lag behind these characteristics.
Hence, while the analyses in this chapter have led to various findings,
they have also posed several new questions, which unfortunately cannot be
answered using solely the secondary data sets. Finding answers for these
questions is fundamental in understanding the impact of international migra-
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tion on ethnic relations and ethnic identity shift. In the following chapter, I
continue to use the survey data sets to explore another important issue re-
lated to international migration: its impact on socioeconomic structures with
emphasis in the income distribution and children’s schooling, both of which, I
contend, strongly influence an individual’s ethnic identity. Findings from this
and the next chapters will then be analyzed and elaborated in Chapters 6 and
7 where I conduct the qualitative analysis of the primary data and propose a
mechanism of ethnic identity shift using the agent-based modeling.
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Chapter 5
Ethnic Differentials in Effects of Economic
Remittance on Recipient Households
5.1 Objectives
In Chapter 4, we have found that a household’s probability of sending
international migrants and receiving economic remittances significantly dif-
fers between indigenous and non-indigenous groups in both Guatemala and
Nicaragua albeit in different ways. In the case of Guatemala, indigenous
households are less likely to become migrant households and to receive in-
ternational economic remittances. While this is also true among Nicaraguan
households, we have found that in Nicaragua, the geographical location seems
to be a more influential factor on a household’s probability of sending migrants
abroad. Controlling for a household’s residential location, indigenous house-
holds are more likely to have sent migrants abroad and to receive economic
remittances than non-indigenous households. In addition, households in the
Atlantic region, where the majority of indigenous people reside, are much less
likely to send migrants than households in other areas of the country.
Limiting the sample to households in Cantel and Bilwi, we have found
that indigenous households in both municipalities are less likely to be migrant
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households than their non-indigenous counterparts. In addition, the regression
analyses presented in Chapter 4 have indicated that the significant difference
in the odds of sending migrants abroad and receiving remittances can usually
be attributed to socioeconomic factors. Since a household’s socioeconomic
status is closely related to its migration status, the above findings indicate
that indigenous households’ lower socioeconomic status often prevents them
from sending migrants abroad. What do these findings mean for economic
structures in Guatemala and Nicaragua? Answering this question is essential
in order to evaluate what international migration means for ethnic structures
in Guatemala and Nicaragua given the assumption that individuals’ socioeco-
nomic status closely correlate with their ethnic identities.
To answer the above question, I explore two impacts that international
economic remittances may have on migrant households and communities in
Guatemala and Nicaragua: the level of household income inequality and chil-
dren’s schooling. I argue that these two factors can affect a person’s ethnic
identity since individuals’ economic status and their educational attainment
tend to affect interactions that people have with others and also, how an in-
dividual perceive others. One reason why there are few interactions between
indigenous and non-indigenous peoples is that indigenous people lag far behind
non-indigenous counterparts in most of socioeconomic indicators. Therefore,
if international migration transforms socioeconomic structures in these coun-
tries, the interactions between the two ethnic groups may also change.
Previous studies that examined impacts of economic remittances on the
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level of inequality in sending communities have encountered mixed-findings.
For example, Barham and Boucher (1998) have found that migration increases
the level of inequality in Bluefields, Nicaragua. On the other hand, Acosta et
al. (2008) have shown that for both Guatemala and Nicaragua, economic re-
mittances reduce the level of inequality. While Acosta and colleagues (2008)
have provided important information on the effects of international migration
on income structures in several Latin American countries, their study does not
consider individuals’ ethnic status. To my knowledge, no study has explored
how international economic remittances can affect inter-ethnic economic struc-
tures. It seems that the lack of such research is due to the fact that the number
of indigenous migrants is much smaller than that of non-indigenous migrants,
especially in countries where the proportion of indigenous populations is small
such as Mexico and Nicaragua. Hence, little attention has been paid to indige-
nous populations in the study of international migration. However, to closely
examine impacts of economic remittances on income and socioeconomic struc-
tures in Guatemala and Nicaragua, we must take into account ethnicity since
it is strongly related to socioeconomic structures in these countries.
In this chapter, I also examine whether or not international migration
is related to children’s schooling in these countries. It is well known that in-
digenous children lag behind their non-indigenous counterparts in educational
attainment, especially in Guatemala. Since it is usually indigenous households’
poor socioeconomic status that leads to a large differential in educational at-
tainment between ethnic groups, households that receive international remit-
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tances are more likely to send their children to school thanks to their addi-
tional economic resources. I argue that the two aspects (i.e. inequality level
and school attendance) should be considered together when studying effects
of migration on ethnic structures because these two factors strongly affect the
ethnic identity shift in Cantel and Bilwi.
5.2 Data
In this chapter, I use the Guatemalan 2006 ENCOVI data and the
Nicaraguan 2005 ENMV data used in Chapter 4. In the analysis of impacts of
economic remittances on household income inequality levels, I have excluded
households that did not report their incomes from the sample. The final
data sets include 12,805 households for Guatemala and 6,522 households for
Nicaragua. In the analysis of the effects of remittances on children’s schooling,
I limit the samples to household heads’ children of ages between 7 and 20.
The sample size for Guatemala is 20,373 children and for Nicaragua, 11,436
children.
5.3 Modeling Strategy
5.3.1 Economic Remittances and Income Inequality
To examine impacts of economic remittances on the level of inequality
among Guatemalan and Nicaragua households, it is fundamental to obtain
information on migrant households’ income both before and after migration
took place. However, the data sets used in the current chapter are cross-
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sectional and do not provide any information on incomes before migration
took place. Therefore, we must impute household incomes in a counterfactual
scenario of no migration and no remittance.
As Acosta et al. (2008) and Adams (2008) argue, we cannot simply as-
sume that migrant households are randomly drawn from the whole population.
Findings presented in Chapter 4 have also indicated that migrant households
differ from non-migrant households in terms of various socioeconomic indica-
tors. Therefore, it is not feasible to simply predict household incomes of the
counterfactual scenario using regression coefficients among non-migrant house-
holds because such an estimate will be biased. In order to examine the effect
of migration and remittances on inequality, we need to estimate the counter-
factual per capita income that a household would have had if a migrant had
stayed at home.
To estimate the counterfactual per capital income, I use the selection
model of Heckman (1976) that is used by Barham and Boucher (1998) and
Acosta et al. (2008) who have predicted per capita income levels for house-
holds with remittances on the basis of a reduced-form specification for the
determinants of income among households without remittances. Using the
selection model, we suppose that non-remittance household income can be
observed only among households that have not sent any migrants abroad.
Y0 = Xβ + u1 receive only non-remittance income
and
Y1 = Xβ + u2 also receive remittance
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The above equations indicate that Y = Y0 if households are households that
do not receive international remittances and Y is missing or 0 otherwise. In
the current case, our substantive equation of interest is:
Y = Xβ + u1,
along with a remittance recipient status equation,
R∗ = Zγ + β + u2,
in which a household non-remittance income (i.e., does not receive interna-
tional economic remittances) if R∗ ≤ 0, and
Pr(R = 1|Z) = Φ(Zγ).
In addition, it can be shown that:




















The ratio φ(z)/Φ(z) is referred to as the inverse Mills ratio and this is included
as a selection variable in the second-stage equation. From the modeling stand,
we have:
R∗ = Zγ + u2, R = 1, if W = 1, if W
∗ ≥ 0, 0 otherwise
Y ∗ = Xβ + u1, Y
∗ = Y if R = 0.
The selection model is identifiable if there is at least one independent
variable in the first-stage choice function (in which we predict a household’s
remittance recipient status) that is not in the second-stage income function.
Therefore, we need to choose at least one independent variable that is included
only in the first-stage equation. That is, at least one variable that affects the
receipt of remittances in the first-stage, but not the household income in the
second stage equation. I use a household asset index as a variable that af-
fects international migration status as the variable that identify the model.
As Chapter 4 has shown, the asset index is closely related to international mi-
gration status. At the same time, I argue that it may not affect the amount of
income a household currently receives as the income usually depends more on
household members’ educational attainment and the presence of their members
living abroad than the asset index.
Using the household asset index as the variable that identifies the
model, I calculate counterfactual incomes for migrant households based on
regression coefficients obtained in the second-stage model. I then calculate
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Gini indices for both observed and counterfactual incomes to analysis the ef-
fects of international migration on the income inequality level in Guatemala
and Nicaragua. However, as Acosta et al. (2008) and Rodriguez (1998) have
noted, the variance of the counterfactual income predicted on the basis of ob-
servable household characteristics (i.e., regression coefficients) is very small
because it ignores unobserved determinants of income.
To overcome this problem, Barham and Boucher (1998) add to the
predicted household income a random error component drawn from a dis-
tribution with the same properties (mean, variance) of the actual estimated
errors. This chapter utilizes the same approach and obtains 1,000 different
estimates of the imputed counterfactual non-remittance income for migrant
households, and the same number of estimates for the inequality levels that
would have been in the case of the above counterfactual scenario. In doing
so, we can present both point estimates for the Gini indices and also, their
confidence intervals. By comparing these Gini indices of the imputed counter-
factual non-remittance income and actual observed incomes, we can examine
whether these Gini indices are statistically different from one another.
5.3.2 Economic Remittances and Children’s Schooling
Another objective in this chapter is to examine the correlation between
households’ economic remittance recipient status and children’s school atten-
dance. I use Cox proportional hazard model since this model enables me
to make use of all the available information in observations that are right-
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censored (i.e., children who were still enrolled in school at the time of survey).
In addition, using the Cox regression, I can include those individuals who have
already completed more than 12 years of schooling. Since the main interest
of the study is school attainment in primary and secondary school, I focus on
grades 1 through 12 by truncating an individual’s completed schooling at 12
years if one has more than 12 years of completed schooling, treating him or
her as right censored.
The sample is limited to children of household heads aged 7 to 20. I
exclude those children of age six younger at the time of the survey because in
Guatemala, the official age of entry for primary school is age seven, which is one
year later than in most countries in Latin America. Following Cox Edwards
and Ureta (2003), I regard children of school age who are not enrolled in
school as those who have dropped out of school. Since the current sample also
includes individuals who have never attended school, I regard “never enrolled”
as the first stage of the schooling process in this study.
Using the proportional hazard model, the observed fraction of the pop-
ulation that dropped out after grade t relative to children who have completed
grade t can be expressed as:
ht = h0(t)exp(x
′b)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard of leaving school after grade t, which is left
unspecified. x′ is a vector of covariates, and b is the vector of parameters to be
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estimated. In the Cox proportional hazard model, the effect of the covariates
is assumed to be proportional over the baseline hazard.
While we can make use of the current data sets using the Cox pro-
portional hazard model, as Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003) argue, there are a
few weaknesses of the use of cross-sectional data to study impacts of remit-
tances on children’s schooling. First, although it is reasonable to expect that
decisions of parents on the schooling of older children depends on their school
experience including whether or not they repeat a grade, the current data sets
do not offer such information. In addition, the composition of the household
such as the number of siblings and household budgets are likely to play a key
role in parental decisions on children’s schooling. Using the cross-sectional
data, such information is not available.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Economic Remittances and Income Inequality
Table 5.1 below presents descriptive statistics of variables used in the
selection model. While both total and non-remittance per capita incomes
are lower among indigenous households than non-indigenous households in
Guatemala, which is expected, the opposite is true in the case of Nicaragua.
This seems to be attributable to the way a per capita income is calculated
in this chapter: the household per capita income is calculated as the sum of
household income divided by household members. If a household member is
15 years old and up, he or she is considered as one person and for those under
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the age of 15, I regard them as one half. Therefore, it is possible that the
higher number of young people that indigenous households tend to have may
lead to a higher per income among indigenous households as compared to that
of non-indigenous households.
Tables 5.2 present results from the second-equation of the selection
models.1 The selection coefficient (λ) included in the model is statistically
different from zero at the 95% level in both Guatemala and Nicaragua, which
suggests that remittance recipient households are not randomly selected from
the population and therefore, the selection coefficient actually corrects sample
bias. Furthermore, the models suggest that in both Guatemala and Nicaragua,
non-migrant households have higher per capita income levels than do migrant
households. This point is consistent with the neoclassical theory of migration
in the sense that potential migrants decide whether to migrate or not by
comparing the returns at home and in their potential destination. At the
same time, this point must be taken account carefully since poorest households
usually face difficulties in sending migrants abroad. Indeed, in chapter 4, I have
shown that migrant households tend to be economically more advantageous
than non-migrant households.
1Table for the first equation is provided in Appendix A.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Characteristics of Households, Guatemala, 2006 and Nicaragua, 2005
Variables Guatemala Nicaragua
Total Non-Indigenous Indigenous Total Non-Indigenous Indigenous
Indigenous (%) 36.54 — — 4.18 — —
Lives in Urban Area (%) 53.15 62.25 37.34 58.77 59.51 41.70
Female Head (%) 20.40 22.25 17.18 31.27 31.40 28.40
Household Head’s Age 44.57 44.64 44.46 48.62 48.67 47.56
Household Head’s Education (%)
None or less than Primary 30.28 21.16 46.12 30.44 30.72 23.99
Primary Education 44.56 45.06 43.68 41.68 41.35 49.06
Post-Primary Education 25.17 33.78 10.20 27.88 27.92 26.95
No. of Male Members Aged 15+ 0.57 0.55 0.62 1.61 1.61 1.66
No. of Female Members Aged 15+ 1.41 1.34 1.54 1.73 1.73 1.83
No. of Male Members Under 15 1.08 0.93 1.35 0.95 0.93 1.42
No. of Female Members Under 15 1.05 0.89 1.31 0.92 0.90 1.35
Region (Guatemala) (%)
Metropolitan Area 26.90 37.15 9.09 — — —
North 8.15 2.46 18.03 — — —
Northeast 8.30 11.49 2.75 — — —
Southeast 7.98 11.71 1.49 — — —
Central 11.24 11.53 10.75 — — —
Southwest 22.69 16.82 32.89 — — —
Northwest 11.73 5.20 23.08 — — —
Peten 3.01 3.64 1.91 — — —
Region (Nicaragua) (%)
Managua — — — 26.32 27.25 5.04
Pacific — — — 29.24 30.01 11.62
Central — — — 33.70 34.69 10.98
Atlantic — — — 10.74 8.05 72.36
Receives International Remittances (%) 15.52 15.97 14.73 21.73 21.94 16.97
Non-Remittance per capita Income (amount) 1,881.12 2,535.87 988.12 1,808.23 1,790.60 2,211.96
Total per capita Income (amount) 1,970.40 2,430.89 926.11 1,903.88 1,886.35 2,305.14
N 12,805 8,307 4,498 6,522 6,051 471
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Table 5.2: Multilevel Linear Regression Predicting Non-Remittance Income among Non-Recipient Households in Guatemala, 2006 and Nicaragua, 2005
Explanatory Variables Guatemala Nicaragua
Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD
Indigenous -0.274 0.018 (-0.308 -0.239) -0.051 0.041 (-0.133 0.031)
Lives in Urban Area 0.422 0.019 (0.385 0.460) -0.052 0.026 (-0.103 -0.003)
Female Head -0.398 0.036 (-0.468 -0.328) -0.406 0.030 (-0.461 -0.346)
Household Head’s Age 0.032 0.003 (0.026 0.037) 0.021 0.005 (0.013 0.031)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 (-0.000 -0.000) 0.000 0.000 (-0.000 -0.000)
Household Head’s Education
(None or less than Primary)
Primary Education 0.308 0.020 (0.270 0.345) 0.077 0.026 (0.027 0.125)
Post-Primary Education 0.929 0.027 (0.874 0.981) 0.330 0.036 (0.266 0.401)
Male Members Aged 15+ 0.032 0.010 (0.012 0.052) -0.017 0.011 (-0.040 0.004)
Female Members Aged 15+ -0.135 0.011 (-0.156 -0.114) -0.090 0.013 (-0.114 -0.066)
Male Members Under 15 -0.183 0.007 (-0.196 -0.169) -0.078 0.010 (-0.097 -0.058)
Female Members Under 15 -0.176 0.007 (-0.191 -0.161) -0.120 0.010 (-0.138 -0.100)
λ 1.354 0.095 (1.166 1.545) 1.826 0.096 (1.635 2.011)
Region
(Metropolitan Area)
North -0.161 0.049 (-0.255 -0.071)
Northeast -0.129 0.039 (-0.206 -0.056)
Southeast -0.110 0.044 (-0.197 -0.027)
Central -0.065 0.042 (-0.145 0.017)
Southwest -0.125 0.039 (-0.202 -0.048)
Northwest -0.144 0.046 (-0.230 -0.050)
Peten -0.129 0.054 (-0.233 -0.021)
Region (Nicaragua)
(Managua)
Pacific -0.007 0.063 (-0.130 0.114)
Central -0.096 0.061 (-0.228 0.022)
Atlantic -0.084 0.064 (-0.226 0.033)
Intercept 6.257 0.067 (6.117 6.385) 6.624 0.125 (6.354 6.851)
Deviance 26,140 12,570
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The models also indicate that even controlling for socioeconomic and
geographical factors, Guatemalan indigenous households’ per capital income is
significantly lower than that of non-indigenous households. On the other hand,
while Nicaraguan indigenous households’ per capita income is also lower than
that of non-indigenous households, the difference is not statistically significant.
However, controlling for other variables including household composition, the
model shows that per capita income among indigenous households is slightly
lower than that of non-indigenous households. Therefore, as I expected, a
higher per capita income among indigenous households shown in Table 5.1.
is likely to be attributable to the fact that there tend to be more children in
indigenous households than in non-indigenous households. Most of other vari-
ables included in the models show predicted signs. For example, per capita
income of households with household heads who have received longer years
of formal schooling tends to be higher than that of households whose heads’
education is low. Furthermore, while the more adult males reside in a house-
hold, the higher per capita income levels become, the opposite is true for the
number of female adult members and children.
Table 5.3 presents Gini indices for observed non-remittance incomes, to-
tal incomes including remittances and imputed non-remittance incomes. The
table also shows Gini indices each ethnic group. In the case of Guatemala, we
can find that the Gini index for the observed non-remittance income (57.67)
is higher than the Gini index for the imputed non-remittance income (56.45).
This is also true for both indigenous and non-indigenous households. This
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finding makes sense since observed non-remittance income levels among mi-
grant households are usually low as these households often lack male members
who may contribute to this part of household income due to their absence
and therefore, heightens the Gini index. On the other hand, Gini indices (all
households and by ethnic groups) for observed total income (that includes re-
mittance) are lower than the Gini indices for the imputed incomes. Yet, for the
whole population and indigenous households, the difference is not significant at
the 95% level. While the Gini index for imputed non-remittance income is sig-
nificantly higher than that of total income among non-indigenous households
at the 95% level, the difference is very small. Therefore, the table indicates
that while international migration and remittances sent by migrants slightly
reduce the level of income distribution among Guatemalan households, its ef-
fects are not as significant as I have hypothesized. Hence, it is possible that
even if economic remittances lower the income inequality level in Guatemala,
the difference is so small that it may not affect income structures in the country
so much.
The effects of international remittances on households in Nicaragua are
somewhat different from the Guatemalan case. Among Nicaraguan house-
holds, Gini indices for imputed incomes are also lower than those for observed
non-remittances incomes. The differences between these incomes are statisti-
cally significant at the 95% level. However, contrary to the Guatemalan house-
holds, remittances increase the income inequality level among Nicaraguan
households and the difference between inequality levels is also statistically
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Table 5.3: Gini Indices Comparisons: Observed vs. No Remittances and No
Migration Scenarios
Country Reported Income Imputed Non-Remittance
Without Remittance With Remittance Income
Guatemala
Total 57.67* 56.25 56.45 (56.23-56.72)
Indigenous 51.36* 49.80 49.91 (49.60-50.33)
Non-Indigenous 57.13* 55.71* 56.00 (55.72-56.34)
Nicaragua
Total 51.95* 52.45* 50.63 (50.37-50.94)
Indigenous 50.64* 51.78* 48.87 (48.11-49.92)
Non-Indigenous 52.04* 52.49* 50.74 (50.47-51.04)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are 95% confidence interval
Gini indices with * are statistically different from imputed non-remittance
incomes at the 95% level.
significant at the 95% level. Overall, the Gini index for observed total in-
come is about 3.6% higher (52.45)than the Gini index for the imputed non-
remittance incomes (50.63). This tendency is true for both indigenous and
non-indigenous households. The Gini index increases by about 6% among
Nicaraguan indigenous households (48.87 to 51.78), the increase is about 3.44%
among non-indigenous households (50.74 to 52.49). Therefore, the analysis
shows that while the income inequality level increases for both indigenous and
non-indigenous households in Nicaragua, the increase is larger among indige-
nous households. It seems that this is partly due to the fact that indigenous
households in Nicaragua tend to concentrate in the Atlantic Coast region. As
we have seen, households in this region are less likely to send migrants abroad
in part due to their geographic disadvantage. Therefore, only socioeconom-
ically selected households can send migrants abroad, which may result in a
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higher inequality level among indigenous groups.
The examination of the effects of international economic remittances
on the income inequality level has shown that while remittances reduce the
income inequality in Guatemala–even though the decline is not statistically
significant–these resources increases the inequality level in Nicaragua. An
important question is how these changes affect indigenous households in these
two countries and how they affect ethnic relations and identities. These points
are discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7. In the following section, I examine
how remittances affect children’s schooling in the two countries.
5.4.2 Economic Remittances and Children’s Schooling
The second point that I analyze in the current chapter is impacts of
international migration on children’s schooling. Given the assumption that
ethnicity is a fluid concept, I argue that children’s schooling can affect this
concept in Guatemala and Nicaragua in a longer term.
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Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Characteristics of School Attendance among Children of Household
Heads in Guatemala, 2006 and Nicaragua, 2005
Variables Guatemala Nicaragua
Total Non-Indigenous Indigenous Total Non-Indigenous Indigenous
Indigenous (%) 45.30 — — 5.25 — —
Lives in Urban Area (%) 44.86 53.84 34.02 55.61 56.69 36.20
Female Head (%) 19.29 22.38 15.55 30.06 30.33 25.21
Household Head’s Age 43.12 43.08 43.17 48.33 48.37 47.56
Female Child (%) 48.62 48.12 49.23 47.82 47.87 46.87
Household Head’s School Year 3.91 5.10 2.48 4.56 4.55 4.70
Male Members Aged 15+ 0.84 0.83 0.86 2.10 2.10 2.13
Female Members Aged 15+ 1.64 1.53 1.79 2.15 2.14 2.23
Household’s Asset Index (%)
1st Quintile 20.01 15.47 25.49 14.87 14.26 25.90
2nd Quintile 20.00 17.02 23.61 18.36 17.73 29.67
3rd Quintile 20.00 18.08 22.30 20.95 21.16 17.12
4th Quintile 20.00 21.75 17.88 22.30 22.62 16.47
5th Quintile 19.99 27.68 10.71 23.52 24.22 10.84
Economic Remittance
Receives International Remittance (%) 16.71 16.72 16.69 20.05 20.52 11.66
Receives Internal Remittance (%) 15.56 17.83 12.83 22.07 22.22 19.41
Amount International Remittance 626.21 723.46 508.79 3,255.93 3,255.00 3,272.74
Amount Internal Remittance 156.73 198.78 105.95 1,191.10 1,172.65 1,524.22
Region (Guatemala) (%)
Metropolitan Area 20.18 31.01 7.10 — — —
North 9.06 2.31 17.21 — — —
Northeast 7.52 11.66 2.53 — — —
Southeast 8.04 13.51 1.44 — — —
Central 10.76 11.54 9.82 — — —
Southwest 25.58 18.36 34.30 — — —
Northwest 15.01 6.54 25.24 — — —
Peten 3.83 5.06 2.35 — — —
Region (Nicaragua) (%)
Managua — — — 24.63 25.77 4.11
Pacific — — — 30.92 32.06 10.23
Central — — — 33.39 34.80 7.83
Atlantic — — — 11.06 7.36 77.83
Child’s School Year 4.67 5.09 4.16 6.76 6.81 5.98
N 20,373 11,796 8,577 11,436 10,388 1,048
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Table 5.4 presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the anal-
ysis. The table shows us various notable differences between indigenous and
non-indigenous groups in the two countries. In Guatemala, on average, non-
indigenous household heads have received more than twice as many years of
formal education as their indigenous counterparts. On the other hand, the
table indicates that in Nicaragua, indigenous household heads have actually
received slightly longer years of education. At the same time, children’s years
of schooling is lower among indigenous children than non-indigenous children
in both countries. Additionally, as we have seen previously, the economic
status of indigenous households in both countries are lower than that of non-
indigenous households.
Table 5.5 and 5.6 present estimates from the Bayesian Cox proportional
hazard model for Guatemala (Table 5.5) and Nicaragua (Table 5.6). Model 1
shows that children in both countries, those who live in urban areas are signifi-
cantly less likely to drop out of school than those in rural areas. In addition, we
can find that while indigenous children’s risk of dropping out of school is signif-
icantly higher than the risk among non-indigenous children in Guatemala, this
is not the case in Nicaragua. As shown in Table 5.4, the average year of school-
ing among Guatemalan children (4.67) is much shorter than that of Nicaragua
children (6.76). And Guatemalan indigenous children tend to receive much
fewer years of education than their non-indigenous counterparts due to the
severe poverty they face and also, the fact that they tend to live in rural areas
where attending school may be difficult. The model reflects such a tendency.
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In Guatemala, the risk of indigenous children to drop out of school is about
35% higher than the risk among non-indigenous children while in Nicaragua,
indigenous children’s risk is about 2.3% higher than that of non-indigenous
children and the difference is not statistically significant at the 95% level. In
both countries, children of households that receive international remittances
are more likely to drop out of school than children of non-recipient households
if we control for the amount of remittances a household receives. Hence, the
risk of school drop out lowers as the amount of international remittances that
households receive increases. Therefore, while remittances are an important
household resource for households, to ensure that children to remain in school,
households need to receive a certain amount of remittances.
In Model 2, I have added several household socioeconomic characteris-
tics and their residential locations. The model indicates that parental educa-
tion significantly and negatively correlates with children’s risk of school drop
out. In addition, households’ economic status is strongly related to children’s
schooling in both Guatemala and Nicaragua. For example, in Guatemala, chil-
dren in the highest quintile of households are only about 56.5% as likely as
the poorest children to drop out of school. In the case of Nicaragua, richest
children are only about 58.7% as likely as the poorest children to leave school.
130
Table 5.5: Cox Hazard Models Predicting the Risk of School Dropout among Guatemalan Households, 2006
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2
Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD
Indigenous 0.300 0.028 (0.245 0.354) 0.032 0.033 (-0.030 0.096)
Lives in Urban Area -0.825 0.031 (-0.889 -0.765) -0.095 0.035 (-0.164 -0.029)
Female Head -0.094 0.041 (-0.174 -0.016)
Household Head’s Age 0.004 0.002 (0.000 0.007)
Female Child 0.266 0.03 (0.205 0.323)
Household Head’s Education -0.163 0.006 (-0.175 -0.152)
Male Members Aged 15+ 0.088 0.014 (0.059 0.113)
Female Members Aged 15+ 0.000 0.014 (-0.027 0.027)
Household’s Asset Index
(1st Quintile)
2nd Quintile -0.294 0.036 (-0.363 -0.229)
3rd Quintile -0.571 0.040 (-0.647 -0.490)
4th Quintile -0.852 0.045 (-0.936 -0.761)
5th Quintile -1.425 0.065 (-1.556 -1.306)
Economic Remittance
Receives International Remittance 0.820 0.291 (0.249 1.372) 0.614 0.303 (0.038 1.214)
Receives Internal Remittance 0.328 0.187 (-0.029 0.721) 0.301 0.185 (-0.070 0.652)
Amount International Remittance -0.152 0.037 (-0.222 -0.078) -0.114 0.039 (-0.189 -0.041)
Amount Internal Remittance -0.055 0.029 (-0.115 0.001) -0.065 0.029 (-0.120 -0.009)
Region
(Metropolitan Area)
North -0.122 0.085 (-0.290 0.038)
Northeast -0.076 0.073 (-0.208 0.075)
Southeast -0.141 0.080 (-0.294 0.018)
Central -0.005 0.075 (-0.150 0.136)
Southwest -0.147 0.072 (-0.290 -0.007)
Northwest 0.192 0.080 (0.039 0.346)
Peten -0.486 0.095 (-0.669 -0.304)
Deviance 38,158 35,630
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Table 5.6: Cox Hazard Models Predicting the Risk of School Dropout among Nicaraguan Households, 2005
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2
Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD
Indigenous 0.026 0.062 (-0.100 0.143) -0.226 0.073 (-0.365 -0.094)
Lives in Urban Area -1.217 0.043 (-1.299 -1.135) -0.513 0.050 (-0.612 -0.421)
Female Head -0.163 0.046 (-0.251 -0.069)
Household Head’s Age -0.004 0.002 (-0.008 -0.001)
Female Child -0.178 0.039 (-0.253 -0.103)
Household Head’s Education -0.085 0.007 (-0.099 -0.071)
Male Members Aged 15+ -0.083 0.018 (-0.116 -0.048)
Female Members Aged 15+ -0.088 0.019 (-0.125 -0.051)
Household’s Asset Index
(1st Quintile)
2nd Quintile -0.196 0.045 (-0.289 -0.108)
3rd Quintile -0.533 0.055 (-0.644 -0.424)
4th Quintile -0.856 0.073 (-0.999 -0.713)
5th Quintile -1.584 0.122 (-1.832 -1.348)
Economic Remittance
Receives International Remittance 1.528 0.292 (0.949 2.118) 1.119 0.279 (0.556 1.648)
Receives Internal Remittance 0.335 0.198 (-0.049 0.729) 0.029 0.219 (-0.395 0.440)
Amount International Remittance -0.240 0.035 (-0.309 -0.173) -0.154 0.034 (-0.216 -0.085)
Amount Internal Remittance -0.041 0.026 (-0.098 0.007) 0.002 0.029 (-0.053 0.058)
Region
(Managua)
Pacific -0.454 0.106 (-0.662 -0.253)
Central 0.008 0.098 (-0.176 0.212)
Atlantic 0.292 0.102 (0.109 0.496)
Deviance 21,299 20,315
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When we control for households’ socioeconomic status in Model 2, the
amount of international remittances that a household receives remains signifi-
cant for both Guatemalan and Nicaraguan households. This point implies that
in both countries, remittances sent by migrants are more than just economic
resources. It is possible that the importance of schooling is also transmit-
ted to migrant households and the amount of economic remittances sent back
home may reflect the frequency of contacts between migrants abroad and their
households. Through frequent contacts between migrants and their household
members left back home, household members may acquire new ideas about
the value of schooling. To further explore why the effects of international re-
mittances on children’s schooling differs between Guatemalan and Nicaraguan
households once other factors are controlled, I estimate the Cox models pre-
sented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 for each ethnic group in both Guatemala and
Nicaragua below.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 present the Cox-proportional hazard models for
Guatemalan indigenous (Table 5.7) and non-indigenous (Table 5.8) children.
Model 1 presents similar coefficients for indigenous and non-indigenous chil-
dren. For example, urban children tend to remain in school longer than rural
children. Furthermore, the amount of international remittances negatively
correlates with children’s school dropout. One notable difference between in-
digenous and non-indigenous children in this model is that the correlation
between the international remittance recipient status and children’s school at-
tendance is statistically different from zero only among indigenous children.
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Since migration is a risky process and many migrants fail to reach their desti-
nation and to send money back home even if they pay a large amount of money
to a coyote. To my knowledge, this is especially the case among indigenous
households. As a result, it is probable that children of migrant households,
especially poor children, are more likely to drop out of school unless these
households improve their economic status through remittances.
In Model 2, controlling for other factors, the amount of economic remit-
tances is significantly correlated with children’s school attendance only among
indigenous children. Guatemalan indigenous children lag far behind their non-
indigenous counterparts in schooling. Since households’ economic status (in
terms of asset index) is also taken into account in this model, it seems likely
that especially among indigenous households, international economic remit-
tances means more than economic resources for these households. I argue that
this point also makes sense considering the fact that a household head’s ed-
ucational attainment level is also negatively correlated with children’s school
attendance even when a household’s economic status is taken into account.
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Table 5.7: Cox Hazard Models Predicting the Risk of School Dropout among Guatemalan Indigenous Households, 2006
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2
Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD
Lives in Urban Area -0.572 0.043 (-0.660 -0.486) 0.004 0.051 (-0.095 0.104)
Female Head -0.114 0.064 (-0.246 0.010)
Household Head’s Age 0.013 0.002 (0.008 0.017)
Female Child 0.410 0.042 (0.332 0.495)
Household Head’s Education -0.166 0.010 (-0.186 -0.148)
Male Members Aged 15+ 0.051 0.022 (0.009 0.091)
Female Members Aged 15+ -0.009 0.020 (-0.045 0.033)
Household’s Asset Index
(1st Quintile)
2nd Quintile -0.291 0.054 (-0.395 -0.182)
3rd Quintile -0.495 0.060 (-0.612 -0.375)
4th Quintile -0.826 0.072 (-0.973 -0.682)
5th Quintile -1.354 0.103 (-1.558 -1.159)
Economic Remittance
Receives International Remittance 0.877 0.457 (0.014 1.744) 0.978 0.514 (0.054 1.971)
Receives Internal Remittance -0.166 0.291 (-0.707 0.390) 0.166 0.300 (-0.402 0.743)
Amount International Remittance -0.153 0.060 (-0.265 -0.038) -0.166 0.067 (-0.297 -0.047)
Amount Internal Remittance 0.016 0.047 (-0.075 0.104) -0.047 0.047 (-0.140 0.044)
Region
(Metropolitan Area)
North 0.080 0.150 (-0.203 0.363)
Northeast -0.002 0.165 (-0.310 0.335)
Southeast -0.050 0.211 (-0.474 0.354)
Central 0.285 0.150 (0.003 0.579)
Southwest 0.044 0.145 (-0.218 0.347)
Northwest 0.460 0.148 (0.190 0.772)
Peten -0.212 0.180 (-0.558 0.141)
Deviance 17,387 16,301
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Table 5.8: Cox Hazard Models Predicting the Risk of School Dropout among Guatemalan Non-Indigenous Households, 2006
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2
Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD
Lives in Urban Area -1.034 0.041 (-1.115 -0.953) -0.181 0.049 (-0.274 -0.086)
Female Head -0.082 0.054 (-0.186 0.022)
Household Head’s Age -0.002 0.002 (-0.007 0.002)
Female Child 0.136 0.043 (0.052 0.222)
Household Head’s Education -0.160 0.008 (-0.176 -0.144)
Male Members Aged 15+ 0.115 0.018 (0.079 0.153)
Female Members Aged 15+ 0.011 0.020 (-0.028 0.050)
Household’s Asset Index
(1st Quintile)
2nd Quintile -0.318 0.049 (-0.414 -0.220)
3rd Quintile -0.666 0.058 (-0.778 -0.556)
4th Quintile -0.885 0.065 (-1.003 -0.752)
5th Quintile -1.503 0.088 (-1.669 -1.324)
Economic Remittance
Receives International Remittance 0.618 0.378 (-0.191 1.322) 0.386 0.395 (-0.358 1.133)
Receives Internal Remittance 0.639 0.225 (0.194 1.074) 0.425 0.240 (-0.046 0.886)
Amount International Remittance -0.133 0.048 (-0.226 -0.030) -0.082 0.050 (-0.176 0.013)
Amount Internal Remittance -0.099 0.035 (-0.164 -0.030) -0.079 0.037 (-0.151 -0.010)
Region
(Metropolitan Area)
North -0.088 0.150 (-0.379 0.197)
Northeast -0.111 0.090 (-0.283 0.068)
Southeast -0.193 0.093 (-0.372 -0.012)
Central -0.153 0.095 (-0.342 0.027)
Southwest -0.208 0.093 (-0.391 -0.028)
Northwest -0.099 0.122 (-0.330 0.136)
Peten -0.609 0.123 (-0.861 -0.377)
Deviance 20,702 19,237
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Tables 5.9 and 5.10 present model estimates for Nicaraguan indigenous
(Table 5.9) and non-indigenous (Table 5.10) children. Model 1 indicates that
as was the case among Guatemalan children, urban children are more likely
to remain in school than rural children. International economic recipient sta-
tus itself is not statistically different from zero among indigenous children
while it is statistically significant among non-indigenous children. For both
ethnic groups, the amount of international remittances that a household re-
ceives is negatively correlated with the risk of school drop out. In Model
2, we find that international remittances are not correlated with children’s
school attendance among indigenous children. On the other hand, the amount
of international remittances received is negatively correlated with the risk of
dropping out of school among non-indigenous children. For both indigenous
and non-indigenous children, it seems that households’ economic status is the
most significant indicator of whether or not a child stays in school longer.
This makes sense given the fact that most children in Nicaragua finish at least
six years of education that is not the case in Guatemala. Since urban-rural
status remains significant for both indigenous and non-indigenous children in
this model, what affects children’s schooling most in Nicaragua seems to be a
household economic status and the availability of schools.
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Table 5.9: Cox Hazard Models Predicting the Risk of School Dropout among Nicaraguan Indigenous Households, 2005
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2
Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD
Lives in Urban Area -1.065 0.147 (-1.364 -0.790) -0.287 0.181 (-0.641 0.057)
Female Head 0.026 0.146 (-0.272 0.311)
Household Head’s Age -0.016 0.006 (-0.027 -0.004)
Female Child -0.015 0.130 (-0.262 0.229)
Household Head’s Education -0.069 0.019 (-0.105 -0.033)
Male Members Aged 15+ -0.238 0.060 (-0.348 -0.110)
Female Members Aged 15+ -0.106 0.062 (-0.225 0.014)
Household’s Asset Index
(1st Quintile)
2nd Quintile -0.189 0.138 (-0.444 0.083)
3rd Quintile -0.901 0.216 (-1.333 -0.469)
4th Quintile -1.371 0.310 (-1.972 -0.771)
5th Quintile -1.229 0.434 (-2.104 -0.415)
Economic Remittance
Receives International Remittance 3.249 1.951 (-0.410 7.445) 2.254 1.921 (-1.675 5.893)
Receives Internal Remittance 1.130 0.884 (-0.481 2.950) 1.095 0.914 (-0.657 2.900)
Amount International Remittance -0.513 0.234 (-1.016 -0.089) -0.356 0.233 (-0.842 0.095)
Amount Internal Remittance -0.097 0.104 (-0.307 0.102) -0.121 0.109 (-0.336 0.083)
Region
(Managua)
Pacific -0.242 0.840 (-1.767 1.513)
Central 0.314 0.761 (-1.031 2.111)
Atlantic 0.116 0.730 (-1.133 1.871)
Deviance 2,038 1,943
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Table 5.10: Cox Hazard ModelsPredicting the Risk of School Dropout among Nicaraguan Non-Indigenous Households, 2005
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2
Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD
Lives in Urban Area -1.235 0.045 (-1.320 -1.150) -0.526 0.055 (-0.635 -0.420)
Female Head -0.178 0.050 (-0.277 -0.084)
Household Head’s Age -0.178 0.050 (-0.277 -0.084)
Female Child -0.003 0.002 (-0.007 0.000)
Household Head’s Education -0.197 0.042 (-0.281 -0.114)
Male Members Aged 15+ -0.086 0.007 (-0.101 -0.071)
Female Members Aged 15+ -0.070 0.018 (-0.106 -0.035)
Household’s Asset Index -0.083 0.021 (-0.125 -0.043)
(1st Quintile)
2nd Quintile -0.188 0.047 (-0.277 -0.094)
3rd Quintile -0.513 0.058 (-0.632 -0.406)
4th Quintile -0.822 0.075 (-0.971 -0.683)
5th Quintile -1.603 0.133 (-1.854 -1.340)
Economic Remittance
Receives International Remittance 1.443 0.290 (0.871 2.007) 1.102 0.298 (0.472 1.635)
Receives Internal Remittance 0.364 0.208 (-0.047 0.753) 0.028 0.222 (-0.392 0.452)
Amount International Remittance -0.227 0.035 (-0.296 -0.159) -0.152 0.036 (-0.218 -0.076)
Amount Internal Remittance -0.049 0.027 (-0.101 0.005) -0.001 0.030 (-0.058 0.056)
Region
(Managua)
Pacific -0.462 0.111 (-0.678 -0.237)
Central 0.005 0.104 (-0.203 0.209)




Findings from the current chapter indicate several important points
regarding to the impacts of international remittances on Guatemalan and
Nicaraguan children. First of all, the findings suggest that international remit-
tance slightly decreases the income inequality level among Guatemalan house-
holds although the decrease is trivial and not statistically significant at the
95% level. This is also true among indigenous and non-indigenous households
when considering them separately. However, since the difference is so small, we
may say that at the national level, international migration does not influence a
country’s income structure as much as I have expected. On the other hand, we
have encountered a quite different story among Nicaraguan households. That
is, international remittances significantly increase the level of income inequal-
ity. Furthermore, the increase in the inequality level is more prevalent among
indigenous households than their non-indigenous counterparts. I have argued
that one reason why indigenous households’ income inequality level increases
more than that of non-indigenous households is that since the majority of
indigenous households reside in the Atlantic region, migration is a quite ex-
pensive process. Hence, only selected households can send migrants abroad
and as a result, the level of inequality further increases among this group.
The case of Nicaraguan households highlights an important point. Since
the majority of indigenous people reside in the Atlantic region, it is possible
that impacts of international economic remittances on income structure are
more apparent among Nicaraguan households as compared to the Guatemalan
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case when using the national level data set. On the other hand, because
Guatemalan indigenous peoples are wide spread across the country and given
the fact that rates of international migration seem to differ considerably by
region, the national level data set may not be suitable to examine actual
impacts of international migration on income inequality. However, using solely
the publicly available data set, it is not feasible to conduct municipality-level
analyses due to the small sample size. This makes sense given that people
usually situate their socioeconomic position comparing themselves with those
they normally interact with, who tend to be those people living in the same
community. Therefore, it is important to conduct a close analysis of each
community to understand what international migration means for economic
structures in sending communities.
In the analysis of children’s school attendance, we have found that
in Guatemala and Nicaragua, the amount of international remittance that a
household receives significantly reduces children’s risk of school dropout net of
other factors considered in the models. This result indicates that international
migration is likely to bring migrant households in the two countries more than
economic remittances. We need to take a close look at the importance of
social remittances in examining the effect of international migration on these
households. One point that seems particularly important is positive impacts of
economic remittances on children’s schooling is much stronger for indigenous
children as compared to non-indigenous children in both countries when other
factors are taken into account in Model 2 (Tables 5.7 to 5.10). I argue that
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the above tendency is in part due to the fact that indigenous children tend to
live in rural areas and also, they tend to be poorer, the importance of formal
education is not widely understood among indigenous households as much as
their non-indigenous counterparts. As a result, indigenous children tend to re-
ceive fewer years of schooling as compared to non-indigenous children in both
Guatemala and Nicaragua as shown in Table 5.4. Since indigenous children
are much poorer than non-indigenous children in Guatemala and Nicaragua,
international migration is one way for many indigenous children to acquire
more education. In this sense, international migration seems beneficial to in-
digenous children’s education. At the same time, it is possible that indigenous
children of non-migrant households may face even more difficulties in a long
run since the gap in formal education among indigenous children may increase.
Due to the data limitation, I could not conduct statistical analysis of
the two factors discussed in this chapter focusing only on households in Cantel
and Bilwi. Even so, we have found that international migration, economic
remittances in particular, affects both Guatemalan and Nicaraguan households
in various and different ways. Do these effects are the same among households
in Cantel and Bilwi? What do these effects mean for both indigenous and non-
indigenous people and their ethnic identity in the two municipalities? In order
to explore these questions, in the following chapter, I present a qualitative
analysis of my field observations conducted in Cantel and Bilwi.
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Chapter 6
Impacts of International Migration on Ethnic
Structures in Cantel and Bilwi
6.1 Objectives
In this chapter, I examine impacts of international migration on ethnic
relations in Cantel, Guatemala and Bilwi, Nicaragua using the data obtained
in my fieldwork. The statistical analyses presented in Chapters 4 and 5 have
shown that international migration is likely to affect socioeconomic structures
of both Guatemala and Nicaragua. The analyses in these chapters have in-
dicated while international migrants seem to be socioeconomically selective
in both countries, impacts of international migration among households in
Guatemala and Nicaragua have similarities and differences. What do these
findings imply for impacts of international migration on ethnic structures in
these countries? Regarding ethnicity as a fluid concept that is related to
socioeconomic factors and circumstances that surround people, I argue that
international migration can have a strong impact on sending communities’ eth-
nic structures. I posit that such impacts are especially the case in countries
like Guatemala and Nicaragua, where economic importance of international
migration is very large and the definition of ethnic groups is not necessarily
concrete or clear.
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In this chapter, I analyze impacts of international migration on the
ethnic structures in Cantel and Bilwi. These two municipalities differ from
other municipalities in Guatemala and Nicaragua considerably. Cantel stands
out from typical Guatemalan municipalities because of its large cotton mill
that was the economic base of many people in Cantel until quite recently.
Similarly, Bilwi is located in the internal war zone and numerous households
have been affected by the internal conflict, especially during the 1980s. These
municipalities have at least two characteristics in common. First, the propor-
tion of indigenous people and other ethnic minority groups is very high, and
this is one reason why people in these municipalities have maintained their
ethnic identity as indigenous. Secondly, both municipalities have been heavily
influenced by international migration in recent years. However, impacts of
international migration on ethnic structures in the two municipalities differ
considerably.
6.2 Data and Methods
This chapter draws on the data I collected in Cantel, Guatemala and
Bilwi, Nicaragua during 2009 for three and a half months in each municipal-
ity. I first started my fieldwork in Bilwi in January 2009 and after completing
the fieldwork there in April of the same year, I moved to Cantel and started
the fieldwork there. The fieldwork in Cantel ended in July, 2009. I decided
to collect first-hand data and conduct qualitative analysis for the following
reasons. First, while there are several survey data sets that contain informa-
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tion on international migration from Guatemala and Nicaragua, none of these
data sets reports detailed information about respondents’ ethnicity. In addi-
tion, I contend that statistical analyses alone cannot tell us much about how
international migration influences ethnic relations and identity change. Since
ethnicity is a fluid and complex concept, in order to understand the complexity
and nuances of ethnic relations and how international migration can possibly
affect these relations, it is imperative to obtain first-hand information that
allows one to study processes leading to changes in one’s ethnic identity. For
example, while I have shown that remittances sent by international migrants
may have more than just economic impacts on children’s schooling, what this
finding means to ethnicity is hard to understand from the statistical analyses.
Therefore, the ethnographic approach is especially suitable for gaining insight
into impacts of international migration on ethnic relations.
In my fieldwork, I first conducted a survey questionnaire using the ques-
tionnaire form shown in Appendix B. In Bilwi, I categorized the population
into eight groups using the following three factors: the sex of household heads,
their households’ migration status and respondents’ religious affiliation. While
I also asked respondents’ religious affiliation in Cantel, I did not use this vari-
able to categorize people there. I used the religious affiliation in Bilwi as one
category in choosing survey questionnaire respondents because the religious
affiliation, especially among those who are Moravian, is very closely related to
ethnic and geographical identity. While religion is also important in Cantel, I
did not see notable ethnic differences in religious affiliation in that municipality
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and thus, did not use this factor to categorize Cantel’s population. Therefore,
I categorized the population into eight groups in Bilwi while I had four groups
in Cantel. This is why the number of respondents in the survey questionnaire
is larger in Bilwi (120 respondents) than in Cantel (60 respondents). Based
on these categories and with my research assistants who are native of Cantel
or Bilwi and very familiar with residents of the municipalities, I selected re-
spondents for the survey questionnaire. Note that the ethnicity was not used
to categorize people for two reasons: 1) given the sample size, it was likely
that non-indigenous respondents would be included in the sample, especially
in the case of Bilwi where the number of respondents is relatively large and
the proportion of Mestizo and other non-indigenous minorities is high. In the
case of Cantel, since most residents are indigenous and the key informants in-
cluded a few Ladino respondents, I did not need to intentionally choose more
Ladino respondents and; 2) since one’s ethnic identity does not always coincide
with what other people think about that person’s ethnic identity, especially in
the case of indigenous people, I decided that it was better to ask respondents
their ethnic identity instead of going to the interviews determining that one
is indigenous or not. Therefore, even the dissertation focuses on indigenous
people’s ethnic identity, ethnic identity itself was not used to categorize the
population for the questionnaire survey.
I then interviewed individuals that seemed particularly interesting dur-
ing the survey questionnaire. I conducted a total of 43 in-depth, digitally-
recorded and semi-structured interviews (21 respondents in Cantel and 22
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respondents in Bilwi) in Spanish and in some cases, indigenous languages
(K’iche’ in Cantel or Miskitu in Bilwi). In recruiting respondents, I also asked
my respondents as well as my local research assistants in each municipality to
suggest potential participants. As a result, even though my study participants
differ in their socioeconomic status and migration status, the small number
and the non-probabilistic method of selecting the respondents precludes any
generalization to the Guatemalan or Nicaraguan populations.
The 43 respondents in the semi-structured interviews also include sev-
eral key informants in each municipality. The key respondents in this disserta-
tion project are composed of community or religious leaders who are familiar
with the issues of ethnicity in these municipalities. Since the time frame of my
fieldwork was limited, it was impossible to observe how international migration
changes ethnic structures during my fieldwork. Therefore, it was necessary for
me to obtain information from those people who have been in Cantel or Bilwi
for a long time and are also familiar with the issue of ethnicity and inter-
national migration. Although my sample is non-random, I argue that it is
not problematic in this project given that ethnicity is situational and how
international migration can affect ethnicity may differ between communities.
The main goal of the current chapter is not to generalize impacts of inter-
national migration on ethnic structure and ethnic identity in Guatemala and
Nicaragua, but to identify factors that affect ethnic identity and understand
whether or not international migration affects ethnic identity change in the
two municipalities.
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In addition to the respondents for the in-depth interviews, I recruited
people who may participate in focus groups during the survey questionnaire.
In this dissertation project, I conducted three kinds of focus groups in each
municipality (one focus group for each kind and therefore, a total of six fo-
cus groups in the two municipalities): 1) members of migrant households; 2)
non-migrant household members and; 3) female members of both migrant and
non-migrant households. Therefore, participants in the focus groups have been
selected based mainly on a household’s migration status and the sex of possible
participants and each group had five to eight participants. By conducting dif-
ferent focus groups between migrant and non-migrant households, I examined
whether migrant and non-migrant household members share different ideas
and attitude toward migration and changes brought by it. For example, how
migrant household members see other migrant households may differ from how
non-migrant household members see migrant household members.
Goals of the focus groups were to learn what participants would think
about their ethnic images and relations as well as ethnic identity shift and how
these factors have been affected by international migration. Since I intended to
captures ideas regarding migration and ethnicity related-issues among ordinary
people in these municipalities, I excluded participants in in-depth interviews
who tend to be more familiar with the issue than others in the municipalities.
I also expected that open discussions in the focus group would show partic-
ipants’ reactions to and interpretations of changes brought by international
migration and impacts of international migration on social networks and eth-
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nic identity shift. In doing so, I aimed to identify factors that were most
likely affected by international migration and also, elements that are most
likely related to one’s ethnic identity in these municipalities. The focus groups
were conducted during the period I conducted in-depth interviews. Therefore,
when I encountered any noteworthy points in the focus groups that had not
been explored before in the fieldwork, that point was included in subsequent
interviews.
6.3 Results
The main goal of my fieldwork was to examine how international migra-
tion affects ethnic structures and people’s ethnic identity in Cantel and Bilwi.
To achieve this goal, I started my fieldwork exploring factors that international
migration may affect. As Cornell and Hartmann (2007) argue, ethnicity is a
product both of social change and circumstance and of human interpretation
and action. In other words, ethnicity is neither natural nor static identity,
and ethnic identity construction may occur in any part of a society and as
an aspect of virtually any set of social relations. Therefore, identifying factors
that international migration is likely to affect in these municipalities is the first
step in examining impacts of international migration on ethnic relations. This
is why I began the interviews asking my respondents whether they perceived
that any notable changes in ethnicity related issues have been observed over
the years since they began to reside in either Cantel or Bilwi. Then, I sorted
out factors that are likely affected by international migration and those that
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are not. The comparison of the two municipalities has helped me to carry out
this task. Below, I present how international migration has affected socioe-
conomic structures and social networks and how such impacts differ among
people in Cantel and Bilwi.
6.3.1 Impacts of International Migration on Socioeconomic Struc-
tures and Social Networks
The strong impact that international migration has had on the socioe-
conomic structure is hard to deny in both municipalities. For example, in both
Cantel and Bilwi, when I asked if there were any notable changes that respon-
dents in my interviews and participants in the focus groups thought that were
due to international migration, most of them commented that a considerable
number of large houses were constructed by migrant households. In the case of
Cantel, several respondents stated that some migrant households constructed
even four-story houses, which are rare in the municipality where most houses
are one-story houses. In addition, children of migrant households often wear
clothes that are so expensive that most non-migrant households cannot afford
them. In both municipalities, children of migrant households are more likely
to attend private schools instead of public schools, especially in Bilwi where
various private schools exist.
Even when children remain in public schools, the socioeconomic differ-
ence between children of migrant and non-migrants households is easily observ-
able. Dario, a school teacher at a public school in Cantel, noted that migrant
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household children tend to possess goods that many non-migrant households
cannot afford such as video games. Not only the difference in economic status
between migrant and non-migrant households is observable, but also people in
both Cantel and Bilwi are well aware of such differences. The prosperity that
international migration has brought to both municipalities is one reason why
people, especially young people in these municipalities migrate internationally.
Indeed, for people in both Cantel and Bilwi, the primary reason to migrate
internationally is to encounter economic opportunities that are hard to find
in these municipalities. For many indigenous people in both municipalities,
migrating abroad is a more attractive and realistic option than migrating to
capital cities of Guatemala City or Managua. Many of indigenous households
in these municipalities do not have family members or acquaintances in the
capital and due to the severe discrimination they have faced as indigenous
seems to discourage them from migrating to the capital. On the other hand,
I found that most residents in these two municipalities know at least one per-
son who lives abroad and virtually everybody could tell me a story or two
about people from their municipalities residing abroad. As a result, I found
most young people in these municipalities are at least interested in migrating
abroad in search of better economic opportunities.
Economic impacts of international migration are also similar in Can-
tel and Bilwi: migrant households usually benefit from economic remittances
and most people in these municipalities often feel that international migra-
tion increases the economic gap between those households that have migrants
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abroad and others that do not. Although it is difficult to verify if the gap has
actually increased based solely on the field observations, what is crucial in res-
idents in the two municipalities do interact with migrant household members
and through such interactions, they feel the gap in both municipalities. How-
ever, I found one important difference in impacts of international migration
on households between the two municipalities during my fieldwork: members
of migrant households in Bilwi are much more likely to change their social
networks than migrants or migrant household members in Cantel.
For example, Julio, a young Miskitu university student in Bilwi stated
that he has seen various Miskitu people of migrant households who now prefer
to interact with Mestizos rather than Miskitu people. According to Julio, in
some extreme cases, Miskitu people may deny the fact they can speak the
indigenous language that they used to speak and avoid interacting with other
Miskitu people as much as possible. During my fieldwork in Bilwi, I have heard
similar comments from other respondents. On the other hand, I noticed that
international migration rarely changes household members’ social relations in
Cantel. The above observation is consistent with the fact that while many
migrant households in Bilwi tend to build a house in the suburban area of the
city and change their residential location, most migrant household members
in Cantel decide to build a house in the same village within Cantel where they
have lived.
Another difference that I encountered is that some Miskitu indigenous
people, especially those of migrant households, aim to change or have changed
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their ethnic identity and identify themselves as Mestizo while such a case is
extremely rare in Cantel. Changes in social networks and ethnic identity seem
to be related to each other since Miskitu people who have changed their ethnic
identity are the ones who are most likely to have relations with Mestizos.
It is puzzling why such differences emerge when socioeconomic impacts of
international migration are similar in the two municipalities. One reason that
seems apparent for this difference is that Bilwi is a multi-ethnic society while
Cantel is not. Inter-ethnic interactions also affect ethnic identity.
However, I contend that the difference in demographic composition be-
tween the two municipalities alone cannot explain why the majority of migrant
household members in Cantel maintain their ethnic identity while it is not nec-
essarily the case in Bilwi. In exploring this point, I have identified two factors
that may explain why migrant household members in Bilwi, especially Miskitu
people tend to change their social networks and identities while Maya-K’iche’
people in Cantel do not: the social status of international migrant household
members and factors that define indigenousness in these municipalities, which
I refer to as ethnic markers.
6.3.2 Migrant Household as Social Status
One notable difference between people in Cantel and Bilwi is the way
they see migrant households. In Bilwi, migrants and their household members
seem to acquire a status that guarantees members of migrant households a
certain social position in the municipality. On the other hand, in Cantel, no
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such position is guaranteed for migrants and their household members. In
Cantel, it is mainly a household’s economic status that determines a house-
hold’s position. Migrant households tend to be placed in socioeconomically
higher positions because they are usually economically more advantageous
than non-migrant households. While a household’s economic position is of
course important in Bilwi, members of migrant households locate themselves
in a higher social position as compared to non-migrant households of simi-
lar economic status. Since migration destinations among people in Bilwi are
not limited to the US, but include Costa Rica, Panama, Spain, Canada and
so on, the economic outcome of international migration differs by migrants’
destination countries. At the same time, regardless of the amount of wealth
that migrant households accumulate, migrant households tend to hold socioe-
conomically higher positions than non-migrant households in Bilwi.
I noticed that the case of Cantel is quite different from that of Bilwi.
While many people in Cantel, especially young men decide to migrate, the risks
of migration are very high and many people return to Cantel as a result of
deportation in either Mexico or in the US. Since the majority of migrants have
paid a large amount of money to smugglers, their economic situations deteri-
orate as a result of trying to migrate to the US. While the poorest households
in Cantel may not be able to send migrants abroad, most households can do so
even though the fee paid to smugglers can be as high as US$6,000. Since the
majority of households in Cantel own some land for cultivating corns, many
of them use this resource to borrow money to go to the US. However, even
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though they pay a large sum of money, for people in Cantel, arriving to the US
is never guaranteed. A relatively high migration failure rate seems to result in
a large economic discrepancy.
Wealth status of migrant households in Bilwi is largely defined by mi-
grants’ destinations. Hence, migrant household’s economic situation varies
considerably. At the same time, there is one factor that differentiates these
migrant households as a whole from non-migrant households. In Bilwi, these
migrant households receive remittances in US Dollar regardless of migrants’
destination countries since the US currency is widely circulated. The role of
US Dollar highlights another important difference between Cantel and Bilwi.
The way people regard the US currency. Most people in both Cantel and Bilwi
are conscious that migrants in the US earn their wage in the US currency. Yet,
most households in Cantel receive their remittances in the local currency (i.e.,
Guatemalan Quetzal) because in Guatemala, most stores accept only the lo-
cal currency. Therefore, the only difference between migrant and non-migrant
households in Cantel is the amount of economic resources that each type of
households holds. Indeed, it seems that the majority of people in Cantel do
not care about the US Dollar-Guatemalan Quetzal exchange rate. Of course,
people in Cantel realize that migrants in the US earn much more than average
people in Cantel, economic remittances are regarded as just another source of
income. Furthermore, it was until late 1990s when a considerable number of
people begin to migrate to the US from Cantel. This relatively short history of
international migration is contrary to the case in Cantel’s nearby communities
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such as Zunil and Almolonga where we can see the presence of associations
among migrants in the US from these communities. During my fieldwork in
Cantel, I have not heard the presence of such associations in the case of Cantel.
The case of Bilwi is quite different. Although Nicaragua possesses its
own currency (Nicaraguan Córdoba), US Dollar is widely used and accepted
everywhere in the country. Bilwi is no exception and various jobs that are
usually regarded as professional such as jobs at international organizations
such as Red Cross and the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)
and university jobs offer salaries in US Dollar. These jobs require a higher
education level and pay more than other jobs. Since most international mi-
grants from Bilwi send their remittances in the US currency regardless of their
country of destination, migrant households often feel that their economic sta-
tus has been improved even if they do not receive a large sum of remittances.
Indeed, Perla, a 55-year old school director in Bilwi, has noted that remit-
tances have recently changed the socioeconomic structure of Bilwi consider-
ably. Since migrant households receive remittances in US Dollar, they tend to
regard themselves differently from non-migrant households, which is usually
not the case in Cantel. I argue that this is one important reason why members
of migrant household change their social networks through migration. At the
same time, the social status that people obtain through international migra-
tion is not sufficient to explain why Miskitu people in Bilwi are more likely
to change their ethnic identity than K’iche’ people in Cantel. The way people
define indigenous people in the two municipalities is also a reason that makes
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it easier and sometimes more desirable for Miskitus in Bilwi to shift their eth-
nic identity than K’iche’ indigenous people of Cantel. Below, I present various
ethnic markers that define the category of indigenous people used in these two
municipalities.
6.3.3 Ethnic Markers
I argue that one reason why Miskitu people in Bilwi are more likely
to change their social networks through their international migration status
is the difference in factors that define indigenous people between Cantel and
Bilwi. Seeing ethnicity as a socially constructed concept, the difference in
these factors can affect impacts of international migration on ethnic structures.
Below, I first present several factors that can be regarded as ethnic markers
and then, explain why such differences influence changes in social networks.
6.3.3.1 Residential Location
One ethnic maker that presents notable difference between people in
Cantel and Bilwi is the way residential location is related to their social iden-
tity. That is, the geographical unit to which people tend to attach their be-
longingness differs between people in the two municipalities. In Cantel, people
usually refer to their residential location at a level that is smaller than munici-
pality, typically villages (aldea or caserio) within their municipality. Griselda,
a young university-educated indigenous woman, commented that within Can-
tel, before being Cantelicense (natives of Cantel), she emphasizes her origin
157
from Pachaj, a village in Cantel that is located about 20 minutes from Cantel’s
city center called Pueblo. The only time she mentions Cantel as her origin is
when she goes to Quetzaltenango or other cities outside Cantel. It is also im-
portant to note that while Cantel has its city center, the majority of residents
in Cantel do their grocery shopping in Quetzaltenango except for those living
in Pueblo. As a result, even though Cantelicences state that they are from
Cantel to people outside the municipality, it seems that they do not share
their residential identity as natives of Cantel very much. Since each village
does not have a strong tie with other villages, people in each village compare
their socioeconomic situations only with those in the same village.
Cantel’s situation is quite contrary to the case in Bilwi where people
tend to identify themselves as Costeño (coast people). While districts within
the municipality do exist in Bilwi, it is rare that people in Bilwi emphasize
these smaller geographical units. The reason why the above noted difference
exists can be attributed to the nature of population dynamics of the two
municipalities. Although a large number of indigenous people reside in these
municipalities, the ethnic composition of Cantel and that of Bilwi differ from
each other. While the majority of people in Cantel are indigenous, Bilwi is
a multi-ethnic society where not only Miskitu indigenous people, but also a
number of Mestizos, Creoles, and Mayangna indigenous people live. Teresa,
a 49 year old Mestizo woman who is a university library director in Bilwi,
stated that while there are districts of Bilwi where certain ethnic groups tend
to concentrate, these districts are not strongly related to the ethnic identity
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in the municipality. Hence, even though people outside the Atlantic Region
usually believe that most habitants in the region are ethnic minorities and
share the same identity, for people in Bilwi, residing there does not necessarily
mean that they are indigenous. In addition, since Miskitus have a choice to
choose whether they identify themselves only as Costeño and/or also from
Bilwi, the ethnic identity as Miskitu is not as strongly related to Bilwi.
Furthermore, Bilwi continues to receive a number of migrants each year,
most of them from nearby communities in the RAAN for various reasons. For
example, Carlos, a sixty-year old municipality office worker, states that today,
many children from nearby communities such as Sisin and Santa Martha come
to Bilwi after completing their primary education since only primary education
is available in these communities. Since many of these children have their
family members living in Bilwi, the transition to Bilwi is not very difficult.
Due to the influx of many people from outside Bilwi, the identity as being
locals of Bilwi is not shared by many people. And this massive incoming
migration flow makes a clear distinction between those originally from Bilwi
and those born outside the municipality.
On the other hand, as Nash (1967) states, various years after the
Fábrica was constructed, a large number of workers from nearby municipalities
migrated to Cantel to work at the Fábrica. However, very few people migrate
to Cantel and, most people who reside in Cantel today were born and grew
up in the municipality. Therefore, people in Cantel can assume that most
of current habitants were born in Cantel. This is why Cantlicenses refer to
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villages within when they talk about their birth place or where they currently
reside. Since their residential identity at a village level is so strong, people
in Cantel usually do not move from village to village within Cantel unless
some necessary reasons such as marriage emerge. The difference in the unit
of geographical locations used for one’s identity leads to another difference in
impacts of international migration on changes in social networks. This strong
attachment to villages leads people in Cantel to think that people residing in
Cantel are indigenous even though most of them realize that there are some
Ladinos in the municipality.
6.3.3.2 Language
Indigenous language is also an important ethnic marker. However, its
importance differs between the two municipalities. It is interesting that while
the proportion of indigenous population in Cantel is much larger than in Bilwi,
more Miskitu people speak their indigenous language than do people in Can-
tel, where the majority of young people do not speak K’iche’. Most indigenous
children in Cantel do not speak K’iche’ today because their parents tend to
speak to them in Spanish. Unfortunately, this is the result of traumatic expe-
riences that their parents had when they were young. That is, as Michaela, a
young school teacher in Cantel stated during an interview:
I do not speak K’iche because my parents never taught it to me.
They did not because they were discriminated by Ladinos because of
being indigenous and also, not being able to speak Spanish well. My
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parents told me that they were punished when they spoke K’iche’ at
school and that is one reason why they did not finish school.
Similarly, many young Miskitu people born in Bilwi do not speak the Miskitu
language today. For example, Tania, a 55 year old teacher has noted in my
interview that when she was a child, she was never taught to speak Miskitu
even though her mother could speak it. Instead, she was forced to learn English
because her mother believed that proficiency in English instead of Miskitu
would bring her success. Tania also recalled that her parents’ attitude toward
the indigenous language and Miskitu people’s generally low socioeconomic
status let her desire to be anything but Miskitu. Tania has also stated that
many young people in Bilwi wish to master English, which reflects the positive
image of British and American cultures.
Despite the fact that some people have negative images of the indige-
nous languages, it is also true that the Miskitu language is very widely spoken.
This is due to the fact that Miskitus from outside Bilwi migrate to the mu-
nicipality even today. Many of these people do not speak any Spanish this
is the reason why the proportion of people in Bilwi who speak the Miskitu
language remains high. Since the Miskitu language is widely spoken in Bilwi,
often times it takes a lot of time for these new migrants to learn Spanish. Since
incoming migrants who speak only the Miskitu language tend to have a very
strong ethnic identity as Miskitu, the inability to speak the Miskitu language
can be used by some people to escape from the Miskitu ethnic identity. This
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example of Bilwi is quite different from the case in Cantel where the ability to
speak the K’iche’ itself is not a determinant ethnic marker of indigenousness.
As a result, those Miskitus who desire to change their ethnic identity can use
the language to help shift their ethnic identity from Miskitu to Mestizo.
6.3.3.3 Traditional Clothes and Skin Color
In addition to the language, indigenous clothing is an important ethnic
marker. The majority of indigenous women in Cantel wear their traditional
clothes called corte and huipil. On the other hand, men in Cantel wear western
clothes just like Ladinos. Hence, the costume is an ethnic marker only for
women in the case of Cantel. In Cantel, I have found that for some young
women, the traditional clothes can be used as a way to escape from their
ethnic identity as indigenous. Josue, a private school director in Cantel, noted
that recently, more women use western clothes after they try them at school,
generally as a school uniform. However, the status of traditional clothes is very
complex. For example, Mariano stated that traditional clothes in Guatemala
can also be a symbol of prosperity because these clothes usually cost much more
than western clothes. Therefore, he argues that many girls do not wear them
not because their parents do not want them to wear the traditional clothes, but
wearing western clothes is more economical. Like Josue, Mariano also mentions
that today’s higher school enrolment rate among girls in Cantel reinforces the
transition from traditional clothes to western clothes. When he was young, it
was almost prohibited for girls to wear clothes other than traditional clothes.
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Hence, when girls were forced to wear a uniform for physical education at
school, there was a large dispute. However, these days, people do not complain
so much on this issue as more people are accustomed to use western clothes.
In the case of Bilwi, to my knowledge, nobody wears traditional cos-
tumes. However, among Miskitu people, I noticed that a person’s skin color is
an important ethnic marker that is not the case in Cantel. Tania, a 55 year-
old university professor states that many Miskitu people desire to have lighter
skin tone and Miskitu people with lighter skin tone are more likely to identify
themselves as Mestizo rather than Miskitu. Tania refers to this as whitening. I
have noticed that it is very difficult, if not impossible to define biological char-
acteristics of Miskitu people. For example, Maritza, an NGO director states
that today there is no pure Miskitu anymore, arguing that all of them are
mixed-blood, there are Miskitu people with blue eyes and are white. Indeed,
Miskitu people are often not as easily recognizable as Mayan-K’iche’ people in
Cantel in terms of physical characteristics. Therefore, it seems that it is more
difficult to define Miskitu indigenous people solely by biological characteristics
than Maya-K’iche’ people in Cantel giving a wider definition of indigenousness
in Bilwi.
6.3.4 Image of Indigenousness
Through my fieldwork, I noticed that international migration would
affect ethnic relations among Miskitu people in Bilwi much more than K’iche’
people in Cantel. This tendency seems to be attributable to the definition of
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Miskitu people that is much wider and less clear than that of K’iche’ people
in Cantel. In other words, there are more categories and ethnic markers that
define indigenous groups in Bilwi than in Cantel and therefore, the image or
definition of indigenousness is broader in Bilwi than in Cantel. I argue that
there are three factors that are attributable to this trend:1) more frequent
inter-ethnic communications and relations in the case of Bilwi; 2) a relatively
high level of formal education that people in Bilwi receive and; 3) the presence
of another indigenous group (Mayangna) in Bilwi.
In Cantel, people do not encounter with other indigenous groups in
Guatemala such as Kaqchikel and ethnicity itself is seldom discussed. In
Guatemala, each ethnic group tends to concentrate in certain areas of the coun-
try, and at least in Cantel, few people interact with other indigenous groups. In
Chapter 2, I argued that migration benefits households from economic remit-
tances. It is possible that migrant households improve their relative positions
in their communities and such changes lead to the transformation of individu-
als’ perception or images of social structure, including images of ethnic groups.
Indeed, it seems that international migration affects image of indigenousness
in both municipalities. Given the fact that there are two types of Miskitu peo-
ple (i.e., those born in Bilwi and those migrating from nearby communities),
the image of Miskitu people is wide. As a result, no single factor can define
Miskitu indigenous people. On the other hand, the image of indigenousness
in Cantel seems to be rather narrow: residing in Cantel usually means one is
indigenous and if she or he speaks the K’iche’ language, nobody will doubt
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that that person is indigenous.
International migration seems to affect migrants’ communities of origin
through changes in ethnic markers and widens the image of indigenousness,
which can reinforce certain people to shift their identity. My fieldwork in
Cantel and Bilwi has helped me in sorting out these markers affected by in-
ternational migration that can reinforce ethnic identity change and those that
are not. Changes in ethnic markers along with the improvement in socioeco-
nomic status often widen the image of indigenousness and this induces migrant
household members to shift their ethnic identities. In addition, when these
members distinguish more categories in the rank order, it seems that they see
more opportunities to shift their ethnic identity. And inter-ethnic interactions
can promote such shift even more as these interactions may pressure more
indigenous people to shift their ethnic identity.
6.3.5 Inter-ethnic Interactions
Ways in which the image of indigenous people is defined differs consid-
erably between Cantel and Bilwi. Such differences are related to the degree
and type of inter-ethnic relations in both municipalities. While Bilwi is a
multi-ethnic society, Cantel is not. Obviously, this is one reason why people
in Bilwi are more sensitive to ethnicity-related issues than people in Cantel.
In his work, Popkin (2005) has observed in Guatemala that international mi-
gration has resulted in the establishment of new ethnic boundaries within the
municipality of Santa Eulalia. For example, some migrants and their house-
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hold members adopted behaviors that people in the municipality associate with
Ladino Guatemalans. Since indigenous people in Cantel rarely interact with
Ladinos within the municipality, such changes do not usually happen. Nev-
ertheless, people in Cantel do also experience inter-ethnic relations, especially
when they visit the city of Quetzaltenango.
In both municipalities, there are various factors that affect inter-ethnic
relations in addition to the ethnic markers discussed above. Of these factors,
one important factor is people’s level of educational attainment. That is, the
probability of indigenous people in both municipalities to identify themselves
as indigenous differs by the level of education they have acquired. Interest-
ingly, I found that the level of education is negatively correlated with the
identification as indigenous only at a certain educational level. For example,
Carlos, a municipality office worker in Bilwi, has noted that people with the
intermediate level (junior and senior high school levels) face the highest danger
of losing their ethnic identity as indigenous. Indeed, highly educated people
in my interviews often identified themselves as indigenous more often than did
those with intermediate levels of education. These respondents have suggested
that there are stages through which many indigenous people must go through
in order to assure that their ethnic identity becomes solid. In Cantel, those
children who study at a public school usually do not interact with any Ladinos
since most of students are indigenous.
Ethnicity becomes salient when young indigenous people from Cantel
try to obtain jobs in Quetzaltenango or other cities. Nancy, an indigenous
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woman who is a nurse in Cantel, states that these people often encounter an
ethnic barrier for the first time in their lives. And this experience often lets
them feel the existence of the barrier that cannot be easily overcome even when
they meet requirements to obtain a job. My respondents with little formal
education usually believe that indigenous people did not do well economically
because they have not received enough formal education to acquire a good
occupational position.
Unlike the case of Cantel, where most students are indigenous even
at private schools, in Bilwi some of the most expensive schools are mainly
composed of Mestizos. Although there are several private schools in Cantel,
most of students in these schools are also indigenous. There are some from
Zunil and Almolonga, but they are also indigenous too. Within the municipal-
ity, people in Bilwi are very conscious of ethnic identities and discriminations
given its very multi-ethnic society. On the other hand, in Cantel only a lim-
ited number of people encounter this kind of experience because many of them
interact only with indigenous, even when they work in near-by municipalities
like Almolonga and Zunil.
When young people in Cantel realize the existence of the ethnic barrier,
they may be motivated to shift their ethnic identity from indigenous to Ladino
if they see such a shift is possible. Indeed, Julio, a school director in Cantel,
told me a story about several indigenous people who changed their last names
to escape from their ethnic identity as indigenous. Since people’s geographical
identity is based at a village level among people in Cantel, the inequality
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is also felt at that level. As a result, people usually do not feel the need
to change their ethnic identity. However, people with an intermediate level
of educational attainment often encounter situations such as job interviews,
inter-ethnic relations and more subtle racial discriminations. Interestingly, in
both Cantel and Bilwi, I noticed that indigenous people with post-secondary
education are much less likely to change or to aim to change their ethnic
identity from indigenous to Ladino or Mestizo. Through the interviews, I
found that this is because acquiring a very high level of education places them
in a higher social position and therefore, they do not need to shift their ethnic
identity. Rather, obtaining a high social position despite the difficulties they
have faced as indigenous, these highly educated people often emphasize their
identity as indigenous.
6.4 Discussion
Contrary to the findings from the statistical analyses presented in Chap-
ter 5, in the case of Cantel and Bilwi, non-migrant households in both mu-
nicipalities perceive that the level of inequality has become higher today than
before the massive international migration took place. However, I have found
several differences between the two municipalities. For example, members of
migrant households in Cantel are much more likely to keep their networks
that were established before they or their household members migrated than
do their counterparts in Bilwi. In addition, Miskitu people are much more
likely to shift their ethnic identity than their counterparts in Cantel. And it
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seems that international migration may accelerate the pace of ethnic identity
shift in Bilwi. However, with the current time span of the fieldwork, it is dif-
ficult to examine how international migration could impact ethnic structures
in these municipalities. To partially offset this limitation, I use computational
simulation to provide a longitudinal perspective in the following chapter.
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Chapter 7
International Migration and Ethnic Identity
Shift in Guatemala and Nicaragua
7.1 Objectives
Findings from Chapters 4 to 6 have shown that in both Guatemala and
Nicaragua, international migration is quite a selective process and therefore,
indigenous households are less likely to benefit from international migration as
compared to their non-indigenous counterparts. Contrary to the above find-
ings, non-migrant households in both Cantel and Bilwi perceive that the level
of inequality has become higher today than before the massive international
migration took place. Despite such a similarity, migrant households in Cantel
are much more likely to keep their networks that were established before they
or their household members migrated than do migrant households in Bilwi.
In this chapter, I present a mathematical model of ethnic identity shift.
The proposed model explores how a combination of various factors such as
the level of socioeconomic inequality and a community’s ethnic compositions
affect the rate of ethnic identity shift. The model is constructed taking into
account the findings presented in the previous chapters. As I have shown in
the previous chapter, ethnic identity shift seems much more prevalent in Bilwi
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than in Cantel. A seemingly obvious reason for this finding is that most res-
idents of Cantel are indigenous while Bilwi is composed of people of several
ethnic backgrounds. However, this factor alone cannot explain a more rapid
ethnic identity shift in Bilwi. Indeed, one important finding from my field-
work is that two persons who are socioeconomically very similar to each other
can end up in having quite opposite ethnic identities through their own or
their household’s migration experience. This point merits serious considera-
tion. However, it has been impossible to rigorously study ethnic identity shift
in Guatemala and Nicaragua beyond field observations due to lack of quantita-
tive data. Computational simulation is one way to overcome such a difficulty.
Recent technological development has given social scientists an opportunity to
examine social processes in experimental settings using computers. Computa-
tional simulation is one way that allows us to examine processes that generate
phenomena we are interested rather than simply analyzing a correlation be-
tween factors.
7.2 Ethnic Identity as Social Process
In both Bilwi and Cantel, I have heard that ethnic identity shift takes
place quite drastically and such a change can occur with or without interna-
tional migration experience. Therefore, when people’s relative positions in a
society can have strong impacts on images of indigenous groups. Furthermore,
changes in relative social positions also lead to the re-construction of ethnic
boundaries. Tilly (2005) states that people organize a significant part of their
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social interaction around the formation, transformation, activation, and sup-
pression of social boundaries. According to the author, to understand bound-
ary changes, we must distinguish between two different types of mechanisms:
1) those that precipitate boundary change (encounter, imposition, borrow-
ing, conversation, and incentive shift), and 2) those that constitute boundary
change and produce its direct effects (inscription, erasure, activation, deactiva-
tion, site transfer, and relocation). I argue that international migration affects
boundary change by influencing factors that precipitate boundary change as
changes in socioeconomic status probably leads to the re-creation and modifi-
cation of social network.
In my field observations, I have encountered various examples that
reconfirm the fact that ethnicity is a fluid concept. For example, in one inter-
view, a Miskitu woman indicated how family relations can affect their ethnic
identity:
I have a friend who married an American woman and now
lives in Florida with their daughter. Their daughter was born in
the US and has never lived here. She occasionally visits here with
her parents. But to my surprise, she speaks our language (Miskitu)!
I was very curious why and asked her father. He said that his wife
loves our culture and she speaks Miskitu very well. Since their
daughter was born, she often spoke to her daughter in Miskitu and
always placed an importance on her daughter’s Miskitu heritage.
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This is why their daughter is now proud of her ethnic background
and speaks the language very well.
If international migration indeed affects the factors that initiate boundary
changes, it can also have impacts on images of indigenousness. That is, while
images are cognitive and boundaries are socially interactive, images emerge
in interactions. What this link between boundaries and images indicates is
that if international migration helps selected indigenous people to cross ethnic
boundaries becoming Mestizos, they tend to have negative images of indige-
nousness. As the proportion of Mestizos increases and that of indigenous
people decreases, indigenous groups enter into a vicious cycle that endangers
indigenous cultures: Images of their groups continue to degrade and those who
identify themselves as indigenous remain poor and isolated from the main-
stream indigenous groups, further dividing a country into two distinctive so-
cieties instead of one multicultural society.
Therefore, both boundaries and images of indigenousness are closely
correlated with social interactions. Furthermore, people in Latin America
may cross ethnic boundaries more easily because the fluidity of ethnicity is
stronger in Latin America. That is, there is a continuum of racial and ethnic
categories, at least more than in the US where the category ‘black’ supposedly
includes anyone with a known ‘drop of black blood’ (Wade 1997). The category
of Mestizo symbolizes such a continuum. However, this feature alone cannot
explain the above noted shift. For example, Wimmer (2008) argues that fuzzy
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ethnic distinctions and boundaries may allow people to maintain membership
in several categories or switch identities situationally. To my knowledge, en-
countering indigenous individuals who present several ethnic categories in this
manner is very rare in Guatemala and Nicaragua. This is because while the
ethnic boundary can be very fuzzy in Latin America, social classes are very
closely correlated with ethnic backgrounds. These two features are key factors
to understanding why international migration and multicultural reforms can
threaten ethnic identity as indigenous.
Multicultural reforms and international migration have drastically changed
some of the conditions that surround indigenous groups. Since multicultural
reforms in the two countries have not been accompanied with necessary struc-
tural changes, the majority of indigenous people remain poor. Similarly, while
international migration may help migrant households through economic remit-
tances, it does not usually help non-migrant households to advance socioeco-
nomically. As a result, indigenous people are motivated to cross the boundary
into the mainstream Mestizo culture to escape from poverty and discrimina-
tion. Indeed, the continuing discrimination along with changes brought by
both multicultural reforms and international migration induced a more rapid
shift in ethnic identity. One such change is bilingual education that covers
both Guatemala and Nicaragua extensively today. While it is a welcoming
fact that more indigenous children have access to education, the acquisition
of Spanish language is a double edge sward for indigenous groups and cul-
tures. In both countries, Spanish is seen as one of the power symbols of the
174
mainstream society as Hill and Hill (1980) discuss about Mexican indigenous
groups. Therefore, while today’s multicultural reforms certainly help some in-
digenous people to overcome hardships and to be included in the mainstream
society, the changes that seem apparently beneficial to indigenous people can
be detrimental to their cultures. For example, in one of my interviews in Can-
tel, one professional indigenous Mayan woman recalls her experience with one
of her friends:
A few years ago, one of my friends asked me whether she could
borrow one of my daughter’s corte and huipil (Guatemalan tra-
ditional clothes). I asked why and she said that she wanted her
daughter to wear them at her school activity. She said that the
corte and huipil are good costume for surprise. I cordially declined
her request because I felt that she regarded our traditional clothes
as those costumes her daughter could wear for...say Halloween.
As this woman’s comment suggests, ethnic discrimination continues to
exist today albeit in a more nuanced way than in the past. Similarly, Garzon
(1998) states on Guatemalan Mayan groups that indigenous population’s inte-
gration into Mestizo society has often resulted in the internalization of negative
images attached to indigenous groups among indigenous people themselves.
Since the end of the civil war in the two countries, more indigenous people are
in frequent contact with Mestizos. However, indigenous people who encounter
Mestizos in a more egalitarian manner frequently face a higher risk of losing
175
indigenous languages and identities because indigenous people continue to face
hostility and derision from the dominant Mestizo group, both explicitly and
implicitly. As a result, some indigenous people decide to abandon their ethnic
identity and assimilate into the mainstream Mestizo culture. Since they usu-
ally speak Spanish well and have other socioeconomic capitals, such as formal
education, it is easier for them to abandon their indigenous languages and shift
their identity (Garzon 1998).
While changes brought by international migration and multicultural
reforms pressure indigenous people to shift their ethnic identity, processes of
such a shift remains obscure. The main purpose of the proposed model is
therefore to understand the processes of ethnic identity shift and to rigorously
analyze what can be done to reverse this trend. Computer simulation is useful
to achieve this objective since by changing parameter values, we can observe
combinations of parameter values that most likely induce ethnic identity shift.
7.3 Methods
To understand ethnic identity shift, I propose a mathematical model
and run a computational simulation based on the model with various parame-
ter combinations. Both recent theoretical advances in the natural sciences and
the decreased cost of computer technology have made it feasible to use compu-
tational models as tools to tackle problems and questions in the social sciences
(Cederman 2005). In addition to its availability, there are other important
reasons why I use computational model to examine ethnic identity change.
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First, to my knowledge, there is no data set that enables us to study ethnic
identity shift trends in Guatemala and Nicaragua. Second, ethnic identity
shift presents a nonlinear dynamics and the use of statistical methods is not
appropriate for studying this type of phenomena. Third, the main purpose of
the current chapter is to understand the process of ethnic identity shift rather
than the correlation between factors and such a shift. As Barth (1981) asserts,
it is not sufficient to identify an association between factors, especially when
one aims to understand why a phenomenon of interest takes place. We should
rather focus on understanding how such a phenomenon was generated. Hence
we need to be able to describe the processes that generate the phenomenon
(Barth 1981; Cederman 2005). Computer simulation enables us to observe and
examine processes generating social phenomena of interest and test whether
our assumptions hold true.
7.3.1 Model Description
The model takes into account findings from the previous chapters. I
use a network approach to examine and explain ethnic identity shift from in-
digenous to Mestizo. Network phenomena are relevant to numerous biological
and social outcomes such as obesity and diffusion of ideas (e.g. Christakis and
Fowler 2007). In addition, the previous literature on international migration
suggests that migrant network is one of the most important factors influenc-
ing a person’s probability of migration (e.g. Palloni et al. 2001). I use the
network approach because types of neighbors that an individual has can affect
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perceptions of discrimination and such perceptions influences the way people
define their identities. Therefore, an agent’s neighbors have impacts on his
or her probability of shifting their identity from one state of ethnic identity
to another. Indeed, as Nagel (1994) states, individual ethnic identification is
strongly limited and influenced by external forces that shape the options, fea-
sibility, and attractiveness of various ethnicities. My field observation noted
earlier that two very similar persons can end up holding opposite ethnic iden-
tities justifies the use of network approach. Networks used in the current are
structured in a similar way to the construction of random network: individuals
are represented by vertices with contacts between members denoted by edge
and each individual has the identical number of linked neighbors. That is,
neighbors that a person has a direct contact with. However, agents (persons)
are not linked to others at random. Instead, the probability of one agent be-
ing connected to another one is determined by agents’ socioeconomic status
and ethnicity so that connections between agents would resemble the actual
situation that I encountered in my fieldwork. While it is also possible to let
agents be connected to others following other types of networks such as spatial
or small-world (Watts and Strogatz 1998), the current framework reflects the
actual situation in the two research communities most suitable.
7.3.2 Modeling Ethnic Identity Mechanism: Transmission on the
Network
Below I define a macro-level formation of the ethnic identity shift mech-
anism using tools from theoretical and mathematical epidemiology and based
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on the findings from Chapter 6. I first divide the population of interest into two
groups: indigenous and Mestizo (Figure 7.1). Note that in the case of the city
of Bilwi, non-indigenous groups cannot simply be viewed as one group since
there are Mestizos and Creoles. However, since I have found in my fieldwork
that Creoles rarely (if ever) change their ethnic identity, dividing the popula-
tion into two ethnic groups would suffice for the objective of this chapter. The
indigenous population is then divided into five states of ethnic identity (S, E,
I, L and ID) and the model assumes that all indigenous agents are situated in
State S at the beginning (i.e. time 0). The Mestizo group is divided into two
groups: those in State Lp hold positive ideas about indigenous groups while
the opposite is true for those in Ln. The description of each state is provided
in Table 7.1.
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Figure 7.1: Scheme of Indigenous Ethnic Identity Shift
180
Table 7.1: Description of States
State Description
S General and susceptible indigenous population
E Indigenous individuals who are exposed to the negative image
associated with being indigenous
I Indigenous individuals who have negative images associated with
being indigenous and also transmits such negative images
L Indigenous individuals who have abandoned their ethnic identity as
indigenous and currently identify themselves as mestizos
ID Indigenous individuals whose identity as indigenous has been
solidified and is robust
Lp Mestizo individuals who have positive images of indigenous groups
Ln Mestizo individuals who have negative images of indigenous groups
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In the proposed model, the ethnic identity change takes place as equa-
tions shown below indicate and Table 7.2 gives a description of each parameter:
Ṡ = −βSE + ǫβES − ǫβID
Ė = βSE − βEI − ǫβES − ǫβEID + ǫβIE
İ = βEI − βIL − ǫβIE
L̇ = βIL
˙ID = ǫβSID + ǫβEID
Table 7.2: Description of Parameters
Parameter Description
β Rate of ethnic identity shift
ǫ Identity reverse parameter that varies 0 < ǫ < 1
As Figure 7.1 indicates, in the current model, mestizos never change
their ethnic identity, which is consistent with my field observation. However,
their attitude toward indigenous people can change. In this study, I assume
that each agent has some ideas or images about indigenous groups. For the
process of how such image is generated, which is beyond the scope of this
paper, I follow the algorithm presented in Fararo and Kosaka (2003). In the
current model, agents are assigned a mean value of the image and its stan-
dard deviation. Agents interact with others and may modify their images at
probability p, which is also assigned at model setup.
Mestizos are situated either in State Ln or Lp depending on the mean
value of images they have. I assign two different distributions of the average
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image that people have on indigenous people: one for the indigenous popu-
lation and the other for the mestizo population. I assign these distributions
using a gamma distribution. I use the gamma distribution because in the
fieldwork, it has become clear that the image of a particular ethnic group does
not usually follow a normal distribution. Rather, the distribution is probably
skewed and gamma distributions are very flexible in creating numerous shapes
of distributions. Once each agent is assigned the average image, mestizos
with images that are higher than the average image of the whole population
will be situated in State Lp while those whose image is lower than the whole
population’s average will be in State Ln .
Another important feature of the proposed mechanism is that the prob-
ability identity shift from one state to another is constant and identical except
when an agent’s identity as indigenous becomes solidified (from S to ID and
E to ID) and when a reversal of identity shift (i.e. from E to S and from
I to E) occur, in which cases β is multiplied by the reverse parameter ǫ. In
my fieldwork, while it has become clear that indigenous people who eventually
change their identity to mestizo tend to have at least some periods to rethink
about their identity, whether the rate from one state to another differs is still
unclear.
Therefore, it is more appropriate using the same value of β for indige-
nous agents’ shift in state. In addition, note in Figure 7.1 that States ID
and L are absorbing states indicating that once individuals enter these states
(whether identified as indigenous or mestizo), they will never change their
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ethnic identity again in the model. In reality, the probability of agents to
change their state from these two states may not be zero. Nevertheless, this
assumption appears to be reasonable according to my findings in the fieldwork.
Finally, using a network approach, while the assigned value of β is identical
across all agents, the probability of indigenous agents to move from a state to
another is contingent on the types of neighbors they have. For example, an
agent’s probability of moving from State S to E is higher when he or she has
Mestizo neighbors than when all neighbors are indigenous.
7.3.3 Ethnic Image Transformation and Rewiring Process
In the proposed model, while Mestizos do not change their ethnic iden-
tity, their attitude toward indigenous groups can. When the modification pro-
cess takes place, each agent evaluates their linked neighbors’ socioeconomic
status and if any of their neighbors’ socioeconomic status is as high as or
higher than that of the agent, they may adapt the image of those neighbors.
This is probably the most important feature included in the proposed model
since changes in an agent’s socioeconomic location in society tends to stimulate
the transformation of their images about society and ethnic groups, which is
also an important factor on ethnic identity shift. For the mechanism of image
transformation, I adapt the mechanism presented in Deffuant et al. (2005).
Let us imagine that two Agents i and j have different images of indigenous
groups and that Agent j’s socioeconomic status is higher than that of Agent
i. Segments of image for Agent i is defined as:
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si = [xi − ui, xi + ui],
while for Agent j :
sj = [xj − uj, xj + uj].
We examine the agreement of Agents i and j as the overlap of si and sj, minus
the non-overlapping part. The overlap hij is given by:
hij = min(xi + ui, xj + uj)−max(xi − ui, xj − uj)
And the non-overlapping width is:
2uj − hij .
The agreement is the overlap minus the non-overlap.
hij − (2uj − hij) = 2(hij − uj)
Then iff hij > uj, the modification of Agent i’s (i.e. xi) occurs by the
interaction with Agent j are multiplied by the relative agreement:





· (xj − xi)
where µ is a scale parameter determining the weight that the interaction with
Agent j can have on the new image possessed by Agent i. Note that unlike
Deffuant et al. (2005), I do not modify u through interaction since I assign the
fixed standard deviation for each agent’s image. Rather, agents maintain the
same width (i.e. standard deviation) of their images. As the above formula
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indicates, if xi < xj , then Agent i’s image of indigenous groups will become
more positive after the interaction between Agents i and j while the opposite
is the case when xi > xj .
In addition to their images of indigenous groups, agents can change
their network ties at the same rate as the rate of image transformation if they
are dissatisfied with their neighbors. An agent is dissatisfied with his or her
neighbor if the neighbor’s socioeconomic status is lower than the agent’s or
if the neighbor’s ethnicity is not consistent with the agent’s preference. The
agent’s ethnic preference depends on his or her current state. For example,
while the dissatisfaction of mestizos in State Lp never depends on the neigh-
bor’s ethnicity, this is not the case among agents in State Ln. If an agent is
dissatisfied with at least one of his or her neighbors, he or she identifies one
such neighbor and disconnects a tie with him or her. Then, the agent creates
a tie with another agent following the same algorithm of networks used at the
setup of the initial network.
7.3.4 Limitations
To my knowledge, the proposed model is the first attempt to explore
how international migration reinforces ethnic identity shift and why the pace
of such an identity shift differs across communities and countries. Therefore,
while the model takes into account the above mentioned features, I have sim-
plified it and thus, the model contains various shortcomings. In the current
model, I do not differentiate those indigenous people whose ethnic identity
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as indigenous has been solidified and robust (State ID in my model). It is
clear that there can be various sub-categories within this group. For exam-
ple, extremists may claim their own ancestral land and even try to construct
their own nations. Meanwhile, others may present a more moderate political
attitude. Moreover, while indigenous agents’ images of their groups can also
change through interactions with other agents, their states do not change given
their value of images. This is because it is still unclear how much change is
necessary for indigenous agents to shift their state. Despite these weaknesses,
I argue that the proposed model is useful in exploring ethnic identity shift and
the model can be improved when more information is available.
7.4 Simulation Results
I ran simulations with 30 different parameter combinations for 100 rep-
etitions each, for a total of 3,000 simulation runs. Below, I present results from
four parameter combinations. To see if my argument that the proportion of
the indigenous population in a community is not necessarily the leading cause
of ethnic identity shift holds true, I fix the proportion of indigenous popula-
tion in the current chapter at 0.5 for all simulation runs. Therefore, half of
the population is indigenous while the other half is Mestizo. Since I set the
population size at 300 agents, there are 150 indigenous agents and 150 non-
indigenous agents. In the simulation runs, each agent has ties with exactly
three other agents and the probability of being connected to another agent
is conditional on both agents’ ethnic and socioeconomic status as well as the
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parameter values presented in Table 7.3. For example, the probability of two
agents with the identical socioeconomic status to have ties each other is higher
if they share the same ethnicity (0.7) than when their ethnic backgrounds differ
(0.3).
Each simulation takes 520 steps (or tick. The above calculations are
undertaken at each step. Therefore, 520 calculations will be performed for each
simulation runs) and for convenience, I treat one step as one week. Hence, 520
steps can be seen as the length of 10 years. The value of ethnic identity
shift rate reflects a composite measure of factors influencing the shift such
as media and community characteristics. Note, however, that the value of
identity shift rate (0.5) was assigned arbitrarily since it is difficult to compute
this rate empirically. Hence, the goal of the simulation runs is to examine
which parameter combinations are likely to lead to a high ethnic identity shift
rather than exactly what proportion of people continue to identify themselves
as indigenous after 10 years.
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Table 7.3: List of Parameter Values Fixed in the Current Chapter
Name Value Description
Population Size 300 Number of agents
Number of Links 3 Number of links each agent possesses
Proportion Indigenous 0.5 Proportion of indigenous population in total population
Same Ethnicity 0.7 Probability of having a tie with an agent of the same ethnicity when SES is controlled
Ethnic Inequality 50 Level of socioeconomic inequality between indigenous
and non-indigenous agents. 0 indicates no inequality. Ranges from 0 to 100
Migrant Selectivity 20 Level of migrant selectivity in terms of agents’ socioeconomic status.
Migration Success Probability 0.75 Probability of migration success. If successful, an agent’s socioeconomic status
increases by one rank (e.g. from poor to middle)
Ethnic Identity Shift Rate 0.5 Rate of Ethnic Identity Change per 52 steps (for each 100 agents)
Poor 0.6 Proportion of agents who are classified as poor
Middle 0.3 Proportion of agents who are classified as middle class
Rich 0.1 Proportion of agents who are classified as rich
Same SES 0.5 Probability of an agent to possess a tie with another agent of the same SES
when agents’ ethnicity is controlled
Different SES 1 0.35 Probability of an agent to possess a tie with another agent whose SES is one rank
different when agents’ ethnicity is controlled
Different SES 2 0.15 Probability of an agent to possess a tie with another agent whose SES is two ranks
different when agents’ ethnicity is controlled
Propensity Score 0.5 Weight the importance of ethnicity and socioeconomic status when creating ties among
agents
Reverse Rate 0.8 ǫ as presented in Table 2
Image Update/Rewiring Frequency 2 Average frequency of image updates and rewiring per 52 steps (for each 100 agents)
Scale Parameter 0.3 Weight of interaction with another agent when creating a new image of
indigenous groups
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Figure 7.2: Two Distributions of Images of Indigenous Groups at Population
Level







































The four parameter combinations are composed of different distribu-
tions of agents’ images of indigenous groups at the population level and differ-
ent widths (in terms of standard deviation) of images that each agent possesses.
More specifically, Figure 7.2 presents two distributions of ethnic images used
in the current chapter. Figure 7.2a shows a narrow distribution (with indige-
nous α = 8, indigenous β = 1.5, Mestizo α = 10, and Mestizo β = 3) and we
can find a wider distribution in Figure 7.2b (for indigenous α = 0.8 and β =
0.15 and for Mestizo, α = 1 and β = 0.3). The mean value of the images for
each group is identical across the two kinds of distributions. However, we can
see that the distribution of images at the population level is much wider in
7.2b than in 7.2a.
The first distribution resembles the population of Cantel, where the
vast majority of its population (approximately 95%) are indigenous. In addi-
tion to its ethnic composition, I argue that the distribution of agents’ images
of indigenous group is likely to be narrow at the population level in Cantel
because of the following reasons: 1) The average years of schooling is very low
in Cantel among peoples of ages 18-64 and many elderly people– especially
women–are illiterate. The level of educational attainment is related to images
of ethnic groups that individuals hold because education is strongly correlated
with types of occupations people have as well as people with whom they in-
teract. In addition, types of media people are most exposed to are important
influential factors on the images they hold have a strong relation with one’s
educational attainment; and 2) According to the 2002 demographic census
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and my own observations, currently, there are few people migrating into this
community. Therefore, Cantel is a very closed community and since residents
know that most of their neighbors were born in the community, it is rare that
they talk about a person’s origin of community or ethnicity. Because of these
reasons, I assert that people in Cantel hold similar ideas about indigenous
groups.
On the other hand, people in Bilwi appear to posses diverse images
of ethnic groups since the city is quite different from Cantel. For example,
while the level of education is low among elderly people, young people in
Bilwi tend to receive many more years of schooling that their counterparts in
Cantel. Furthermore, not only does Bilwi send many migrants abroad, it also
receives a number of incoming migrants from many rural communities in the
Atlantic region of Nicaragua. Ethnic backgrounds of these incoming migrants
include the Miskitu group and other ethnic groups such as Mayangnas (another
indigenous group in Nicaragua) and Creoles, and Mestizos both from inside
and outside the Atlantic region. As a consequence, images of indigenousness
have in Bilwi are likely to vary more than those possessed by people in Cantel.
In addition to the distributions of images at the population level, an
agent’s width of image varies in the four combinations. In one case, an agent’s
image has a standard deviation of 0.5 making 95% of his or her image ap-
proximately ranges from the mean ± 1. In the second case, the standard
deviation is 1.5, making an agent’s image much wider (i.e. mean ± 3). While
the individual-level distribution may seem similar to the population-level dis-
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tribution, the two distributions are quite different. A narrow individual image
indicates that a person has quite a firm idea about indigenousness regardless
of whether people share different images of indigenous groups or not. On the
other hand, when an individual possesses wide images, they are less clear about
what they think about indigenous groups. Wider images can be attributed to
various factors including more frequent inter-ethnic contacts or when Mestizos
have few contacts with indigenous people and have little idea about them.
I vary the distributions of images in the simulation because my field-
work presented in Chapter 6 has suggested that it is images of ethnic groups
that international migration most likely affects. That is, through the migra-
tion experience, migrants, especially indigenous migrants, tend to be more
aware of their ethnic backgrounds and think more often about the meaning
of their ethnic backgrounds in their societies. Of course, such changes also
derive from changes in agents’ social interactions, which reflect changes in
ethnic boundaries. In a similar vein, I have observed that as impacts of mi-
gration in a community increase, people observe more drastic changes brought
by migration including the establishment of luxury houses and the improved
economic situation among migrant households. Often, socioeconomic status
has a stronger impact on people’s social interactions than one’s ethnicity in
both Cantel and Bilwi. At the same time, ethnicity continues to be an im-
portant factor for such interactions even though its meaning may be more
nuanced. These changes can lead inhabitants to feel unsure about their ethnic
backgrounds and to possess a wider definition of indigenousness. The results
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from the simulation runs based on the four parameter combinations aim to
explore possible consequences that changes in distributions of images can have
on ethnic identity shift.
Figure 7.3 presents results from the simulation runs based on the two
parameter combinations: simulation runs of the population with a narrow im-
age distribution at the population level. Let us suppose that 7.3a represents
the population before massive international migration begins and 7.3b, after
the noticeable number (e.g. 10% and up) of the population from the same
community left, migrating abroad. I argue that these populations resemble
the population in Cantel, except for the proportion of the Mestizo popula-
tion that is much higher (0.5) than the actual demographic characteristics of
Cantel (0.05). In Figure 7.3a, in which each agent possesses a narrower im-
age of indigenous groups (i.e. standard deviation = 0.5), we can find that
more indigenous people have solidified their ethnic identity as indigenous than
become ladinized (begin identifying themselves as Mestizo). While at earlier
steps (fewer than 100 steps), more indigenous people are exposed to negative
images of being indigenous (situated in States E or I) as the number of in-
digenous people who have reaffirmed their identity as indigenous increases,
fewer people are exposed to negative ideas of being indigenous and even fewer
are found in State I. This is because as the number of indigenous people
with a robust identity as indigenous increases, other indigenous agents tend
to be surrounded by those who are not affected by negative images of being
indigenous. Therefore, even the ethnic identity shift rate remains the same
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throughout the simulations, the risk of agents moving to States E, I and L
decreases. As a result, while about 20% of the total population (i.e. 40% of
indigenous agents) are situated in State ID at the last step, more indigenous
agents have solidified their ethnic identity.
We encounter quite a different outcome when agents have wider images
of indigenousness even when the distribution of agents’ average images remains
the same at the population level (Figure 7.3b). In this scenario, at the end of
the 520 steps, we find many more indigenous agents who identify themselves as
Mestizo than those who solidified their ethnic identity as indigenous. Nearly
60% of indigenous agents identify themselves as Mestizos at the end of the
simulation while only about 20% of indigenous agents (i.e. 10% of the total
population) have a robust identity as indigenous. In addition, note that in this
scenario, we see a much lower number of Mestizo agents who have a positive
idea about indigenous groups at the end of the simulation runs as compared
to the initial state.
This finding derives from two factors: 1) the average image of indige-
nousness possessed by Mestizos is more negative than that possessed by indige-
nous agents, and 2) Mestizo agents are socioeconomically more advantageous
than their indigenous counterparts. Both of these factors are consistent with
the situations in my two research communities as well as in other parts of the
two countries. As a result, Mestizo agents tend to adapt to their images of in-
digenous people with Mestizo agents more than with indigenous agents. Since
more Mestizos hold negative ideas about indigenous groups, when exchanges
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of images take place between Mestizo agents, their images tend to degrade.
Another important result from the simulations based on this population
is that the number of steps indigenous agents spend in States S, E and I is
shorter than the number when each agent’s distribution of images is narrow.
This is because of the high number of agents in States E, I and L as well as
the increasing number of Mestizo agents in state Ln. Indeed, as compared to
the scenario in 7.3a, indigenous agents tend to be surrounded by neighbors
with negative ideas about being indigenous more often. Hence, their risk of
abandoning their original ethnic identity increases. As a consequence, even
though the probability of indigenous agents to have Mestizo neighbors across
the two scenarios does not differ at first, their chance identifying themselves
as Mestizo is higher in 3b than in 3a since interactions with Mestizos with
negative images of indigenousness pressure indigenous agents to shift their
ethnic identity.
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Figure 7.3: Results from Simulation Runs with a Narrow Image Distribution at the Population Level












































Figure 7.4: Results from Simulation Runs with a Wide Image Distribution at the Population Level












































Figure 7.4 presents results from simulation runs based on the popula-
tion with a wide distribution of images of indigenous groups at the population
level. I argue that this population is similar to that of Bilwi since even among
indigenous people, the image of indigenousness differs depending on their birth-
place and the length they have lived in the municipality. In these simulation
runs, we can find several different results from those simulations based on the
narrow distribution at the population level. For example, the shift in attitudes
toward indigenous groups among Mestizo people takes place much less often
as indicated by very flat lines representing the proportion of two kinds of Mes-
tizo groups (i.e. Lp and Ln). Since the distribution is much wider in these
scenarios than the case of the previous two scenarios, the sufficient overlap of
images between two agents required for the modification occurs less frequently,
especially when individual’s definition and image of indigenousness is narrow
(7.4a). Note that in 7.4a, although the modification of images of indigenous
possessed by agents takes place infrequently, indigenous agents nevertheless
shift their ethnic identities. The number of indigenous agents who have solid-
ified their ethnic identity slightly surpasses the number of those agents who
shifted their identity from indigenous to Mestizo in 7.4a.
At the same time, we observe that when the individual level distribution
is wider (7.4b), which resembles the case of Bilwi more than the population
7.4a, the proportion of indigenous people who identify themselves as Mestizo
at the end of the simulation runs surpasses the number of indigenous people
who solidify their identity as indigenous. About 40% of indigenous agents
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shifted their ethnic identity from indigenous to Mestizo while less than 30%
of indigenous agents solidified their origin ethnic identity. It is because the
wider definition of indigenousness for each agent allows more agents to have a
sufficient overlap in images between them. Indeed, we observe that the number
of Mestizo agents with negative images of indigenousness is higher at the end
of the simulation than the number of such agents at the beginning.
As noted previously, the population presented in Figure 7.3a repre-
sents the case of Cantel most while the population in 7.4b resembles Bilwi.
The results from simulation runs based on these two populations are differ-
ent in various ways. For example, the number of indigenous agents who have
solidified their original ethnic identity is much higher in Figure 7.3a than in
7.4b. At the same time, the numbers of indigenous agents who shifted their
ethnic identity in the two cases differ only slightly. What do these findings
indicate? They suggest that when indigenous agents have a wider image of
being indigenous, they tend to see a higher probability of being able to identify
themselves with Mestizos (especially the case when the distribution of images
at the population level is narrow (7.3b)) because the modification of images
takes place often. Such agents are often pressured to shift their ethnic iden-
tity to succeed socioeconomically as well as to avoid unwanted attention and
discrimination. In a similar vein, when the individual level image distribu-
tion is wide, Mestizos’ images of indigenous groups tend to be more negative
than at the beginning because the overlaps of images happen more often when
one’s image distribution is wider. Since the shift in ethnic identity takes place
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almost always unidirectionally, from indigenous to Mestizo, and implicit dis-
crimination against indigenous groups continue to exist in both Guatemala
and Nicaragua, the more frequent modification of images of indigenous groups
tends to deteriorate the average image of being indigenous and further de-
creases the proportion of the indigenous population in these countries.
7.5 Discussion
This chapter has explored a little studied but very important aspect of
international migration in Guatemala and Nicaragua-impacts of international
migration on ethnic identity shift. The simulation runs have indicated that
the pace of ethnic identity shift among indigenous people varies considerably
depending on the distribution of ethnic images agents possess regardless of
the proportion of the indigenous population in the society. I argue that this
finding explains more the seemingly rapid rate of ethnic identity shift in Bilwi
than in Cantel. There are several reasons to believe why the distribution of
images of being indigenous is wider in Bilwi than in Cantel. First, indirectly
related to the lower proportion of the indigenous population in town, sev-
eral languages (Spanish, Miskitu, Creole English, standard American English,
and Mayangna) are spoken in Bilwi while only two (Spanish and K’iche’) are
spoken in Cantel. Furthermore, most young people in Cantel speak only Span-
ish today. The variety of languages available and more frequent inter-ethnic
contacts in Bilwi surely affects what it means to be indigenous in this town.
Hence, daily interactions in Bilwi remind its inhabitants of people’s ethnic
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backgrounds more often than the same events in Cantel.
Additionally, the existence of a large number of incoming migrants,
mostly Miskitu and Mayangna indigenous people, usually migrating from nearby
indigenous communities, who often speak little Spanish at first, lead people to
situate indigenous people at the bottom of ethnic hierarchy. Since they also
interact with people in Bilwi, residents in Bilwi tend to see indigenous as poor
and less competent both socioeconomically and culturally. This perception is
often the case among many indigenous people themselves. As a result, the
distribution of images of indigenous tends to be wider at the population level
among people in Bilwi than in Cantel since such incoming migrant flow is
nonexistent in Cantel. It is also important to realize that because the level of
educational attainment in Bilwi is considerably higher than indigenous chil-
dren in Guatemala, indigenous children are much more likely to interact with
children of other ethnic background in school. These interactions can also
threaten the further decline in the number of indigenous groups. Additionally,
the fact that Guatemalan traditional clothes can be an icon of prosperity may
be one reason why more indigenous people in Cantel maintain their ethnic
identity than their counterparts in Bilwi since these clothes are more expen-
sive than western clothes and rich indigenous women tend to wear very pricey
traditional clothes.
While the situation in Cantel appears to be better than the case in
Bilwi, indigenous cultures in Cantel are also threatened. Currently, the pace
of the ethnic identity shift is much slower in this community as compared
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to the pace in Bilwi, despite the fact that the distribution of images at the
population level seems to be narrow. This finding can be attributed to the
very high proportion of the indigenous population in this community as well
as the narrow definition of images of indigenous groups that each agent in
Cantel possesses. However, even in this municipality, the ethnic identity shift is
taking place. In the past, it occurred mainly among individuals who migrated
to Guatemala City in search of opportunities and to a lesser degree, those
who work in nearby Xela. The situation in Cantel is much different today.
More and more children attend school for a longer period of time in Cantel,
especially among children of migrant households. I found that often times,
these children attend school in Xela where they usually interact with non-
indigenous children. My interviews with people in Cantel have revealed how
fragile identity as indigenous can be when the pressure from peers is strong.
The model of ethnic identity shift and the simulation runs presented
in this chapter suggest the maintenance of ethnic identity as indigenous will
be a much more difficult task than in the past. We should also be concerned
that recent qualitative changes in inter-ethnic relations may also lead some
non-indigenous people to be hostile towards indigenous people even if they
may have had positive images of these people in the past. That is, the new
type of inter-ethnic relationship may induce a tension between indigenous and
non-indigenous groups. The increased contact between ethnic groups leads not
only indigenous, but also non-indigenous people to rethink ethnic hierarchies
and relations in a society. Economically less advantaged Mestizos are most
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likely to interact with indigenous groups in their daily lives, such interactions
may lead to the perception of abandonment among Mestizos. Therefore, if
these Mestizos show hostile attitudes toward indigenous people, indigenous
people themselves may feel more pressure to shift their ethnic identities to
free from unwanted problems. Therefore, one very serious problem of multi-
cultural reforms today is its emphasis on equality in the existence of severe
socioeconomic inequality. This problem can make the protection of indige-
nous cultures even more difficult. The rejection of the constitutional reforms
in Guatemala reflects such a difficulty (Montejo 2002).
Finally, I must admit that the model presented in the current chapter
is very simple and holds many assumptions that can be criticized such as the
choice of the distribution of images at the population level and the width of
such images for each agent, as well as parameter values used in the simula-
tion runs. The proposed model is an initial step to understand ethnic identity
change in migrants’ communities of origin and the model can be improved
or totally changed based on further empirical evidence. However, despite the
above-noted limitations, the findings presented in this chapter highlight pos-
sible hidden dangers of international migration on migrant areas of origin and
how such dangers are similar closely related to negative consequences of mul-




8.1 Impacts of International Migration on Inhabitants
of Sending Communities
International migration is an important demographic process that has
considerable impacts on socioeconomic and ethnic structures in both Guatemala
and Nicaragua. Regarding ethnicity as a fluid concept whose definition is influ-
enced by socioeconomic and cultural factors, I have argued that international
migration has a potential to affect sending communities’ ethnic structures if
it has impacts on socioeconomic structures of these communities. I posited
that such impacts are likely to exist in both Guatemala and Nicaragua where
economic impacts of international migration are so massive that economic
remittances account for more than 10% of GDP (World Bank 2006). As com-
pared to research on migrants in receiving countries, much fewer studies have
been done on impacts of international migration in sending communities and
to my knowledge, no study has examined how this important demographic
process can influence one’s ethnicity. This dissertation has explored such a
little studied area and examined the issue both indirectly through the statis-
tical analyses of the secondary data sets and directly by the fieldwork and
computational simulations. The statistical analyses presented in Chapters 4
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and 5 have examined correlation between international migration and various
socioeconomic factors.
In my fieldwork, taking into account the findings from the secondary
data analysis, I have examined how inhabitants of sending communities per-
ceive changes brought by international migration and whether or not such
changes affect their ethnic identity. I conducted the fieldwork in two munici-
palities: Cantel, Guatemala and Bilwi, Nicaragua. These municipalities share
several important aspects in common. First of all, in both municipalities, a
high proportion of ethnic minorities reside. Additionally, these municipali-
ties differ from other typical Guatemalan or Nicaraguan municipalities, which
is also one reason why ethnic minorities, especially indigenous people live in
these municipalities. I compared two municipalities of the different countries
because the situation that indigenous people face in these two countries also
differs in one very important aspect: while indigenous people in Guatemala
are wide spread across the country and each indigenous group does not inter-
act with other indigenous groups so much, the majority of indigenous people
in Nicaragua concentrate in the Atlantic region of the country and are aware
of other ethnic minorities. In the fieldwork, taking advantage of these unique
characteristics and differences, I closely examined changes brought by inter-
national migration that indigenous people in these municipalities face. In the
fieldwork, I also paid special attention to processes through which people feel
changes in socioeconomic structures, social networks and ethnic identity.
Finally, based on the findings from the fieldwork, I proposed a mecha-
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nism of ethnic identity change and tested it using computational simulations.
Even though the model is simple, it has permitted me to test how the pace of
ethnic identity shift can change by various settings. In doing so, I have explored
reasons why the pace of ethnic identity change seems different between Cantel
and Bilwi even though both municipalities have been considerably influenced
by international migration. The findings from these simulations have allowed
me to examine possible effects of international migration on ethnic structures
and what international migration means for Guatemalans and Nicaraguans in
the era of multicultural reforms. In the following section, I present a brief
review of the findings.
8.2 A Review of the Findings
In Chapters 4 and 5, I evaluated ethnic differentials in the selectivity
of international migrants and examined economic impacts of international mi-
gration in Guatemala and Nicaragua. In Chapter 4, using the demographic
censuses of the two countries, I examined how the odds of having sent migrants
abroad is correlated with various socioeconomic factors at both national level
and also, limiting the sample to the populations of Cantel and Bilwi. The re-
gression models have suggested that international migration is a socioeconom-
ically selective process in both Guatemala and Nicaragua. This result and the
fact that indigenous households are usually poorer than non-indigenous house-
holds indicated that international migration may impact inter- and intra-ethnic
relations and ethnic identity in these countries.
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The findings from the analyses of the Cantel and Bilwi samples have
shown that the disadvantage of indigenous households in sending migrants
abroad is much larger in Cantel than in Bilwi. I have argued that the smaller
gap in educational attainment across ethnic groups in Bilwi as compared to
that in Cantel and the longer history of international migration in Bilwi are
two reasons that account for the above trend. Furthermore, Chapter 4 has
shown that while indigenous households are significantly less likely to receive
economic remittances than their non-indigenous counterparts in Guatemala,
the opposite is true among households in Nicaragua. I noted that the finding
in Nicaragua may be attributable to the concentration of ethnic minorities
in the Atlantic region of the country. Indeed, once other factors, including
households’ residential location, are controlled, the advantage of indigenous
households disappears. Since households in the Atlantic region are less likely
to send migrants, I stipulated the gap in income distribution among households
in that region may be more pronounced than other regions of the country.
In Chapter 5, the main question was whether or not international mi-
gration widens a socioeconomic gap in the two countries as it may mean a wider
gap across ethnic groups. To answer this question, I focused on two factors
that are likely to be affected by international migration: income distribution
and educational attainment. The statistical analysis of the survey data sets
has indicated that economic remittances sent from abroad slightly decrease the
income inequality level among Guatemalan households. On the other hand, in
the case of Nicaragua, I found that economic remittances considerably increase
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the level of income inequality. Furthermore, the widened gap is more visible
among indigenous households as compared to non-indigenous households. I
have argued one reason for the findings among the Nicaraguan households is
that since the majority of indigenous people reside in the Atlantic region, even
using the national level data, the changes in income structure is reflected in
the analysis. In this sense, I stipulated that at the municipality level, the
level of income inequality may rise due to remittances sent by international
migration.
Chapter 5 has also shown that economic remittances affect children’s
schooling in sending countries. In Guatemala, the amount of international
remittance that a household receives significantly reduces children’s risk of
dropping out of school. In addition, international migration seems to have an
acculturation effect among indigenous households. Impacts of international re-
mittances on children’s schooling are much stronger among indigenous children
of migrant households than non-indigenous children of migrant households.
Hence, international migration may bring indigenous household not only eco-
nomic remittances, but also transmit cultures and ideas from migrant receiv-
ing countries to sending countries in the form of social remittances. These
social remittances may be taken as positive if these also affect non-migrant
households and improve their socioeconomic status. At the same time, these
resources may have led to a wider gap between migrant and non-migrant house-
holds. Therefore, it is necessary to observe and examine this point carefully.
In the case of Nicaragua, international remittances also significantly reduce
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the risk of children’s school dropout. As in the case of Guatemala, impacts of
international remittances on children’s schooling are stronger among indige-
nous children than non-indigenous children. Findings presented in Chapters 4
and 5 suggested that while both Guatemala and Nicaragua send a large num-
ber of migrants abroad and the importance of economic remittances is hard to
negate in both countries, impacts of international migration on socioeconomic
structures may differ between the two countries.
In Chapter 6, I have presented findings from my fieldwork conducted
in Cantel, Guatemala and Bilwi, Nicaragua. In both Cantel and Bilwi, non-
migrant households perceive that the level of inequality has increased since the
massive international migration took place. Indeed, the economic gap between
migrant and non-migrant households is obvious in both municipalities and peo-
ple of these municipalities experience such a gap through interactions among
them on a daily basis. Due to the widened gap felt by members of non-migrant
households, many people from these municipalities decide to migrate abroad in
search of economic opportunities. Despite the above similarities, the fieldwork
has also revealed that social status given to migrant households considerably
differs between Cantel and Bilwi. In Cantel, since a number of people do not
succeed in sending money back home from a destination country, even though
most of them pay a large sum of money to smugglers, being migrant house-
holds itself does not guarantee any position since some migrant households are
poorer than non-migrant households as they try to pay back debts. On the
other hand, to my knowledge, migrants from Bilwi are rarely deported. For
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example, unlike migrants from Cantel who are most likely to migrate to the
US, those from Bilwi have various destination countries in addition to the US
such as Costa Rica, Panama, Spain, and so on. Since most of these migrants
go to countries where they have a relative or friend, it seems the risk of de-
portation is much lower among migrants from Bilwi. Therefore, most migrant
households are economically more advantageous than non-migrant households
in Bilwi. In addition, people in Bilwi started migrating abroad during the early
1980s when the Atlantic region was the internal war zone, and many people
take advantage of social networks that have been established between Bilwi
and destination countries. On the other hand, it is until quite recently when a
considerable number of people began to migrate to the US from Cantel. While
people in Cantel often depend on their family members or acquaintances in
the US when they migrate, it is usually smugglers who guide them to their
destinations. As a result, I found a considerable gap in the success rates of
international migration between the two municipalities.
In addition, the role that the US currency plays in both municipalities
cannot be dismissed. In Bilwi, the fact that migrant households receive re-
mittances in US dollars regardless of migrants’ destination country due to the
wide availability of the US dollars gives migrants and their household members
a special position in their society since high status is given to the US currency.
The US currency is widely used in Bilwi just like other parts of Nicaragua, and
occupations that are paid in the US dollar are those that are usually well paid.
As a result, people in Bilwi tend to relate those paid with the US currency
211
with high social status. On the other hand, in Cantel, I could not find such a
special role given to the US currency.
During the fieldwork, I also found that migrant households in Cantel are
much more likely to keep their social networks that were established before they
or their household members migrated than do migrant households in Bilwi. I
posited that this is because people in Cantel use a village level residential
location for their identity while people in Bilwi uses the level that is larger
than municipality: the Atlantic region as a whole. For people in Bilwi, residing
in the Atlantic region does not indicate they are indigenous or other ethnic
minorities because there are also a large number of Mestizos who reside in the
region. Instead, people in the Atlantic region often prefer using the label “coast
people.” As a result, changing residential locations within the municipality is
emotionally much easier to achieve for people in Bilwi than their counterparts
in Cantel.
Furthermore, I have shown that international migration is likely to af-
fect ethnic markers that shape people’s ethnic identity. The difference in ethnic
markers used in Cantel and Bilwi is one reason that explains the difference in
impacts of international migration on ethnic structures in these municipalities.
Due to its ethnic composition, incoming migrant flow and relatively high ed-
ucational attainment, it is much easier for indigenous people in Bilwi to shift
their ethnic identity than those in Cantel. Besides, because of much more
frequent inter-ethnic interactions that people in Bilwi experience, I posit that
they may be more likely to feel the need to shift their identity as compared to
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those in Cantel. The fieldwork suggested that international migration is likely
to accelerate the pace of ethnic identity shift in Bilwi.
An important question explored in Chapter 6 was the process through
which such identity shift takes place. I have argued that in addition to more
frequent inter-ethnic interactions especially in Bilwi, international migration
widens the definition or image of indigenousness in both municipalities. For
example, in both Cantel and Bilwi, indigenous people tend to be very poor. At
the same time, indigenous people of migrant households may be economically
more advantageous than average households in these municipalities. Hence, for
people in the two municipalities, it becomes more difficult to equate indigenous
people with poverty. In a similar sense, international migration widens the
image of indigenousness in terms of such factors as educational attainment,
language and clothing. In this sense, it is likely that changes in the image of
indigenousness and more frequent inter-ethnic interactions complement each
other and induce further ethnic identity shift.
Since the duration of the fieldwork was limited, I could not find answers
to questions related to the ethnic identity shift that arose during the fieldwork.
To test possible mechanisms of ethnic identity change and answer the question
of why indigenous people in Bilwi are more likely to shift their ethnic identity
than people in Cantel, I ran computational simulations applying the concept
of image of ethnicity in Chapter 7. The simulation runs have indicated that
the pace of ethnic identity shift among indigenous people varies considerably
depending on the distribution of ethnic images that people possess regardless
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of the proportion of the indigenous population in a society. This finding ex-
plains why the pace of ethnic identity shift seems more rapid in Bilwi than in
Cantel: people’s definition or image of indigenous people seems to be much
wider in Bilwi than in Cantel, which means that inhabitants of Bilwi are given
more ways to shift their ethnic identity from indigenous to Mestizo and also,
more reasons to do so. In addition, since the level of educational attainment
in Bilwi is considerably higher than indigenous children in Guatemala, indige-
nous children are much more likely to interact with children of other ethnic
background in school. These interactions can also reinforce the further decline
in the number of indigenous groups.
8.3 Impacts of International Migration on Ethnic Iden-
tity
A number of scholars have studied socioeconomic and cultural impacts
of international migration in migrant receiving countries. In addition, there
are various studies that have explored such impacts in sending communities
(e.g., Acosta et al. 2008; Acosta et al. 2007; Adams 2006; Popkin 2005). It
is my contention that studying impacts of this demographic process on ethnic
structures is extremely important in countries where socioeconomic factors are
closely correlated with ethnicity related issues. In this dissertation, I have ex-
amined impacts of international migration on both socioeconomic factors and
ethnicity related issues in Guatemala and Nicaragua. I tried to understand
what international migration means for indigenous people in the two coun-
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tries who have suffered from numerous social problems for centuries. While
international migration gives unprecedented economic opportunities to many
indigenous people, it also seems to worsen existing problems in sending soci-
eties such as socioeconomic inequalities. Considering this point, my question
was whether or not international migration would be beneficial to indigenous
people and other ethnic minorities and also, if it would contribute or not to the
preservation of their culture. To analyze impacts of international migration on
the preservation of indigenous cultures, I chose to analyze ethnic identity shift
because the concept of ethnicity is fluid and in both Guatemala and Nicaragua,
the concept of indigenousness is vague.
A focus on ethnic relations and international migration in Cantel and
Bilwi led me to examine impacts of international migration on ethnic identity
shift. As the fieldwork progressed, it has become clear that international mi-
gration reinforce ethnic identity shift among indigenous peoples in Bilwi by
affecting ethnic markers utilized in that municipality. Findings in this disser-
tation have suggested that while there are indigenous households who have
achieved economic success through international migration, international mi-
gration has a potential to threaten indigenous cultures in both Guatemala
and Nicaragua. In both Guatemala and Nicaragua, there remains an implicit
but hard-to-break ethnic hierarchy. In such societies, indigenous people who
have achieved economic success may be motivated to shift their ethnic iden-
tity to avoid unwanted problems if these problems are ethnicity related ones.
This dissertation has suggested such a hidden danger is especially prevalent in
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societies such as Bilwi where inter-ethnic contacts are frequent and the defi-
nition of indigenous people is wide and vague. The wide definition or image
of indigenousness makes it easier for indigenous people in Bilwi to shift their
ethnic identity to Mestizo if they wish. Indeed, during my fieldwork, several
respondents have commented that there are Miskitu indigenous people who
have abandoned their identity as Miskitu and act like Mestizo.
Ethnic identity shift is less common in Cantel. I have argued that it is
because the image of indigenousness is much narrower than the case of Bilwi.
Residing in Cantel almost equals being indigenous for many people. And this
fact makes it more difficult for people in Cantel their identity as indigenous
even for those people who do not speak the indigenous K’iche’ language or
women who do not wear traditional indigenous clothes. At the same time,
while the situation in Cantel appears to be better as compared to the case in
Bilwi in the above sense, I have argued that indigenous cultures in Cantel are
also threatened. Even in this municipality, the ethnic identity shift seems to be
taking place. My interviews with people in Cantel have revealed how fragile a
person’s identity as indigenous can be when the pressure from peers is strong.
If the proportion of people who migrate internationally increases, more people
in Cantel may feel it necessary to shift their ethnic identity. Even though it
remains low, the level of educational attainment among children in Cantel is
also rising and such a rise may result in the accelerated pace of ethnic identity
change in the near future. This is especially true given that most students
in Cantel who attend high school need to commute to Quetzaltenango, where
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they need to encounter and interact with Ladinos.
Considering the above findings, an important question arises. Why do
changes in ethnic markers induced by international migration endanger ethnic
identity as indigenous? Literature related to neoliberal multiculturalism may
give an answer. Even though indigenous peoples seem to be given unprece-
dented rights today that were hard to imagine only a few decades ago thanks
to multicultural reforms, a hidden discrimination against indigenous peoples
and other ethnic minorities continues in both Guatemala and Nicaragua. At
the same time, because of changes that multicultural reforms bring, indigenous
peoples are more likely to interact with non-indigenous populations at a num-
ber of occasions. Since the discrimination against indigenous peoples albeit
in a more subtle way continues and indigenous people who interact with non-
indigenous people often may be motivated to shift their ethnic identity from
indigenous to Mestizo or Ladino. When the image of indigenousness is wide,
such image gives indigenous peoples more room to negotiate their identity.
It is hard to deny the fact that international migration gives indigenous
people economic opportunities that are hard to obtain through other ways.
Besides, international migration may bring sending communities’ cultures and
ideas of receiving societies that seem very positive including the importance
of formal education. At the same time, this dissertation has shown that in so-
cieties where severe socioeconomic inequality between different ethnic groups
exists and prejudice against ethnic minorities is yet hard to overcome, interna-
tional migration can have unexpectedly negative effects on ethnic minorities
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and their cultures in the long run. The above point must be taken into account
carefully in order to plan development through the use of economic remittances
at both community and national levels. This dissertation has shed light on
impacts of international migration on ethnic structures and mechanism of how
ethnic identity shift may take place. It has also emphasized the need to take
into account ethnicity related issues more carefully when examining effects of
international migration on socioeconomic, cultural, and health issues to more
accurately understand what international migration means for inhabitants of
sending countries, especially ethnic minorities.
At the beginning of this dissertation, I have argued that without exam-
ining the relationship between international migration and ethnic identity, we
cannot fully understand the meaning of international migration for Guatemala
and Nicaragua. In addition, understanding impacts of international migration
gives us a hint to construct true and robust multicultural society that encour-
ages Guatemalan and Nicaraguan indigenous people to preserve their ethnic
identity. This dissertation project has shown that the above argument is valid.
When studying impacts of international migration on multiethnic countries
like Guatemala and Nicaragua, it is not sufficient to look only at topics widely
covered in previous literature such as income distribution and educational at-
tainment. This dissertation has indicated that ethnic relations are strongly
affected by international migration in an unfavorable way: international mi-
gration tends to deteriorate situations of ethnic minorities-indigenous peoples
in the case of Guatemala and Nicaragua. This finding sounds reasonable given
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the fact that indigenous people tend to live in areas where governmental sup-
ports are least likely to reach and as a result, the increased income inequality
is easily visible and more pronounced.
In both Guatemala and Nicaragua, well-paid jobs are scarce, stimulat-
ing many to leave their countries in search of better economic opportunities.
Since this is a tough reality that the majority of indigenous people in both
Guatemala and Nicaragua face, it is difficult to prevent people from migrating
to other countries. To conserve indigenous cultures and prevent more indige-
nous people from abandoning their ethnic identities, we need to assure that
indigenous people feel pride in their cultures while they participate in national
economy and politics under the strong pressure caused by changes originating
from international migration and multicultural reforms. I have argued that
both international migration and multicultural reforms work against such a
goal. Since the trend of international migration and multicultural reforms are
difficult to be reversed, we need to work hard to find a way to make a more
equal society and also, the importance of respecting different cultures. Un-
derstanding how images of ethnicity are constructed and transformed is an
essential step to finding solutions to the above-noted dilemma and achieving
a robust multicultural society.
While I have shown that international migration may have devastating
effects on the preservation of indigenous cultures and induce ethnic identity
shift, it is necessary if such a case holds true in other countries where a large
number of ethnic minorities migrate abroad. Additional observations are also
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needed to further verify and improve the model of ethnic identity shift pre-
sented in Chapter 7. One important question that needs to be answered is why
certain ethnic groups do not show any tendency of ethnic identity shift to the
mainstream ethnic group. For example, in Bilwi, I have never hard that Creole
people change their ethnic identity to Mestizo. It may be the case that Cre-
oles in Bilwi are usually socioeconomically more advantageous than Miskitu
people and they do speak English. However, we have seen that Miskitu people
who have attained a socioeconomic upward mobility often shift their identity.
Another possibility is that the image of Creole is much narrower than that of
Miskitu.
Finally, although I have focused on how international migration mod-
ifies ethnic markers in Cantel and Bilwi, it is also possible that international
migration creates new ethnic markers since new ideas are transmitted from
receiving societies to sending societies in the form of social capital. For ex-
ample, while there are types of food that is mainly consumed by indigenous
people, none of my respondents has listed it as ethnic markers. Yet, as the
rate of migration rises and more indigenous peoples adapt to Mestizo or Ladino
food consumption patterns, what were not considered as ethnic markers in the
past may become markers that identify indigenous peoples or other ethnic mi-
norities. Further examining these points will help us to further understand
what international migration means for indigenous peoples and other ethnic





Results from Multilevel Probit Regression
Table A.1: Multilevel Probit Regression Predicting Households’ Remittance Recipient Status in Guatemala, 2006 and Nicaragua, 2005
Explanatory Variables Guatemala Nicaragua
Mean S.D. 95% HPD Mean S.D. 95% HPD
Indigenous 0.123 0.047 (0.028 0.214) -0.137 0.140 (-0.412 0.144)
Lives in Urban Area 0.404 0.051 (0.306 0.502) -0.077 0.067 (-0.207 0.055)
Female Head -0.905 0.049 (-1.001 -0.807) -0.427 0.059 (-0.537 -0.309)
Household Head’s Age 0.003 0.007 (-0.010 0.015) -0.009 0.008 (-0.025 0.007)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 (-0.000 0.000) 0.000 0.000 (-0.000 0.000)
Household Head’s Education
(None or less than Primary)
Primary Education -0.036 0.044 (-0.122 0.048) -0.063 0.059 (-0.170 0.052)
Post-Primary Education 0.006 0.065 (-0.124 0.129) -0.143 0.081 (-0.302 0.014)
Male Members Aged 15+ 0.104 0.022 (0.061 0.149) 0.051 0.025 (0.004 0.100)
Female Members Aged 15+ -0.079 0.021 (-0.121 -0.036) 0.003 0.028 (-0.049 0.055)
Male Members Under 15 -0.027 0.015 (-0.055 0.004) -0.002 0.023 (-0.044 0.043)
Female Members Under 15 -0.056 0.016 (-0.088 -0.023) -0.016 0.023 (-0.060 0.029)
Household’s Asset Index -0.137 0.011 (-0.158 -0.117) -0.175 0.017 (-0.207 -0.144)
Region (Guatemala)
(Metropolitan Area)
North -0.177 0.116 (-0.396 0.055)
Northeast -0.285 0.088 (-0.453 -0.117)
Southeast -0.359 0.098 (-0.554 -0.168)
Central 0.089 0.088 (-0.091 0.254)
Southwest -0.469 0.087 (-0.634 -0.290)
Northwest -0.745 0.109 (-0.955 -0.524)
Peten -0.473 0.126 (-0.721 -0.244)
Region (Nicaragua)
(Managua)
Pacific -0.247 0.180 (-0.570 0.123)
Central 0.120 0.176 (-0.211 0.497)
Atlantic 0.364 0.194 (-0.005 0.729)





1. Caracteŕıstica del hogar
Experiencia de migración
No. de miembros que está viviendo en el hogar
No. de miembros que está viviendo en otro lugar dentro del páıs
No. de ex-migrante internal que está viviendo aqúı actualmente
No. de miembros que está viviendo en otro páıs
No. de ex-migrante internacional que está viviendo aqúı actualmente
Caracteŕıstica del hogar
Sexo de jefe de hogar Masculino Femenino
No. de miembros del hogar Total Masculino Femenino
No. de niños 0 - 5
No. de niños 6 - 14





No. de cuartos solo para negocio
Material de piso 0 Tierra 1 Madera 2 Cemento 3 Otro:
especifique
Agua 0 Tubeŕıa dentro del hogar
1 Tubeŕıa fuera del hogar pero dentro del terreno
2 Tubeŕıa fuera del terreno 3 Sin tubeŕıa
4 Otro: especifique
Medio para cocinar 0 Leña o carbón 1 Gas 2 Electricidad
3 Otro: especifique 4 Ninguno
Sanitario 0 Inodoro conectado a red de drenajes
1 Inodoro conectado a fosa séptica








Cable para TV Śı No
Satelite para TV Śı No
Computadora Śı No
Internet Śı No
Telefono (fijo) Śı No





2. Caracteŕıstica de miembros del hogar
Nombres y Apellidos
Sexo del jefe Masculino Femenino
Edad del jefe año de nacimiento
Lugar de nacimiento Esta municipalidad Otro:
Lugar de nacimiento de madre Esta municipalidad Otro:
Lugar de nacimiento de padre Esta municipalidad Otro:
Lugar de vivienda anterior N/A Otro municipio:
Otro páıs: especifique
Estado civil 0 soltero 1 union libre 2 Separado
3 Divorciado 4 viudo 5 casado
Si está casado... 0 Sólo civil 1 sólo ceremonia religiósa
2 ambos
etnicidad de esposa 0 Ladino/Mestizo 1 Ind́ıgena 2 Otro
Si ind́ıgena o Otro... especifique etnicidad
Etnicidad 0 Ladino/Mestizo 1 Ind́ıgena 2 Otro
Si ind́ıgena o Otro... especifique etnicidad
Habla lengua ind́ıgena? Śı: especifique No
Habla español Śı No
¿Viste traje tradicional? (solo Guatemala) Śı No
Religión 0 Catolico 1 Evangelico 2 Moravo
3 Otro: especifique 4 Ninguno
Nivel de Educación 0 Ninguno or o menos que primaria 1 primaria
2 primaria completa 3 secondaria
4 Secondaria completa 5 Post-secondaria
Si primaria o secundaria... especifique el año más alto
Año escolar total
Está asistiendo a escuela actualmente? Śı No
Si śı, tipo de escuela 0 publica 1 privada 2 otro: especifique
Primer empleo
Horas que trabajó la semana pasada
salario (frequencia) 0 por hora 1 semanal 2 quincenal 3 mensual 4 otro
salario (cantidad)
Segundo empleo
Horas que trabajó la semana pasada
salario (frequencia) 0 por hora 1 semanal 2 quincenal 3 mensual 4 Otro
salario (cantidad)
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3. Miembros del hogar que no están en el hogar (pregunte al jefe de hogar)
No. Nombre Relación con Sexo Edad Año de primera destino Año de última destino











Codigo de páıs: 1. dentro del páıs 2. EE.UU: 3. Costa Rica 4. México 5. Otro: especifique
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4. Migrantes retornados (preguntas para migrantes retornados)
Nombres y Apellidos
Edad de migración
Duración de permanencia años y meses)
Destino dentro del páıs EE.UU. Costa Rica Mexico
Otro: especifique
Estaba casado/a cuando migró? Śı No
Estudiaba en el destino? Śı No
Hablaba inglés cuando migró? Śı No
Habla inglés ahora? Śı No
Estado de visa cuando migró Con visa vigente sin visa vigente
Usó coyote? Śı No
Si śı, cuanto pagó? dollares/quetzales/córdobas
Trajo dinero a su casa? Śı No
Si śı, cuanto? dollares/quetzales/córdobas
Nombres y Apellidos
Edad de migración
Duración de permanencia años y meses)
Destino dentro del páıs EE.UU. Costa Rica Mexico
Otro: especifique
Estaba casado/a cuando migró? Śı No
Estudiaba en el destino? Śı No
Hablaba inglés cuando migró? Śı No
Habla inglés ahora? Śı No
Estado de visa cuando migró Con visa vigente sin visa vigente
Usó coyote? Śı No
Si śı, cuanto pagó? dollares/quetzales/córdobas
Trajo dinero a su casa? Śı No
Si śı, cuanto? dollares/quetzales/córdobas
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5. Remesa económica
Algun miembro ha mandado dinero o paquete Śı No (pase a No. 8. “remesa social”)
desde cuando salió
Si śı, su relación con usted es... 0 Esposa 1 hijo/a 2 nieto/a 3 padre/madre
4 Otro: especifique
Que ha mandado?
Como recib́ıo dinero 0 Western Union 1 MoneyGram 2 Banco 3 cajero automático
4 Otro: especifique
Normalmente gasta o ahorra el dinero que recibe? 0 gasta 1 ahorra 2 ambos 3 Otro: especifique
Si gasta, para cual? 0 deuda 1 alimento 2 ropa 3 educación 4 negocio
5 Inversión 6 Otro: especifique
En caso de negocio o inversión:
tipo de negocio
año de formación
año de venta o clausura
6. Remesa social (preguntas para jefe de hogar)
Cada cuanto tiempo recibe noticia de miembros de su hogar? Diario semanal mensual
Otro: especifique
NOMBRE comunica con otro miembros del hogar o amigos? Śı No
La frecuencia de su communicación ha cambiado desde cuando NOMBRE salió? Śı No
En el curso de años desde la salida de NOMBRE ,
ha NOMBRE venido a la casa para vistar? Śı No
Si śı, cuantas veces ha NOMBRE venido y por cuanto tiempo?
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7. Imágen de etnicidad
Ahora, voy a presentar perfiles de 16 personas. Imaǵınese usted es esta persona y digame
si usted se identifica como ind́ıgena o no y también, como costeño/a o no.
1. Habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Los dos padres son ind́ıgena. No creció en la región.
No vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
2. Habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Uno o los dos padres no son ind́ıgena. Creció en la
región. Vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
3. No habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Uno o los dos padres no son ind́ıgena. No creció
en la reǵıon. No vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
4. No habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Los dos padres son ind́ıgena. No creció en la reǵıon.
No vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
5. No habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Uno o los dos padres no son ind́ıgena. Creció en la
reǵıon. No vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
6. Habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Los dos padres son ind́ıgena. Creció en la región. No
vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
7. Habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Uno o los dos padres no son ind́ıgena. Creció en la
región. No vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
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8. Habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Los dos padres son ind́ıgena. No creció en la región.
Vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
9. No habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Uno o los dos padres no son ind́ıgena. Creció en la
reǵıon. Vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
10. No habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Uno o los dos padres no son ind́ıgena. No creció
en la reǵıon. Vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
11. No habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Los dos padres son ind́ıgena. Creció en la región.
Vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
12. No habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Los dos padres son ind́ıgena. Creció en la reǵıon.
No vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
13. No habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Los dos padres son ind́ıgena. No creció en la
reǵıon. Vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
14. Habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Los dos padres son ind́ıgena. Creció en la región.
Vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
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15. Habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Uno o los dos padres no son ind́ıgena. No creció en
la región. Vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
16. Habla el idioma ind́ıgena. Uno o los dos padres no son ind́ıgena. No creció en
la región. No vive en la región ahora.
Ind́ıgena No-ind́ıgena No sabe
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